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Billions of people in the world live under heavy information censorship. We propose a
new class of delay tolerant network (DTN), known as a censorship tolerant network (CTN),
to counter the growing practice of Internet-based censorship. CTNs should provide strict
guarantees on the privacy of both information shared within the network and the identities
of network participants. CTN software needs to be publicly available as open source
software and run on personal mobile devices with real-world computational, storage, and
energy constraints. We show that these simple assumptions and system constraints have a
non-obvious impact on the design and implementation of CTNs, and serve to differentiate
our system design from previous work.
We design data routing within a CTN using a new paradigm: one where nodes operate
selfishly to maximize their own utility, make decisions based only on their own observations,
and only communicate with nodes they trust. We introduce the Laissez-faire framework,
an incentivized approach to CTN routing. Laissez-faire does not mandate any specific
routing protocol, but requires that each node implement tit-for-tat by keeping track of the
data exchanged with other trusted nodes. We propose several strategies for valuing and
retrieving content within a CTN. We build a prototype BlackBerry implementation and
conduct both controlled lab and field trials, and show how each strategy adapts to different
network conditions. We further demonstrate that, unlike existing approaches to routing,
Laissez-faire prevents free-riding.
We build an efficient and reliable data transport protocol on top of the Short Message
Service (SMS) to serve a control channel for the CTN. We conduct a series of experi-
ments to characterise SMS behaviour under bursty, unconventional workloads. This study
examines how variables such as the transmission order, delay between transmissions, the
network interface used, and the time-of-day affect the service. We present the design and
implementation of our transport protocol. We show that by adapting to the unique channel
conditions of SMS we can reduce message overheads by as much as 50% and increase data
throughput by as much as 545% over the approach used by existing applications.
A CTN’s dependency on opportunistic communication imposes a significant burden on
smartphone energy resources. We conduct a large-scale user study to measure the energy
consumption characteristics of 20,100 smartphone users. Our dataset is two orders of mag-
nitude larger than any previous work. We use this dataset to build the Energy Emulation
v
Toolkit (EET) that allows developers to evaluate the energy consumption requirements
of their applications against real users’ energy traces. The EET computes the successful
execution rate of energy-intensive applications across all users, specific devices, and spe-
cific smartphone user-types. We also consider active adaptation to energy constraints. By
classifying smartphone users based on their charging characteristics we demonstrate that
energy level can be predicted within 72% accuracy a full day in advance, and through an
Energy Management Oracle energy intensive applications, such as CTNs, can adapt their
execution to maintain the operation of the host device.
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Freedom is the right of all sentient beings.
— Optimus Prime
1.1 Introduction
Billions of people in the world live under heavy information censorship [40, 150, 194].
Countries such as China, Saudi Arabia, and Iran practice strict filtering of Internet con-
tent [22]. These countries are also quick to tighten such filters during periods of social
unrest. China in particular continues to reinforce its “Great Firewall of China” and is
working to remove all anonymity from Internet and cell phone usage [8, 88]. In Iran, blog-
ging against the government can come with a penalty of over 19 years [189]. Uzbekistan,
Syria, Morocco, Vietnam, among others, have enhanced their censorship to stifle the echoes
of the revolutions agitating the Arab world [17, 170, 178, 198].
Currently, one out of every three Internet users is unable to access the free Internet. Net
censorship is evolving from a practice of repressive regimes to the norm. Approximately 60
countries are implementing some form of Internet censorship, which entails either content
filtering or harassment of citizens based on their Internet usage behaviour [89]. Figure 1.1
illustrates the world map of censorship.
Other countries are expected to begin the practice in the months and years to come.
For the first time, Bangladesh has blocked access to certain sites because of videos deemed
offensive to their religion [152]. Cambodia is censoring news sites that are critical of the
Cambodian ruling party [79]. Even India is moving beyond the censorship of ‘obscenity’
and beginning to target social networks to remove content deemed ‘offensive’ [165].
Several software systems have emerged to resist the growth of censorship [38, 44, 55,
190, 191]. These communication systems are often highly distributed to provide both
robustness to attack and scale to large numbers of users, and utilize some form of public
key infrastructure (PKI) to provide communication privacy [155].
Unfortunately, even these systems can be easily blocked by governments due to their use
Internet-based infrastructure [27]. Directed by a repressive government, Internet service
providers can easily block access to the IP addresses of anti-censorship services. It is
also conceivable that in the future repressive regimes may regard using censorship-evasive
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Figure 1.1: World map of censorship. Image courtesy of Reporters Without Borders [150].
systems as an offence in itself. We therefore introduce, in addition to robustness, scalability,
and privacy, a fourth tenet of censorship resistance: unlinkability. Unlinkability requires
that no central authority is able to determine that two entities are communicating with each
other [155]. This definition of unlinkability is stronger than the definition of unlinkability
commonly used in security literature [140]. The weaker definition requires that no central
authority is able to determine that two end-points are communicating with each other. The
Tor system, for example, which routes messages through internationally dispersed onion
routers, satisfies this weaker definition [44].
Not surprisingly, strong unlinkability is impossible to achieve in Internet-based systems
due to their inherent use of infrastructure, which can easily be monitored by the government
or a sufficiently compliant Internet service provider [154]. However, mobile ad hoc networks
trivially achieve unlinkability due to the fact that any two nodes can create a network
anywhere and at any time. Robustness and privacy are also trivially achieved. However,
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mobile ad hoc networks trade-off scalability for unlinkability, and are only practical for
small groups of users.
We claim that the only way to achieve complete censorship resistance is through a
delay tolerant network (DTN), where geographically dispersed personal mobile devices are
used to disseminate censored content to interested parties. However, to the best of our
knowledge, censorship resistance has never been considered in DTNs.
This thesis proposes a new class of DTN that we call a censorship tolerant network
(CTN) that strictly adheres to the four tenets of censorship resistance. While DTNs have
conventionally been designed to provide connectivity to the geographical fringes of the
world [45, 66, 85, 137], CTNs are targeted for average smartphone users with real-world
resource constraints.
1.2 Censorship Tolerant Networking
DTNs have conventionally been designed to provide network connectivity to developing
regions [25]. These networks are typically owned and operated by a single entity, such as
a non-government organization (NGO) or a research group, which has the authority to
regulate the operational behaviour of the network’s constituent nodes. In these networks,
nodes operate according to prescribed protocols to maximize the aggregate utility of the
network. Attempts have been made to create DTNs for average smartphone users [144,
176]; however, these networks continue to force nodes to selflessly, and therefore, in our
opinion, irrationally, expend limited resource for the sole benefit of others.
Given the resource constraints of personal mobile devices [129], (energy being the most
significant constraint [52, 130]), resources must be rationed. We believe that rational users
are unlikely to expend limited resource to carry messages on behalf of other users without
a future expected benefit, even if the resources are used to disseminate censored, valuable
content. As designers of an autonomous mobile system, the assumption that users are
selfish and do not want their devices’ resources depleted unfairly has a significant influence
on our system design. However, as we will discuss later in this chapter, users that are less
sensitive to resource expenditures may simply ignore mechanisms to ensure fairness and
expend resources as they see wish.
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A CTN must satisfy both the strict criteria of censorship resistance: robustness, scal-
ability, privacy, and unlinkability [155], and respect the needs of rational users. This
introduces the following design constraints:
• Identity privacy: The network must ensure that no non-trusted third party is able
to determine the contents of a message exchanged between two mutually trusted
nodes. Moreover, a node cannot learn the identity of another node unless they
mutually trust each other.
• Infrastructure-independence: The network must operate independent of com-
munication infrastructure and servers on the Internet. However, communication
infrastructure may be used for direct node-to-node communication to reduce delay
in retrieving content and improve network QoS. This requirement implicitly provides
robustness and unlinkability.
• Openness: The effectiveness of a CTN is proportional to node density. To encourage
deployment, the operation of the network must be transparent to all users, including
free-riders. We consider the ability to distribute the source code without negative
consequences to be a necessary condition of the network’s openness. In Chapter 2 we
show that prior DTN work is ill-equipped to operate under this design constraint.
• No specified forwarding protocol: As a consequence of openness, nodes must be
free to allocate/expend resources and forward messages in a manner that maximizes
their own utility. Nodes within a CTN are only be required to implement a standard
pairwise tit-for-tat protocol.
• Deployability: The network must be incrementally deployable and not require a
central authority to authorize membership or verify identity.
• Participation fluidity: The network must allow nodes to enter or exit the CTN at
any time. Independent CTNs should be able to merge or separate as participation
in the network fluctuates.
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1.2.1 Use cases
We envision two main use cases for this work.
The technical savvy activist
Internet censorship1 is a continual arms race between governments blocking content and
those that pursue it. Fortunately, there exist citizens of many countries that are able to
circumvent government censorship [8, 150] and download content to their computer and
subsequently their personal mobile device. In the pursuit of spreading censored content
through a country, we believe that these users will be the proverbial ‘patient zero’.
Imagine the following scenario. A technical savvy individual in Iran, which we’ll call
Casper, connects to VPN server outside of the country on a daily basis to download the
daily news from balatarin.com (a popular Persian blog that is currently blocked by Iran
due to its role in pro-democracy movements [134]). While visiting the site, Casper down-
loads a compressed archive of the daily news onto their computer and transfers it to his
mobile device.
Casper has many friends both at work and in the neighbourhood. On the way to
work Casper stops at a coffee shop frequented by friends. These friends are trusted and
share the same pro-democracy interests. While sharing a coffee, Casper’s device detects
the smartphones of his friends, and connects to each of them. His friends’ devices vibrate
signaling that new content has been discovered. Upon examination of their devices they
see that Casper’s device contains the latest digest of Balatarin! As avid readers, they all
select the item for download. While Casper’s device is connected to one of his friends’
devices, the content is transferred to them. He then leaves causing a subsequent download
to be broken. His friends, who trust each other, continue downloading the content from
each other while they continue to be collocated in the coffee shop.
At work, Casper only trusts a select few coworkers, none of which desire political news.
Upon arrival these coworker quickly learn of Casper’s news, but do not download the
content. One of them happens to be well connected and trusts many coworkers that do
1Internet censorship may be imposed throughout the Internet, from tier 1 ISPs down to home gateways.
However, the term generally refers to state-mandated Internet censorship.
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desire political content. Upon discovery of fresh political content, they want it! However,
since Casper does not know who they are, and obviously does not trust them, he cannot
deliver the desire content to them. Instead, the intermediate mutually trusted coworker
retrieves the content from Casper, stores it, and eventually delivers it to the requesting
coworker. Through this process, both the trusted intermediate coworker and requester
possess a copy of the censored content.
We envision that this daily process could be used to disseminate enormous quantities
of censored content throughout a population.
Viral content
Restricting a country’s Internet and cellular communication infrastructure during periods
of civil unrest is an effective means of inhibiting a population from organizing protests and
other forms of social disobedience [154]. Shutting down communication infrastructure fur-
ther prevents citizens from uploading inflammatory (to the government) content to services
such as YouTube, Flickr, Facebook, etc., which can, and often does, spark international
outrage and condemnation. The 2009 shooting of Iranian Neda Agha-Soltan is a perfect,
but tragic, example of such an event [74]. Her death, captured via cellphone and uploaded
to YouTube, went ‘viral’ on the Internet, shocking the world and putting a face on the
pro-democracy, Iranian election protests.
Tragedies of a similar magnitude probably take place everyday, are witnessed and cap-
tured by some, but are blocked from the Internet. These tragedies therefore never reach
the masses and are highly unlikely to ever force political change. We envision a system
that allows citizens with personal mobile devices to share content on a mass scale, inde-
pendent of government control and censorship of the Internet or cellular communication
infrastructure.
1.2.2 Usage assumptions
Based on these two use cases, we envision that CTN nodes will fall into one of two general









Figure 1.2: Resource-sensitivity spectrum
Highly asymmetric
Highly asymmetric deployments are those with a small number of content producers and
a large number of content consumers. We envision that these deployments will arise as a
result of activism in the form of citizen journalism. These content gateways are assumed
to place higher utility on sharing and disseminating information than they do on the
resources needed to share the content, and the time and effort to retrieve the content from
the Internet or produce it themselves. In practice, we believe that content gateways will
be the primary reason for users to participate in a CTN - particularly if the gateways are
producing original content that cannot be legally or safely shared openly on the Internet.
Nodes that communicate with, and receive censored content from, a node operating as
a content gateway must be trusted by the content gateway (a topic we address in detail in
Chapter 4). Although these nodes are free to withhold or further disseminate the content
received from a gateway, we believe that nodes that are trusted by a content gateway will
themselves operate as sub-content gateways. That is, like content gateways, these nodes
place higher utility on sharing and disseminating content, perhaps to a lesser degree, than
on the resources needed to share the content. In the absence of a hierarchy of sub-content
gateways, content would not propagate beyond the first set of consumers.
Symmetric
We believe that content gateways will be instrumental in getting content from the Internet
into a CTN. However, we further assume that the bulk of content will be exchanged in
symmetric deployments, where most nodes are sharing and retrieving content from each
other. Although we make no assumptions on how content should propagate through a
CTN, for content to reach the maximum number of users, it must be shared among what
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we generally refer to as average smartphone users. These are users that use smartphones
as their personal computing device, and are comfortable installing applications on their
device.
We expect average smartphone users participating in a CTN to be highly diverse in
their goals for the system and their sensitivity to the resources consumed in the pursuit
of these goals. Users may be categorized based on their position in a resource-sensitivity
spectrum, as illustrated in Figure 1.2 and defined by the following two extremes:
• Insensitive to resource costs: In a CTN, users that are insensitive to resource
costs and prefer to spread content to as many people as possible are content activists.
From the perspective of resource allocation, these nodes are considered to be highly
altruistic.
Nodes exhibiting similar characteristics are frequently observed in existing Internet-
based peer-to-peer networks [33, 60, 188]. Although their apparent altruism is often
rewarded by, for example, an increase in gross data from peers [188] or increased
traffic to a website [42]. As we will discuss in Chapter 2, nodes in existing mobile
systems generally resemble content activists.
• Sensitive to resource costs: At the other end of the resource-sensitivity spectrum
are casual users. We assume that casual users value the content that they receive
through the CTN and allow resources to be consumed; however, we further assume
that they value the resources needed to maintain their normal use of the device
and expect a reciprocal benefit for any resource expenditure. Casual users will not
expend resources to share content with others without an expectation of receiving a
commensurate quantity of content in return.
Nodes exhibiting similar sensitivity to resource expenditure have been observed in
Internet-based peer-to-peer systems [28, 133]. In these systems, nodes only contribute
as much bandwidth resources as they receive. Though this approach is more “fair”,
the resulting performance is often far from optimal. In particular, these nodes can
create asymmetric links and livelock in a network if reciprocal content cannot be
provided to them.
Users that reside beyond the casual user end of the spectrum, that are not willing to
reciprocate the resource expenditure of other nodes to an equal degree, are considered
free-riders.
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Although there is evidence to support the claim that users may exist at both extremes
of the resource-sensitivity spectrum, to the best of our knowledge, no prior work tackles
the problem outlined in this thesis (a topic that we further discuss in Chapter 2). In the
absence of evidence supporting how future users would be distributed within the spectrum,
we engineer for the latter, most rigid usage scenario where users expect a reciprocal benefit
from any resource expenditure. Users that are less sensitive, or fully insensitive, to resources
may simply ignore, or partially ignore, resource costs and share content without restriction.
A CTN consisting exclusively of resource-conservative, selfish, casual users may not be
successful. If demand is not expressed uniformly over the network, nodes that reach the
resource allocation limits of other nodes will be starved of subsequent content. Although
these nodes may be detrimental to the operation of a CTN, their presence and expecta-
tions cannot be ignored. In Section 5.4 we conduct simulations that consist of resource-
conservative casual users. In Section 5.5 we further evaluate resource-conservative casual
users, however, their resource allocation limits are set sufficiently high that their behaviour
is indistinguishable from content activists during the course of the experiment.
1.2.3 A non-networked approach
The goal of this work is not just to build a mobile system, but rather to empower society
by resisting, if not defeating, information censorship. There are clearly many ways for
censored content to be exchanged. Simple content could simply be printed and widely
broadcast as leaflets throughout a region. Richer content could be written to CDs or
DVDs and covertly exchanged or anonymously distributed. These techniques are ideal for
broadcasting a fixed set of content to a large audience; however, it does not scale to support
the dissemination of an arbitrary set of content.
USB keys allow arbitrary content to be stored and exchanged at will. Although the
point-to-point ‘bandwidth’ between two people exchanging USB keys is very high, this
approach does not utilize all of the ‘connection’ opportunities that may exist with other
individuals that are, for example, friends-of-friends; increasing the connection opportunities
in the system increases its capacity to exchange content. Moreover, the content owned and
demanded by the population is likely to be highly diverse [59, 98] and would greatly exceed
the capacity of a single USB key. This would require many USB keys and some form of
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metadata on the keys governing the state of the shared USB media. We believe that this
approach is unrealistic and impractical.
1.3 Threat model
CTNs are designed to broadly circumvent Internet censorship, which may be enforced at
various points on the Internet - from the home Internet gateway to tier 1 ISPs. The
penalties for violating Internet censorship vary widely; the most significant penalties are
those resulting from violating state-mandated censorship [150]. The state is therefore
regarded as the primary, most capable attacker.
Limiting access to content is an efficient means of controlling a population and inhibiting
social, economic, or political change [150]. Although the act of viewing censored content
may be benign, the act of seeking, sharing, or producing content that would be censored,
can be regarded as a threat to the state. Websites that advocate democracy, human rights,
social justice, etc. are prime examples of this form of content. Individuals violating state-
mandated censorship may consequently be considered a threat to the state. Determining
the identity of individuals that violate state-mandated censorship is therefore the main
asset of interest to attackers.
1.3.1 Capabilities of an attacker
We assume the attackers of a CTN have the following capabilities. In Chapter 8 we
will review a CTNs ability to protect the identity of users while subject to each attacker
capability.
Internet-monitoring
Attackers have the ability to monitor and control all Internet communications flows both
within the country and crossing its borders. Attackers have the ability to perform deep
packet inspection on all non-encrypted traffic, and allow or deny any communication flow.
Since most states do not operate their own Internet infrastructure, we assume that ISPs
operating within state boundaries are fully compliant with the demands of the state.
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Although many regimes are subject to trade embargoes that inhibit the sale of computer
hardware capable of enforcing Internet censorship, these embargoes can be circumvented
by routing the hardware through countries sympathetic to censorship, such as Dubai [187].
Locate end-hosts
Complicit ISPs can further provide an attacker the physical location of an IP address
allocated to a subscriber. Through this capability, attackers are able to quickly locate and
detain any Internet subscriber that accesses censored content within its borders.
Regulate access to public Internet access points
Attackers have the ability to regulate how public Internet access points, such as those in
coffee shops, restaurants, hotels, libraries, Internet cafes, and airports, are accessed. For
example, the Chinese government requires that all public Internet access points identify
users of their network [18]. This is easily accomplished by requiring users to provide their
cell phone number, where a text message can be sent with an access code.
Isolated monitoring
We assume that an attacker has the ability to monitor short-range wireless communication
between devices in a specific set of venues. This can be accomplished by a laptop passively
collecting packets, or by dedicated monitoring hardware. An attacker can, for example,
monitor all communication within popular venues, and subsequently identify communi-
cation patterns between users. We further assume that attackers with the capability of
monitoring a region are also capable of flooding the spectrum and blocking all communi-
cation. We further assume that it is currently not economically feasible for an attacker to
monitor all short-range wireless communication throughout a large region.
Infiltrate social networks
We assume that attackers or agents of an attacker, operating under duress or of their
own volition, have the ability to infiltrate existing social networks. That is, agents of
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an attacker may earn the trust of existing CTN users, and thereby discover information
about the network or content within it that would otherwise be private. Attackers that
subsequently leave the CTN take all of the discovered information with them.
Physical harm
Unfortunately, the most repressive regimes in the world have the capability to indefinitely
detain or execute its citizens [189]. Through this capability, we assume that an attacker
that has identified a user in a CTN has the ability to extract all information known to the
user. This information, unfortunately, includes the identities of other trusted nodes.
1.4 Contributions
We make three major contributions in this thesis.
• An architecture for CTNs
In Chapter 3 we define a set of design principles for opportunistic communication
that are derived from prior work. Following these principles, we present a practical
architecture for a CTN in Chapter 4. In addition to satisfying the censorship resis-
tance criteria, our architecture tightly couples network content with node demand
and facilitates a pairwise accounting scheme that is not present in existing DTN
systems.
Chapter 5 motivates and defines the Laissez-faire framework, a free-rider tolerant
approach to CTN routing. We believe that the simplicity of Laissez-faire will serve
as the foundation for future DTNs targeted for average smartphone users. We im-
plement the Laissez-faire framework within a prototype CTN system and evaluate
Laissez-faire across a cluster of smartphones using a custom-built experimentation
platform. Although Laissez-faire does not mandate any specific routing behaviour, we
propose several practical strategies for retrieving content fragments. We demonstrate
the trade-offs between strategies and the behaviour of Laissez-faire under varying net-
work conditions and in a three-week field trial.
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• SMS-based control channel
We characterise the channel characteristics of the Short Message Service (SMS) and
design and implement an efficient SMS-based data transport protocol that we call
SMS-TP in Chapter 6. SMS-TP provides reliable data transport while attempting
to minimize message overhead and maximize data throughput of data transfers. We
have implemented SMS-TP as a stand-alone library in Java Micro Edition. Our
implementation is compliant with the Java Connected Limited Device Configuration
(CLDC) and can therefore be embedded into a wide range of applications running on
Java enabled cell phones, smartphones, and PC environments (using a USB tethered
cell phone). Our protocol significantly outperforms existing, available, alternatives.
We show that by adapting to the unique channel conditions of SMS, SMS-TP can
reduce message overhead by as much as 50% and increase data throughput by as much
as 545% over the existing method used by existing mobile applications to exchange
large amounts of data over SMS.
This work has been published as [127].
• Characterization of energy consumption behaviour of smartphone users
We study the smartphone usage and energy consumption characteristics of 20,100 Black-
Berry smartphone users in Chapter 7. Using this energy traces within this dataset,
we build the Energy Emulation Toolkit. This toolkit allows developers of energy in-
tensive applications to test their applications’ energy consumption behaviour against
existing energy traces. Developers may then alter their design or tune algorithm
parameters to reduce energy consumption and ensure that their application does not
deplete users’ batteries.
We further classify smartphone users into one of three groups according to their
unique energy consumption characteristics. We demonstrate that energy level can
be predicted to within 7% error within an hour and within 28% error a full day in
advance. Using our prediction algorithm, we build the Energy Management Oracle
library. By querying the library before executing an energy intensive operation,
applications can adapt their execution to achieve a near optimal successful execution
rate.







This chapter surveys prior work in content sharing between mobile devices. Prior
work does not satisfy our design goals. This chapter further surveys prior work related to
building a CTN.
2.1 Mobile content sharing
The idea of sharing content between mobile devices is not new. The ability the exchange
content directly between two devices safely and reasonably securely is available on nearly
every mobile device today. Using Bluetooth for unidirectional content dissemination has
been widely discussed [100, 101, 104]. However, this practice requires more manual user
intervention and does not scale to allow content to move between potentially non-trusted
nodes.
Several BitTorrent clients have been ported to mobile environments that allow mobile
devices to download content while within Wi-Fi coverage [10, 39]. This method operates
the same as in the desktop setting, with the addition of the resource constraints of the
mobile device. We dismiss BitTorrent (in its conventional form) prima facie as a means to
share censored content due to its reliance on Internet-based infrastructure.
Decentralized forms of BitTorrent have been explored, where mobile devices exchange
content over short-range wireless technologies such as Bluetooth or Wi-Fi, leaving no trace
of the data that was exchanged. In BlueTorrent devices exchange fragments of data while
connected in a Bluetooth piconet [86]. A similar idea where data fragments are exchanged
between cars is presented in CarTorrent [102, 116]. In practice, the set of content that
may be available on a mobile device or vehicle is highly diverse [98], so it is unlikely that
peers would ever inadvertently retrieve partial files from each other. Instead peers with
content would act as distribution nodes, and others would simply retrieve the content that
is available via a single hop. Neither BlueTorrent nor CarTorrent satisfy the criteria of
censorship resistance.
McNamara et al. examine the problem of maximizing the chances of a successful
content download during an opportunistic connection [113]. Transferring content such as
songs or movies takes time and consumes valuable resources. To maximize the chance of a
successful download, the authors argue that users should identify neighbouring devices that
possess desirable content and will remain within range long enough to make a successful
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data exchange. They propose a user-centric prediction scheme that collects historical
collocation information to determine the best sources of content. This method operates by
filtering out neighbouring devices that do not contain content of interest and then ranks
contacts in decreasing order according to an estimated remaining collocation time. The
device then connects to the top ranked neighbouring device to retrieve a summary of files to
download. If the summary contains at least one desirable file, and the predicted remaining
collocation time is longer than the estimated time to download the file, then the transfer
begins. The prediction technique that underlies this method operates by continuously
scanning for nearby devices. Devices that are encountered often are classified as ‘familiar
strangers’ [117] and a ‘personalized profile’ is maintained for that device. Each profile
contains the mean collocation time for the device for each time slice within some time
period. On subsequent encounters with these familiar devices, the mean collocation time
of the current time slice is used to estimate from the remaining collocation time. For
devices that are not familiar, i.e. a newly encountered device, a global mean collocation
time is used for that time slice to predict the remaining collocation time.
The authors evaluate their technique using a simulation derived from a dataset consist-
ing of over one millions trips on the London Underground1 by users carrying Bluetooth-
enabled devices. They simulate music collections on these mobile devices from a sample
of 500,000 users of a popular online “social music” website, Last.fm. The probability that
two simulated devices share the same interests in music, and thus make an exchange, is
proportional to its popularity within the Last.fm dataset. Their simulation shows that
using their prediction technique, which only transfers with contacts with sufficiently long
collocation periods, has a success rate of 80%; a 50% improvement over exchanges made
with random contacts. Moreover, with perfect knowledge of future collocations, a success
rate of 100% is not achievable. They found that with perfect knowledge, roughly 20% of
transfers are wasted (incomplete exchanges of files), and that prediction improves efficiency
by only 18%. They show that due to the initiation threshold employed by the prediction
and perfect knowledge methods, less Bluetooth congestion is present, and subsequently
more songs are collected on each simulated device.
McNamara et al. focus solely on single hop exchanges of content, which avoids complex
incentive mechanisms: a simple tit-for-tat approach would be sufficient in this scenario.
1The subway system uses RFID tags to facilitate easy payment and faster movement through the ticket
checkpoints, which allows them to track when a passenger enters and exits the subway system.
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However, single hop exchanges could limit the overall quantity of data exchanged between
devices and thus underutilize the wireless capacity between devices. It remains an open
question if disseminating data as diverse as songs and videos through a single hop is more
efficient than multiple hops. Their scheme works under the assumption that people have
a high degree of regularity in their movements and that while traveling on city public
transport a non-negligible set of passengers will be encountered daily. These assumptions
are not always true, and could significantly constrain the effectiveness of applications using
this technique.
May, Lenders et. al have created a wireless podcasting system called PodNet [105, 112].
A competing system called HyCast has been also been created by Andronache et al. [16].
In both PodNet and HyCast, users retrieve content from the Internet and advertise their
available channels and constituent episodes to neighbouring devices. In both systems,
nodes solicit content of interest during opportunistic wireless connections. As in the pre-
vious systems, content is never retrieved on behalf of others. While this approach avoids
free-riding, it favours nodes with homogeneous content interests. Helgason et al. extend
the PodNet concept with a middleware architecture for a mobile peer-to-peer content dis-
tribution [73]. Their architecture allows wireless content dissemination between mobile
nodes without the user of infrastructure. In this system content may be exchanged op-
portunistically when nodes are within communication range. As in PodNet, applications
running on top of the middleware may retrieve content feeds from neighbouring devices.
To scale to large numbers of users and accommodate a diverse range of interests [98],
we believe that it is necessary for content sharing systems to be able to route content across
multiple hops. None of these systems provide that functionality, nor do they satisfy the

















Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of related work: the building blocks of a CTN.
2.2 Building blocks of a CTN
Existing mobile content sharing systems do not satisfy our goals. In the remainder of
this chapter we decompose the design of a CTN into several key research domains. These
domains are illustrated in Figure 2.1, and will be described throughout the remainder of
this chapter. For each domain we conduct a survey of related work relevant to the creation
of a CTN.
2.2.1 Feasibility
We begin this survey with a discussion of the feasibility of large-scale DTN-based mobile
systems. The work surveyed in this section does not satisfy any of our CTN goals; however,
the work does provide context to the problem.
Grossglauser and Tse examine the asymptotic throughput capacity of large mobile
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wireless ad hoc networks [62]. Their work shows that direct communication between source
devices and destination devices cannot achieve high throughput. Instead, they propose to
spread traffic to intermediate relay nodes to exploit the multiuser diversity benefits of
having additional routes between a source and destination. Although Grossglauser does
not consider end-to-end delay, they prove that mobility significantly increases capacity of
ad hoc wireless networks.
Su et al. report on the results of a user study to examine the feasibility of using
user mobility and opportunistic contacts to form mobile ad hoc networks [174]. In this
work, students carry Bluetooth-enabled devices for several weeks. Their work shows that
networks can be successfully formed under the conditions of user mobility, and that there
is potential for exploiting the regularity in contact behaviour to improve message transport
between devices. One key observation from their experiment was that less than 18% of
messages were delivered via a single hop. The remainder of messages was delivered faster
using some multi-hop path. This seminal experimental work provides insights into the
capabilities of much larger networks.
Kathiravelu and Pears further explore the capacity of ‘opportunistic2 networks’ [91].
In this work they present a simulation of 50 to 200 Bluetooth-enabled devices operating
in a simulated airport environment. The simulation and results presented in this paper
are weak primarily due to their use of a random waypoint model, which has been proven
to poorly model human mobility [153]. However, this paper draws our attention to sev-
eral factors that must be considered in evaluating the capacity of opportunistic networks.
First, Bluetooth devices must first be discovered before they can communicate with each
other; being within range of another Bluetooth device is not a sufficient condition for an
opportunistic connection to take place. These issues are addressed in Reference [119], and
will be further discuss in Section 2.2.2. Second, mobile Bluetooth-enabled devices such
as cell phones and smartphones are highly resource-constrained, which often inhibits their
ability to transmit data at the full rate supported by the wireless chipset. A discussion
of how resource constraints affect opportunistic communication can be found in our pre-
vious work [128, 129]. Techniques for adapting to the multitude of resource constraints
2‘Opportunistic’ is an overloaded term in the networking research community. It is most commonly
used to refer to networks where in the absence of network infrastructure, content of interest is transferred
between mobile devices using connection opportunities that arise when devices are within wireless range
of each other.
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common to mobile devices remain an open problem. Third, our prior work has shown
that the process of selecting data to forward to other nodes during an opportunistic con-
nection further reduces the amount of data transferred and reduces the capacity of these
networks [143, 144].
2.2.2 Opportunistic communication
Devices participating in CTN must be able to communicate robustly despite potentially
short and infrequent connection opportunities. This section explores work in this crucial
problem domain.
Liberatore et al. explore the problem of maximizing transfer opportunities between
mobile devices using Bluetooth [107]. As one of the most inexpensive, energy-efficient
and widely deployed peer-to-peer capable radios, Bluetooth is well suited for use in a
DTN. Unfortunately, Bluetooth’s half-duplex process of neighbour discovery can take tens
of seconds to complete between two mutually undiscovered radios, which is often longer
than two devices are within proximity. To solve this problem, the authors introduce a
second Bluetooth radio to provide a full-duplex inquiry channel. The use of two radios
would allow a device to both inquire for neighbouring devices, and listen for incoming
connections. Through analysis and simulation3 they show that using two radios reduces
the time until nodes discover each other by 12 to 25%. This reduction translates into an
estimated 170 to 440% increase in the number of discovered transfer opportunities. They
also showed that dual radios are more energy efficient, spending 7 to 27% less energy on
average per second of data transferred. While their work yields significant improvements in
both connection frequency and duration, the addition of a second radio in a mobile device
is impractical for the foreseeable future.
Jung et al. present BlueTorrent, which allows collocated Bluetooth devices to form a
piconet to disseminate data between them [86]. A key challenge inhibiting BlueTorrent,
and systems that use Bluetooth, is efficient peer discovery. Unlike the previous paper, this
work assumes that only one Bluetooth radio is available in each device. Recall that for
two nodes to connect using Bluetooth, one node should be in the inquiry state and the
3The simulation uses a mobility model based on random, predetermined paths, which has been shown
to poorly represent human mobility [153].
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other in the inquiry scan state. However, since Bluetooth users are typically moving, their
roles as inquirers (masters) or inquirees (slaves) cannot be predetermined. These roles must
therefore be randomly alternated. Bluetooth supports such a random role selection through
the periodic inquiry mode. In this work, the authors approach the neighbour detection
problem by analyzing the Bluetooth periodic inquiry mode. Through their analysis and
simulation, they show that the timings used within the periodic inquiry mode are sub-
optimal, the inquiry scan interval is a critical factor, and that reducing the interval to 0.32
seconds minimizes discovery latency at 2.53 seconds.
Unfortunately, the work by Liberatore and Jung require modification to either the
physical hardware or Bluetooth stack, which is currently not feasible in most mobile de-
velopment platforms.
The problem of maximizing communication during an opportunistic connection is ex-
asperated by increased speed and shortened connection periods that are introduced when
users are within vehicles. Ott and Kutscher investigate the practicality and challenges in
providing network connectivity and Internet access to mobile users in vehicles [132]. They
evaluate the performance of 802.11b under several scenarios using both TCP and UDP
to transfer data from a mobile client (laptop) to a server behind a roadside access point.
They show that the total amount of data that can be transferred decreased proportionally
to the vehicle’s speed: approximately 8.8 MB at 80 kph, 7.8 MB at 120 kph, and 3.7 MB
at 180 kph for UDP traffic sent from the client to server. They also observe an asym-
metric relationship between UDP traffic. UDP data sent from the server had a minimum
loss rate of nearly 60%, with a corresponding decrease in throughput. Using TCP they
observe that a total of 6, 5, and 1.5 MB of data can be transferred at 80, 120, and 180
kph respectively; nearly a factor of two improvement over UDP transmissions from server
to client. Moreover, they observed similar that throughput using TCP was similar in both
directions.
Hadaller et al. further examine the behaviour of 802.11g under drive-by scenarios [70].
Through experimentation in real-life drive-by scenarios, Hadaller shows that on average,
current protocols only achieve 50% of the overall throughput possible in a drive-by scenario.
They further show that “high packet losses early in a connection are responsible for the
loss nearly 25% of overall throughput, 15% of the time.”
Although the measurement studies by Ott and Hadaller are not specifically relevant to
the creation of a CTN or provide solutions to any of the goals, their work provides insight
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into the service quality that mobile users can expect when using their device to interact
with roadside Wi-Fi infrastructure (if desired).
2.2.3 Participation incentives
Device participation in a DTN requires the device owners to invest energy, storage, com-
putation, and possibly money. This section outlines techniques used to incentivize partic-
ipation in existing systems that exchange data between mobile devices.
Ananthanarayanan et al. present a system for collaborative downloading that uses
both the WLAN and the WWAN in combination, in an attempt to “bridge the range-
speed dichotomy” [13]. In COMBINE, devices in close proximity use the high-speed WLAN
interfaces to discover each other, form a collaboration group, and stripe static HTTP traffic
across their WWAN links. This allows any one device to increase its effective WWAN
download speed, in a manner that is transparent to the user. A significant contribution
of this work is COMBINE’s approach to buying and selling WWAN bandwidth, and thus
providing incentive participation.
In COMBINE, each device determines the energy cost associated with downloading
over a WWAN interface. This estimation, along with the monetary cost of downloading
data, is used to determine the price of using the device’s WWAN bandwidth. Devices
running this service periodically announce their presence and their bid, which contains the
collaborator’s price and an estimation of the WWAN download speed that it is able to offer.
When a device requires bandwidth neighbouring devices, it notifies its neighbours of the
website URL that it wants to download, and waits for a small duration. If a neighbouring
device has the website in cache, it can then unicast a response to the initiator indicating
that it has the file. Otherwise, the initiator forms a download group through one of two
approaches. The first method narrows the set of neighbouring devices to those whose bid
is less than the cost per byte that the initiator is willing to pay. The initiator then selects
the group members in order of decreasing bandwidth. In the second method the initiator
considers all devices, including those with bids higher than its cost per byte threshold. The
initiator selects group members according to an optimization problem that minimizes the
total time taken to download the desired file while maintaining a maximum cost C.
Once a collaboration group has been formed, the initiator distributes work items using
one of two strategies. In the first, the initiating device gets the total size of the file to
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be downloaded and forms a work queue that specifies fixed equal sized byte ranges of the
file to download. Collaborating devices then pick up data from the work queue, download
the data specified in the work item, and return the data-initiating device. In the second
strategy the initiator divides the file of size F into fixed-size partitions of size p bytes each
and apportions to each partition a cost budget of (C/F )p. The initiator then allocates
work items to collaborators explicitly to ensure that the budget is satisfied. Payment to
collaborating devices is achieved using a system of signed IOUs that are issued by the
initiator after each work item is completed. Collaborating devices store the IOUs and can
redeem them at a later time by contacting a centralized, trusted accounting server. The
accounting server maintains record of redeemed IOUs to prevent duplicate redemption.
While the IOU approach to enabling participating incentives satisfies the requirements
of COMBINE, it does not solve the incentive problem underlying communication in a
DTN. In COMBINE, the reward of an IOU is tightly coupled with the act of downloading
data; an IOU is not issued until the participating node has delivered an intact work unit.
However, in a DTN, participating devices must store, carry, and forward data independent
of the source or destination. Moreover, data relayed to one device may never reach another
device or may be replicated to many devices. Due to the tight coupling of actions and
rewards, COMBINE’s approach to providing incentives does not satisfy our CTN design
goals. Further, the use of a centralized accounting server further violates the unlinkability
constraint and could lead to the loss of anonymity for users of the system.
We further explore strategies for incentivizing participation in DTNs in Section 2.2.6.
2.2.4 Energy conservation
Energy conservation is a fundamental concern in the design of any mobile system. Systems
that consume energy too aggressively will drain the host device’s finite energy resources,
and are likely to be deleted from the host device.
The wireless subsystem consumes a significant portion of total power consumption [11,
139]. A primary source of wasted power consumption in mobile ad hoc networks is scan-
ning for neighbouring devices; a scan that yields no neighbouring devices provides no real
utility and consumes limited energy. Galluccio et al. have proposed an analytical frame-
work for studying the trade-off between energy efficiency and time for neighbour discovery
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process in ad hoc networks [56]. Sedov et al. discuss an approach for making the Blue-
tooth service discovery protocol more energy efficient [162]. Several authors propose and
analyze symmetric neighbour discovery schemes [32, 156, 169]. However, these techniques
all require making changes to the Bluetooth software stack to adjust the timings within the
inquiry and scanning processes. In practice, altering the established Bluetooth protocol is
not feasible. Drula et al. consider the problem of performing energy efficient Bluetooth
neighbour discovery without modifying the existing Bluetooth software stack [46, 47]. In
this work they present two algorithms that select the method of neighbour discovery: ei-
ther low-power slow discovery or high-power fast discovery. Their first algorithm uses the
level of recent activity to determine scanning mode: recent device detection is a strong
indicator that a subsequent scan will discover devices. The second scheme relies on loca-
tion sensing and the location of previous contacts to determine the scanning mode. For
example, if few neighbours are detected in the vicinity of location A and many neighbours
are detected in the vicinity of location B, then a device should operate in low-power mode
at location A and high-power mode at location B. This work further shows that the mean
discovery time can be as low as 0.2 seconds, contradicting prior work by an order of magni-
tude [23, 159, 200]. Although both techniques appear to be relevant to the implementation
of a CTN, real-life evaluation in a diverse range of usage scenarios is needed to realize the
true benefit of each scheme.
A process similar to the efficient detection of neighbouring devices is the process of
detecting neighbouring Wi-Fi access points. Nicholson et al. present BreadCrumbs [123].
BreadCrumbs is a network middleware that exploits the fact that users of mobile devices
are typically creatures of habit, whose mobility is limited to few fixed regions. Bread-
Crumbs tracks the movement of the device using beacons from existing Wi-Fi AP4 and
GSM cell towers and builds a mobility model of that user (similar to the technique used
in Reference [111]). This model allows the middleware to predict both future network
connectivity and level of throughput that applications can expect. This has two significant
benefits to the creation of a CTN. Although BreadCrumbs uses Wi-Fi APs for location
sensing, coarse-grained positioning using purely cell tower triangulation is probably suffi-
cient for many applications. Using even a rough prediction would allow a device to save
energy by disabling its Wi-Fi radio an AP is predicted to be within range. Predicting
the time until Wi-Fi availability and future throughput can further improve the service
4Using an AP triangulation method first presented by LaMarca et al. in Place Lab [97].
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quality of delay tolerant applications that utilize multiple network interfaces. If an appli-
cation predicts (with a high probability) that sufficient Wi-Fi service will not be available
within some deadline, then the application can avoid unnecessary delays and immediately
transmit data over an alternate interface.
Techniques like BreadCrumbs that rely on existing knowledge of Wi-Fi access points
perform poorly when users are highly mobile. When a mobile device has data to send,
it is often necessary to scan for access points. Work by Falaki reveals that by using a
small cache of Wi-Fi access points and the GSM cell tower IDs within their range, a 46%
reduction in scans can achieved over static scanning techniques [53].
CoolSpots by Pering et al. examine how multiple network interfaces can be used to
minimize energy consumption [138]. CoolSpots is a hybrid Wi-Fi and Bluetooth system
that provides improved communication capabilities to devices that are within a ‘CoolSpot-
enabled’ region. The system uses Bluetooth-enabled access points, which allows mobile
devices to take advantage of the diversities between the two radio technologies. Low band-
width applications can connect to access points over Bluetooth, and when higher band-
width and/or an increased transmission range is needed, the device can switch to Wi-Fi.
Underlying CoolSpot’s system for switching between network interfaces is a policy lan-
guage that allows applications to specify their bandwidth, power, and range requirements.
Their results indicate that more than a 50% reduction in energy consumption is possible,
with an associated increase in the effective battery lifetime. Although we believe that the
dependency on CoolSpot-enabled infrastructure makes this work difficult to deploy, the
insights gained by their energy management policy could be applied to device-to-device
communication and have applications in our work.
Banerjee et al. present a ten person study that measures how users of mobile devices
consume battery [19, 147]. Although their study is preliminary, the paper highlights the
diversity of energy consumption habits among users. Falaki et al. expand upon this work
by measuring the energy consumption and application usage behaviour of 33 Android and
222 Windows Mobile devices [52]. They subsequently build tools to visualize and identify
sources of energy consumption on mobile devices [51].
Although a great deal of work has been done to minimize energy consumption by wire-
less interfaces and categorize sources of energy consumption, no work has been done how
energy-intensive applications themselves should respond to fluctuating energy reserves. As
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a potentially energy demanding application, the operation of a CTN can be significantly af-
fected by users’ energy consumption habits. For example, if a user charges her device daily,
then her device may scan for neighbouring devices and APs more frequently. Conversely, a
device that is charged shortly before losing power has little capacity for extraneous wireless
communication. We believe that it is essential for energy-intensive mobile applications to
adapt their execution to changing levels of energy reserves. We will revisit this problem in
Chapter 7.
2.2.5 System and application design
Several related projects have explored the use of opportunistic communication to either
disseminate data between mobile devices or to communicate with servers on the Internet.
The most relevant work is within the context of the Haggle Project [75, 76, 161], the Op-
portunistic Connection Management Protocol (OCMP) [164], and the MobiClique mobile
social networking system [143, 144].
Haggle is a mobile application middleware that is designed to separate application logic
from transport bindings so that applications can be agnostic to the underlying network
interface. Applications delegate the task of handling and communicating data to Haggle,
which in turn adapts to the current network environment using the ‘best’ available forms of
connectivity. For example, the Haggle middleware is designed to allow applications, such as
email, to transport application data either between devices using opportunistic communi-
cation or by using existing infrastructure, such as SMTP servers on the Internet. However,
most of the research within the Haggle Project has focused solely on infrastructure-less
communication, where mobile devices communicate with each other to disseminate data
over a DTN.
Seth et al. define the Opportunistic Connection Management Protocol (OCMP) [164].
OCMP allows applications to communicate opportunistically over multiple heterogeneous
wireless networks. Like Haggle, OCMP abstracts network connectivity from applications,
which forces applications written for OCMP to be delay tolerant. Internally, OCMP also
views network connectivity as a schedulable resource, which can consume network time,
battery power, monetary costs, etc. However, unlike Haggle that relies solely on Wi-Fi,
network scheduling is controllable through application specific policy. A similar technique
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can be found in the Horde middleware [146], which allows applications to specify quality-
of-service objectives when transmitting data over a heterogeneous set of varying wireless
network channels.
OCMP further differs from Haggle by its integral use of infrastructure5 on the Internet.
Communicating over multiple network interfaces with intermittent connectivity requires
that OCMP first fragment data on the mobile device. Fragments are transmitted indepen-
dently over available network interfaces to a centralized server, or ‘proxy’ on the Internet.
At the proxy, data fragments are reassembled into their original data and forwarded to
legacy servers. For example, an email sent from a mobile device containing a large photo
attachment is fragmented on the device, transmitted over one or more wireless networks
to the proxy. At the proxy the email is reassembled and forwarded to a SMTP server for
delivery to the recipient.
The third system, MobiClique by Pietiläinen, Oliver et al. [143, 144], is designed to
provide a system of participation incentives in a DTN. MobiClique builds on the Haggle
philosophy of disseminating content purely between mobile devices and operates in a fully
decentralized manner; however, it depends on an existing online social network, such as
Facebook, to bootstrap its operation. The design of MobiClique was motivated by the
assumption that people will forward data on behalf of others if they are friends, friends-of-
friends, or share similar interests; online social networks are the glue that represents these
criteria.
In MobiClique, each participating device stores the identity of its user and the iden-
tities of all of their friends (as obtained from the online social network). As users and
their devices roam around and detect other devices, they each exchange their identity
and the identities of their friends. Using this information, each device forms a directed
graph that is an aggregate representation of social relationships. MobiClique then uses the
social network graph to make forwarding decisions. During an opportunistic connection,
data is forwarded only if the neighbouring device shares some social connection with the
recipient. The result of our experimentation and social network analysis are presented
in References [118, 143]. MobiClique’s key contribution was the lessons learned from its
5‘Infrastructure’ is loosely defined in the literature to mean both communication infrastructure like cel-
lular and Wi-Fi networks, and computing infrastructure such as servers on the Internet. In this proposal,
we assume that communication infrastructure is ubiquitous and that ‘infrastructure’ refers to computa-
tional capacity.
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failures. As the first working prototype of its kind6, MobiClique revealed many system
constraints that inhibit the effectiveness and reliability of systems that use opportunistic
communication. For example, during an opportunistic connection, each device must first
select a subset of data to forward, which can be both a computational and I/O intensive
operation, then load the data from slow persistent storage into memory, and transfer the
data over the network interface. Depending on the device, this operation can trigger either
virtual memory page flushes or garbage collection, which further constraints data trans-
fer. The initial MobiClique prototype also used Bluetooth to discover and communicate
with neighbouring devices. Although Bluetooth reduces the energy cost needed to discover
neighbouring devices, it does not maximize the amount of data that could be transferred
between two neighbouring devices. Switching to Wi-Fi, for example, would significantly
increase the amount of data exchanged between two neighbouring devices. This observa-
tion motivates the need for multiple network interfaces; however, in the presence of human
mobility, variable setup times, and different energy requirements, the problem of how and
when to use multiple network interfaces efficiently remains an open problem.
None of the three aforementioned systems satisfy our goals. OCMP’s use of a centralized
proxy server violates the unlinkability constraint. Like BitTorrent, users of the OCMP
service could be identified purely through their communication with the proxy server.
MobiClique and Haggle are both robust to attack and scale; however, they do not provide
security or unlinkability. Any user running the software may interact with any other node.
It is therefore not safe to share censored content in either system.
Several other systems have been built based on a message ferrying approach that uti-
lizes mobile nodes to store, carry, and forward data to other nodes in the network. The
KioskNet [66, 67] project builds on previous DakNet work by Pentland et al. [137]. In
DakNet vehicles, such as public buses, are equipped with access points. As the vehicles
drive through rural communities, data is uploaded from village kiosks to the mobile access
point. The data ‘bundles’7 are then transported to an urban center where Internet access
is available. The data is then transferred over the Internet to a proxy and forwarded to
legacy servers. This technique has been termed ‘mechanical backhaul’. KioskNet differ-
entiates itself from DakNet by supporting all forms of available connectivity, including
6At the time, the prototype Haggle implementation was in Java and only ran on a high performance
laptop.
7Packets transported over a DTN are commonly referred to as bundles [54].
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long-range wireless, SMS [127] (and Chapter 6), Wi-Fi in conjunction with mechanical
backhaul, cellular data services, and USB key-based sneakernets.
KioskNet’s security architecture allows disconnected nodes to securely communicate
with all other disconnected nodes. Secure communication is achieved by storing the public
keys of users in a central trusted database on the Internet. By periodically disseminating
the database to all rural kiosks, applications may encrypt data destined for any other user
in the network using the recipient’s public key. Similarly, rural kiosks can communication
securely with the proxy by encrypting data using the proxy’s public key8. KioskNet security
architecture therefore enables e-commerce and other privacy sensitive applications to be
deployed in disconnected regions [185] . While KioskNet’s approach to providing secure
communication to disconnected nodes is both simple and practical, it does not satisfy the
criteria of censorship resistance due to the need to trust the service provider. KioskNet is
thus not suitable for widespread sharing of censored content.
2.2.6 Data routing and forwarding
Borrel et al. provide a classification framework that formally describes the relationship
between DTNs and mobile ad hoc networks and how they change over time [24]. They
argue that MANETs are simply a special case of DTNs, and that DTNs are a special
case of disconnected networks where space-time paths do not exist. This classification
is important to understanding where the proposed research fits into the body of existing
‘mobile’ routing research. Using terminology presented in Borrel’s paper, this survey will
focus purely on routing in assisted-DTNs, where there may not exist a space-time path
between all participating node pairs. However, as evidenced by an existing survey [83],
there is an extensive body of work even in this sub-domain. We therefore focus on the
subset of work that could be relevant to the creation of a CTN.
Jain et al. formulate the DTN routing problem, where messages are moved from end-
to-end across a time-varying connectivity graph [80]. In these networks, data is stored at
intermediate nodes until a connection, or edge, to the next node in a routing path can be
made. The main contribution of this work is their outline of several different routing algo-
rithms and framework for evaluating each algorithm. They distinguish algorithms based on
8Or more precisely, using a symmetric key encrypted using the proxy’s public key.
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the amount of knowledge that an algorithm has about the contact patterns of nodes, buffer
capacities at nodes, and traffic patterns. Zero knowledge algorithms that operate indepen-
dently of past or future information performs poorly in non-trivial topologies because the
chosen next hop is essentially random and exchanges with a neighbouring node may not
transport data closer to its destination. Partial knowledge algorithms utilize knowledge
about both contact data and/or buffer capacities. These algorithms are based upon as-
signing costs to edges in the time-varying connectivity graph and finding the cheapest path
using a modified version of Dijkstra’s Algorithm. The first algorithm seeks to minimize the
expected delay by assigning edges the sum of the average waiting time, propagation delay,
and transmission delay. This algorithm is the most practical as it relies solely on average
contact statistics, which can be approximately by each node over time. The second algo-
rithm uses knowledge of expected contact patterns to determine routes that result in the
earliest delivery of a message. Paths are computed at the source node without considering
the availability of storage at intermediate nodes, which in practice would lead to message
drops when buffers overflow. The third algorithm accounts for the buffer sizes on all edges
leaving the current node, which the authors show significantly reduces delay under heavy
workloads. In this algorithm, routes are recalculated at every hop to take into account
buffer sizes at all edges in the path. The fourth algorithm uses knowledge of buffer capac-
ities to determine the instantaneous buffer sizes across the entire topology at any point in
time. Like the previous two algorithms, this information is combined with knowledge of
contact patterns to determine routes that result in the earliest delivery. Like the second
algorithm, routes are predetermined at the source since buffer capacities are known a pri-
ori. Interestingly, they show that this algorithm yields negligible improvements over the
third algorithm that does not have global knowledge of buffer capacities. The third class of
routing algorithm presented in this paper utilizes complete knowledge of contact patterns,
buffer sizes, and node movement to find the optimal path. The authors present a detailed
linear programming technique for finding optimal routes to minimize average delay in the
network. The authors show through simulation that the performance of ‘smarter’ algo-
rithms that take consider contact patterns and time-varying link conditions perform best,
both in terms of delay and delivery ratio. In general, the performance of an algorithm is
proportional to the amount of knowledge that it has. In practice, devices operating in a
DTN are not privy to future knowledge; however, as alluded to by the authors, the use of a
low-delay control channel to provide global state could simplify some the routing problem.
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Jones et al. present an alternative approach to routing in a DTN that does not rely
on future connectivity knowledge [84]. Their technique, Minimum Estimated Expected
Delay (MEED), relies solely on observed information about the network and follows the
same approach previously used by Jain et al. to minimize end-to-end delay. Instead of
computing the expected waiting time using the future contact schedule, Jones’s technique
records the observed contact history at each node and floods the ‘link state’ information
to the other nodes in the network. Routing decisions are then made at each node to
ensure that data is routed according to the most recent information. Through simulation
they show that MEED achieves 96% of the delivery ratio achieved when using epidemic
routing and that MEED approaches the performance of Jain’s algorithms that require
future knowledge of the network topology.
Leguay et al. present the MobySpace routing scheme [103]. In MobySpace, each device
records its mobility model as the probability in being in each of n fixed known locations,
or MobyPoints. The mobility pattern is then flooded to all other nodes in the network.
Routing decisions using MobySpace are then made under the assumption that a node is a
good candidate for taking custody of a bundle if it has a mobility pattern that is similar
to that of the bundle’s destination. Routing is then accomplished by forwarding bundles
toward nodes that have mobility patterns that are increasingly similar to the mobility
pattern of the destination. This technique is unique in that it tightly couples human
mobility with routing, which we believe is essential to routing in a DTN. Unfortunately,
this technique is only suitable for small-scale deployments, such as within a school, where
most of the nodes can be represented by a reasonable number of MobyPoints. As the
radius, r, of the networked region expands, the number of location points would likely
increase by O(r2), which makes MobySpace impractical for large-scale deployments.
Chaintreau et al. assess the impact of human mobility on the design of opportunistic
forwarding algorithms [29]. They observe that the distribution of the inter-contact time,
that is the time gap separating two contacts of the same pair of devices, exhibits a heavy
tail such as one of a power law, over a large range of value. These results were also observed
in Reference [143]. Based on this observation, they prove that forwarding algorithms based
solely on the destination address/identity may deliver data with a bounded expected delay
in the case of light tailed inter-contact times, as well as when the mobility of devices creates
inter-contact times that follow a power law with coefficient greater than 1. However, they
also prove that these simple algorithms have an infinite expected delay when the inter-
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contact times follow a power law with coefficient smaller than 1.
Lindgren et al. propose PRoPHET, a Probabilistic Routing Protocol using History of
Encounters and Transitivity [108]. PRoPHET is based upon a probabilistic metric called
the “delivery predictability” at every node a for each known destination b. The delivery
predictability is used to represent how likely it is that this node will be able to deliver
a message to that destination. When two nodes meet, they exchange summary vectors,
and also a delivery predictability vector containing the delivery predictability information
for destinations known by the nodes. Each node subsequently updates its own internal
delivery predictability vector. Once delivery predictability vectors are exchanged, the
updated vectors are used to decide which messages to request from the other node. The
technique used in PRoPHET is not sufficient for use in a CTN for two major reasons. First,
there are many factors that in practice could impact delivery probability. For example, the
size of a message and its corresponding resource cost could significantly impact delivery
probability. Users may be willing and able to transport only censored content that is
small in size. Second, their technique for ranking nodes based on delivery probability is
impractical under our design assumptions. Nodes that are often encountered have a higher
delivery probability; however, free-riding nodes can falsify this state and report that all
other nodes have low or zero delivery probability. PRoPHET’s dependency on falsifiable
link-state makes it unsuitable for use a CTN. This critical limitation will become a common
theme throughout this section.
MV Routing by Burns et al. learns structure in the movement patterns of nodes [26].
MV maintains information about meetings between nodes and their visits to locations and
uses this information for routing and buffer allocation. In MV, when two nodes encounter
each other, each node discloses the list of messages that it carries along with a likelihood of
delivering each message. Each node sorts the unioned list of messages by delivery likelihood
and deletes the messages that the other node has a higher likelihood of delivering. Each
node then selects the top n messages and requests the messages that are not already stored.
The likelihood of delivery of a message is computed by each node based on the probability
of visiting the message’s destination region. MV assumes that the probability of visiting
a region in the future is strongly correlated with the node’s history of visiting a region.
Free-riding nodes could easily report low visitation probability, and thus legitimately delete
all unwanted messages or simply delete everything and never report holding any messages.
Hui et al. create the BUBBLE forwarding algorithm that exploits observations that
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human interaction is heterogeneous both in terms of popular individuals and groups or
communities [77, 197]. The authors identify through examination of existing mobility
traces, that within a community of cooperating individuals, some people are more popular,
and interact with more people than others. These individuals have high centrality and
are ‘hubs’. BUBBLE utilizes community information and correlated interaction to select
forwarding paths. Forwarding between nodes under BUBBLE is dependent on a global
ranking of all nodes in the system and a local ranking within a community. If a node has
a message destined for another node, this node first bubbles the message up a hierarchical
ranking tree using the global ranking, until it reaches a node that is in the same community
as the destination node. Once a message has reached the destination community, the
message continues to bubble through a local ranking tree until the destination is reached
or the message expires. The authors show that BUBBLE outperforms PRoPHET; however,
its dependence on a global ranking of nodes and community structure makes it unsuitable
for use in a CTN.
Zhao and Ammar introduce the Message Ferrying routing scheme [206]. The message
ferrying routing scheme differs from previously discussed routing approaches primarily
through its use of a low-bandwidth, long-range control channel. In the node-initiated vari-
ant of this scheme, message ferries move around in a deployed area according to known
routes and communicate with other nodes they meet. With knowledge of the ferry routes,
other nodes can adapt their trajectories to meet the ferries and transmit or receive mes-
sages. Zhao’s definition of ‘message ferry’ differs from its use in other DTN-based sys-
tems [67, 137] that loosely define message ferrying as the act of storing, carrying, and
forwarding data; independent of the routing protocol used. This scheme further differs
from previous schemes in its non-random proactive movement of nodes. For example, both
KioskNet and DakNet, use epidemic routing [186] to disseminate data from the Internet to
rural kiosks, which may lead to significant and even unacceptable transmission delays and
low throughput. As a proactive routing scheme, Message Ferrying proposes that mobile
nodes actively modify their trajectories in order to transmit messages as soon as possible.
The key contribution of this paper is the ferry route-finding algorithm that minimizes de-
lay while satisfies minimum bandwidth requirements. The authors divide the route-finding
problem into two sub-problems. The first problem seeks to find a route that minimizes
the average delay for a random set of expected traffic without considering the end-to-end
bandwidth requirements. They show that this problem reduces to the (NP hard) Euclidean
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Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP), and approximate it using existing TSP solutions. The
second sub-problem extends the route generated in the first sub-problem, if necessary,
to meet the bandwidth requirements. Through simulation they show that with proac-
tive movement of both the ferries and the nodes, the message ferrying scheme, in theory,
provides regular connectivity in an otherwise disconnected ad hoc network.
Zhao et al. introduce the ferry initiated message ferrying (FIMF) routing scheme [205].
Under FIMF, when a node wants to send packets to other nodes or receive packets, it
generates a service request and transmits it to a chosen ferry using a low bandwidth, long-
range radio. When a ferry receives a service request, it alters its trajectory to rendezvous
with the node. While navigating to the node, the ferry periodically broadcasts its position
to nodes. Similarly, if nodes move from the location where they initiated the service
request, they must broadcast location updates for the ferry. The ferry then recalculates its
route to rendezvous with the node at its new location. Data exchange takes place when the
ferry reaches the node. After servicing the node, the ferry then resumes a known default
route through the deployment region while continuing to broadcast its location and listen
for service requests. If additional service requests are received, the ferry services them
using one of two approaches. The first approach services the nearest neighbouring node.
The second approach uses a traffic-aware heuristic that considers both the location of the
node and its message drop information. The message drop information is collected from
each visited node. It contains the message generation rate and the cumulative number of
messages. Given that buffer sizes are assumed to be constant, the ferry then calculates the
message drop rate at each node.
Zhao and Ammar’s papers are among the first work to propose proactive movement of
mobile devices to forward data. Proactive movement of nodes is further studied by Burns
et al. [26]. They discusses and evaluate the impact of autonomous nodes moving around
within a DTN and altering their mobility in response to changing network capacity and
demand. Although there are few circumstances today where mobile users would alter their
mobility to satisfy the data forwarding needs of their device, we believe that the idea has
merit and could be used in a CTN. For example, if a user was somehow informed that some
content was available at a nearby location, she may be inclined to alter her plan to retrieve
the data. To the best of our knowledge, no further work has considered a user -driven
approach to routing content within a DTN.
An alternative approach to disseminating content is to simply flood the content through-
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out the network. Vahdat et al. refer to this as Epidemic routing [171, 186]. Unfettered
epidemic routing is infeasible in a DTN if the aggregate size of content within the net-
work is greater than the storage capacity on any node. Nodes must be highly selective
in the data they retrieve to satisfy storage constraints. One approach to this problem is
to produce an unlimited number of copies of messages, but restrict the message to travel
a maximum of number of hops from the source [186]. Similarly, Reference [171], restricts
the number of message copies, which limits both the depth and breadth of the resulting
flood tree. However, under our design assumptions it is not possible for individual nodes to
dictate operational behaviour to other nodes in the network. Nodes are assumed to operate
independently and rationally, and thus allocate their limited resources as they deem to be
in their best interests. Epidemic routing is suitable for disseminating small amounts of
data, such as control information, where the aggregate size of the data is assumed to be
small. We will revisit the limitations of epidemic routing in Chapter 5.
Epidemic routing is not suitable for the reasons previously discussed. Prioritized Epi-
demic Routing Protocol (PREP) defines a average availability metric may be a useful
metric for ranking nodes [148]. PREP operates by measuring the average fraction of time
that a link will be available for use. The value is calculated based on the amount of time
that the link was available over some duration. The protocol then advertises this quantity
to all other nodes in the network through standard epidemic routing (a topology sync).
This best effort topology awareness mechanism is subsequently used to compute routing
costs. The shortest path is then computed using Dijkstra. PREP prioritizes messages as
follows: messages with an expected hop count exceeding some threshold are assigned a
priority based on their shortest path length. The higher the path, the lower the prior-
ity. PREP then disseminates messages with the lowest priority. PREP keeps storage and
bandwidth utilization maximized and drops data only when necessary. When resources
are consumed, messages are deleted in order of highest priority. Unfortunately, in practice,
malicious nodes could share invalid average availability vectors to create artificially long
paths through themselves. There is also no mechanism to prevent a PREP node from
deleting all of its messages. In addition to sharing invalid availability vectors, malicious
nodes are free to drop all data without consequence.
Gradient routing protocols operate by computing a delivery metric for all destina-
tions [172]. Messages are forwarded when a node is encountered with a higher delivery
metric. ZebraNet is system that uses gradient routing protocol to flood messages towards
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fixed base stations (gateways) [85]. Ignoring the fact that CTNs do not have fixed base
stations, grading routing protocols would not work because the aggregate quantity of data
in the network could easily exceed node storage capacities. Moreover, these techniques
require more knowledge of the system than can be guaranteed to be available in a CTN.
Costa et al. propose SocialCast, a publish-subscribe based routing protocol that ex-
ploits predictions based on metrics of social interaction (i.e. patterns of movements among
communities) [41]. A basic assumption underlying SocialCast is that nodes that have
the same interests spend time collocated. Routing in SocialCast consists of three phases:
interest dissemination, carrier selection, and message dissemination. During the Interest
Dissemination phase, each node broadcasts a control message containing its interest strings
and utility vector to its direct neighbours. The utility vector contains a list of value derived
from collocation with other nodes. During the Carrier Selection phase, the utility vector
of the local node is recomputed for all interests. This utility of each interest is compared
against the utility vectors received by neighbours. If any neighbour has a higher utility,
then they are a better carrier for the data, and the content is transferred to them in the
next phase. Otherwise, the local node is still the best carrier for messages tagged with
the interest string. During the Message Dissemination phase, the content of the buffer is
re-evaluated against the new subscriptions and utilities, and messages are forwarded to the
interested nodes. A copy of messages matching an interest is immediately sent to all neigh-
bours whose subscriptions contain the interest. SocialCast is not suitable for use in a CTN
for two reasons. The first obvious, common problem is that malicious nodes to exclude
themselves as carriers can easily falsify utility vectors. Second, SocialCast’s expression of
interests is imprecise and in practice would lead to efficient network utilization. We will
revisit this topic in Chapter 5.
As we have seen, none of the previously discussed routing protocols are suitable for
use in a CTN. In addition the use of falsifiable link-state, none of the previously described
routing techniques are incentive compatible. For DTNs to be used on personal mobile
devices, there must be some mechanism to incentivize participation. We now consider
recent work that aims to incentivize participation in a DTN.
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Participation incentives in DTN routing
The lack of participation incentives has been a major problem ignored by existing DTN
systems designed for personal mobile devices [144, 176]. Several solutions have been pro-
posed.
Shevade et al. propose a pairwise tit-for-tat mechanism where node A forwards data
for node B in proportion to the amount of data that node B has previously forwarded for
node A [166]. A signed delivery ack serves as proof that the work was done by a next
hop. Each node maintains the waiting time on links between itself and other nodes. Each
node also computes the link capacity with other nodes and periodically floods these metrics
throughout the network. This work assumes that node link-state is disseminated faithfully.
Selfish nodes could easily attack the protocol by disseminating a modified link-state vector
that is favourable to themselves. Increasing the inter-contact time or reducing the link
capacity with other nodes would make the selfish node a less favourable node in the path.
Selfish nodes may also drop delivery acks package in an effort to artificially skew their own
participation in a successfully delivered message. This routing scheme also assumes that
messages have uniform value and consequently does not favour any message over another.
Source routing is also incompatible with a CTN. Source routing would not only require that
content holders care about the demands of others, but for intermediate nodes to comply
with the source node chosen route. Moreover, the source node is not guaranteed to know
the identities or contact behaviour of all intermediate nodes or even the destination node.
This protocol is therefore not suitable for use in a CTN.
Social Selfishness Aware Routing (SSAR) considers a DTN node topology where all
nodes share some measurable social relationship [106]. In SSAR, the higher the social rela-
tionship, the more willing a node is to forward messages for the other. SSAR uses a variant
of the multiple knapsack problem for buffer management and to make forwarding decisions.
Messages are prioritized according to their delivery priority, which decays as the distance
from the source node increases. Nodes also prefer to save messages of equal distance from
the source for recipients with a stronger social relationship. Unfortunately, SSAR does
not consider free-riding nodes in its design. It assumes existing social relationships are
sufficient to ensure that nodes behave according to the specified routing algorithm. This
assumption violates the goals of a CTN. SSAR also assumes the social relationship between
two nodes is expressed honestly. While it has been shown that people can quantitatively
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rate their friendships [58], we do not believe that this would work in practice due to the
strict requirements for both geographical collocation and pre-defined social relationships.
Yin et al. propose a simple game-theoretic approach to routing in a DTN called Pay-
for-Gain (PFG). Their approach is pure pairwise tit-for-tat scheme where source nodes
buy buffer capacity in the network. PFG assumes that paying for buffer space guarantees
that a message will be forwarded. In practice, selfish nodes could simply accept the credit
and never deliver the message - i.e. mimic the behaviour of simply never encountering
upstream nodes. Finally, MobiCent by Chen et al. introduce a trusted third party to
provide centralized accounting between DTN nodes [30]. Like COMBINE, OCMP, and
BitTorrent, MobiCent’s use of a centralized component invalidates it for use in a CTN.
The work surveyed in this section provides significant insight into the design of DTNs.
The work examines the expected behaviour of several DTN routing protocols and their
expected performance. However, the assumptions in this body of survey work differ from
those underlying CTNs. Most of the work surveyed in this section is designed for managed
DTN systems, where nodes in a deployment are managed by a single authority and are
assumed to well behaved.Moreover, managing authorities are typically more concerned
with the aggregate performance of the system rather than the QoS for any single node.
We strongly believe that the software implementing CTNs must be open source, and freely
available to everyone. Under this design assumption, none of the work described in this
section is suitable for use in a CTN. By releasing the code, all protocols can be manipulated
by would-be free-riders. For CTNs to be practical, we require a DTN routing protocol that
is resistant to free-riders.
2.3 Chapter summary
This chapter has surveyed a broad range of work generally related to the creation of a
CTN. Despite an enormous amount of related work, we have shown that the necessary
building blocks of a CTN do not exist.
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Chapter 3





In the previous chapter we surveyed a broad range of related work and demonstrated
that existing research is insufficient to achieve our goals and piece together a censorship-
resistant communication network. Before describing the architecture and design of a CTN,
this chapter briefly summarizes a set of design principles that influence the design of our
prototype CTN implementation.
3.1 Introduction
CTNs are designed to operate using personal mobile devices. These computing platforms
are characterised both by their constrained mode of operation and distinctive physical
attributes. As devices used extensively for communication and other personal tasks, max-
imizing battery life is a key concern. To conserve energy, these devices use low-power
CPU(s), which are often underclocked to reduce heat and maximize battery life. They
typically contain a limited amount of RAM; roughly an order of magnitude less than an
average personal computer. Persistent storage is provided by low-power solid-state Flash
memory. Short range wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth are also standard.
As the dominant form of future computing [92] and the target computing environment for
CTNs, understanding and adapting to the trade offs they present between computing and
communication resources and energy consumption will become increasingly important.
Although today’s cellular networks provide nearly ubiquitous data service, using these
networks to communicate with centralized servers makes it easy to track and censor mobile
users [150]. Instead, devices operating in a CTN must utilize intermittent, short-lived, wire-
less opportunistic connections to exchange data with other mobile devices. The capacity,
or throughput, of these connections is further handicapped by their constrained computing
environments. In this chapter we consider the effect of a constrained computing environ-
ment on opportunistic communication. Moreover, we argue that a conventional system
model, where applications operate oblivious to their connectivity state, is inefficient in an
opportunistic communication setting. Based on our experiences with two related systems,
we propose a set of design principles for CTNs and other systems that use opportunistic
communication.
We derive our design principles from our experience with two real-world systems intro-
duced in Chapter 2. The first system, KioskNet, uses opportunistic connections between a
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kiosk-based computer and an embedded device in a vehicle to transport data to and from
kiosks in rural areas of developing regions to gateways on the Internet [66, 67].The second
system, MobiClique, exploits human mobility to provide decentralized store-and-forward
communication between mobile devices [143, 144]. Although these systems solve differ-
ent problems and cater to very different types of users, we believe that they encapsulate
the problems that other similar systems would face in that their effectiveness is directly
dependent on their ability to maximize communication during opportunistic connections.
This chapter begins with a brief overview of the KioskNet and MobiClique in Sec-
tion 3.2. In Section 3.3 we define our system model and outline the set of system constraints
that adversely affect opportunistic communication. Based on our experiences, we define
a set of design principles for opportunistic communication in Section 3.4. We conclude in
Section 3.5.
3.2 Overview of existing systems
The following two systems utilize opportunistic wireless communications to exchange data
amongst resource-constrained, wireless-enabled devices.
3.2.1 KioskNet
KioskNet is a mobile system that provides very low-cost Internet to developing regions.
Building on the pioneering lead of Daknet [137], KioskNet utilizes buses and cars as “me-
chanical backhaul” devices to carry data between rural village kiosks and Internet gateways.
A village kiosk consists of a kiosk controller, a low-cost, low-power embedded computer
that can be powered from an independent power source such as a solar panel. Villagers ac-
cess the kiosk using a recycled PC connected to the controller. Data created by users, such
as emails, information requests, videos, etc., is fragmented and stored on the controller as
self identifying bundles. A controller is assumed to have Wi-Fi, and possibly a cellular or
dial-up connection. Although controllers can communicate with the Internet using a vari-
ety of connectivity options, mechanical backhaul is the primary mode of communication.
Mechanical backhaul is provided by cars, buses, motorcycles, and trains that pass by a
kiosk and also pass by an Internet gateway. Such entities are known as ferries.
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Figure 3.1: Example scenario: Mobile devices operating in a pocket-switched network.
During an opportunistic connection with a controller, which may last from 20 seconds
to 5 minutes, bundles are transferred from the controller to the ferry. Similarly, bundles
destined for a kiosk user is transferred from the ferry to controller. To minimize redundant
bundle transfers during an opportunistic connection, each connection begins with a meta-
data exchange where each component exchanges a list of its existing bundles. Only bundles
that have not present on the other component are transferred. Each component maintains
a record of how many times each bundle was forwarded, which ensures that precedence is
given to bundles that have been forwarded the fewest times.
Similarly, ferries upload and download bundles opportunistically to and from an Inter-
net gateway, which is a computer that has a Wi-Fi interface, storage, and an always-on
connection to the Internet. The gateways are likely to be present in cities having DSL
or cable broadband Internet access. A gateway collects bundles opportunistically from
ferries and stages them in local storage before uploading to a server on the Internet. It
also downloads bundles from the Internet on behalf of kiosk users, and transfers them
opportunistically to the appropriate ferry, governed by a routing protocol [68].
3.2.2 MobiClique
As a form of pocket-switched network [76], MobiClique exploits natural human mobility
and opportunistic wireless connections to disseminate data from device to device across
an otherwise disconnected network. Unlike KioskNet, where data flows to and from rural
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kiosks and Internet gateway, each device running MobiClique is both a source and destina-
tion for data content. The system depends on intermediate devices to ferry data between
source and destination. An example scenario is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Delay tolerant
applications such as email pass data into MobiClique as opaque objects. The data is sub-
sequently fragmented into smaller bundles and stored in persistent storage (a relational
database). At the receiving device, bundles are stored, reassembled, and passed to the
receiver’s instance of the application.
Devices running MobiClique operate by continuously scanning for neighbouring devices
through a combination of Bluetooth scans and UDP beacons sent over Wi-Fi. When
another MobiClique device is detected, an opportunistic connection is established. During
an opportunistic connection, each device exchanges a set of identifying/authenticating
information and metadata about the user. In MobiClique, this metadata consists of the
user’s social profile: their friends and their interests. Each device uses this metadata to
query a local relational database that returns a set of bundles that should be forwarded to
the neighbouring device. Referring to our example figure, device A would have determined
that device B and C were friends or shared interests with device D, and were thus likely
to deliver data to D.
Like KioskNet, MobiClique’s ability to efficiently disseminate content is dependent on
its ability to maximize data transfer during an opportunistic connection.
3.3 Computing environment
With an overview of two existing systems as context, we now present a more detailed
system description and consider the constraints that inhibit opportunistic communication.
3.3.1 System model
Opportunistic communication is typically provided at the OSI session layer. Applications
access this layer through a conventional set of APIs for sending and receiving data. Data
received from applications is fragmented into bundles. These bundles are then stored in
persistent storage to provide robustness to power failure during periods of long disconnec-
tion. Bundles received by other devices are also stored in persistent storage. When all
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of the bundles composing a data item are received, the data is passed to the application
layer.
Associated with each bundle is a set of metadata. Metadata is application dependent;
however, it typically consists of the source and destination of the bundle, a creation times-
tamp that is used to expire bundles, a globally unique identifier, and value identifying its
structure or purpose.
We make three fundamental assumptions regarding the data and metadata handled by
this layer.
• Metadata fits in memory: Although pathological metadata schemes can be de-
fined that consume vast amounts of memory, we assume that metadata can always
fit into main memory. This assumption is easy to satisfy even in low-memory envi-
ronments; because by doubling the size of a data bundle, we can usually reduce the
total metadata size by half. Metadata per bundle is about 100 bytes at most.
• Application data bundles cannot fit in memory: For these systems to scale
to a large number of users, they must accommodate large amounts of data for a
wide range of users. For example, two hours of music recorded at 192 kbps (which
is currently typical) occupies about 170 MB. Twenty-minute videos can range from
20 MB to several hundred MBs. Given that mobile devices have about 1 GB of
RAM, we assume that the amount of data contained on any device for the purpose
of forwarding exceeds the amount of main memory and must reside on persistent
storage.
• Every opportunistic connection needs different data: To disseminate large
amounts of data, devices should not repeatedly transfer the same bundles during
each connection. For example in KioskNet, connections between ferry and rural
kiosk must exchange bundles that have been forwarded the fewest number of times.
In MobiClique, the bundles exchanged during a connection depends on the identity
and social relationship with the neighbouring device. Each opportunistic connection
must therefore identify the neighbouring device and making a subsequent bundle
selection decision.
The primary function of the opportunistic communication layer is to establish and par-
ticipate in opportunistic connections with other devices. These connections are generally
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Figure 3.2: Phases of an opportunistic connection.
defined by the following four phases:
• Scanning phase: Each device continuously scans for neighbouring devices. The
scanning interval may be static or dynamic depending on the user’s previous mobility
and current context. Scanning may be performed passively by listening for beacons
or actively by probing for neighbours.
• Setup phase: Upon detecting and connecting to an opportunistic contact, each
device must first identify the contact, and in some cases, authenticate and setup a
secure connection.
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• Selection phase: After establishing a connection with the neighbouring contact,
each device must select a subset of its local bundles to forward. In sparse networks,
where opportunistic connections are infrequent, this selection may be simple. For
example, in KioskNet, bundles travel either upstream to the Internet, or downstream
to a rural kiosk. The selection phase therefore only considers the class of contact
(i.e. kiosk or gateway) and selects bundles in the order of least times sent. In dense
networks, where devices are in frequent contact, more complex queries are neces-
sary. The selection phase in MobiClique selects forwarding bundles based on their
destination and social relationship with the contact. To prevent redundant bundle
transfers, MobiClique maintains a record of each bundle successfully transferred to
each device in persistent storage. Experimentation has shown that the resulting se-
lection phase can quickly grow to the order of tens of seconds because of the need to
access persistent storage [143].
• Data phase: After selecting a set of bundles to be forwarded, each device begins the
forwarding process. Ideally, this phase should occupy the largest portion of the op-
portunistic connection. During this phase, bundles are read from persistent storage,
transmitted to the neighbouring device, and stored persistently on the receiver. At
this time, the receiver either explicitly or implicitly acknowledges (depending on the
transport protocol) the receipt of each data bundle. The data phase terminates when
both parties have finished transmitting data or when the connection is disconnected
(either intentionally or due to signal loss).
The four phases of an opportunistic connection are illustrated in Figure 3.2.
Scanning and setup phases have been extensively studied in the literature [70, 192].
Scanning more aggressively reduces the expected delay in detecting a nearby device, at a
cost of increased energy consumption. The trade off between scanning periods and missed
opportunities is detailed in [192]. Similarly, the setup phase offers little opportunity for
improvement and has been studied in great detail [70]. In existing systems, contacts are
identified by their MAC address or an exchange of globally unique identifiers. Techniques
for authentication and setup of a secure channel range in complexity; however, these are
typically CPU-bound operations with a constant running time.
The remainder of this chapter therefore focuses on minimizing the duration of the
selection phase, and maximizing the quantity of data transferred during the data phase.
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Unfortunately, these phases are inhibited by a series of system constraints.
3.3.2 System constraints
Opportunistic communication is inhibited by the following constraints.
• Need to limit energy consumption: The need to limit energy consumption is a
constraint that fundamentally defines constrained computing environments. On mo-
bile platforms, conserving battery life requires low-power and sometimes underclocked
CPUs, wireless technologies that cannot operate at full data rates and frequently en-
ter power saving modes [15], and low-power, high-latency forms of persistent storage.
These hardware requirements also exist in embedded environments that depend on
passive cooling and must minimize heat.
This constraint affects decisions made when implementing an opportunistic commu-
nication system. As mentioned above, the chosen scanning frequency has a direct
effect on battery life. Excessive computation causes the CPU to be active when it
can otherwise be off. Finally, the choice of wireless interface(s) can significantly affect
power consumption [138, 142].
• Underpowered CPU: Mobile devices are commonly designed with an underpow-
ered and underclocked CPU to save energy and reduce heat. Other devices, such as
Apple’s iPhone [3], contain ample CPU power; however, the CPUs are disabled or
placed in a low-power mode when the user is not interacting with the device. Under-
powered CPUs affect three phases of an opportunistic connection. (1) For systems
that must authenticate contacts or establish a secure connection, an underpowered
CPU increases the duration of the setup phase. (2) In the selection phase, each de-
vice must execute a forwarding algorithm to select a subset of bundles to forward. In
KioskNet and MobiClique, this selection is computationally simple; however, other
forwarding schemes have been proposed that demand significant computation [193].
(3) Finally, in both the selection and data phases, underpowered CPUs have been
shown to be the primary bottleneck when performing wireless network I/O, and
significantly reduces throughput during an opportunistic connection [128]. Mea-
surements in KioskNet show that an underpowered CPU can reduce the maximum
throughput of a Wi-Fi card capable of 54 Mbps to 12 Mbps or less.
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Constraint Design principle
Need to limit energy consumption Minimize redundant wireless data transfer
Underpowered CPU Explicitly distinguish between periods of
connection and disconnection
Poor and intermittent communication Use hysteresis
Slow persistent storage Cache metadata
Limited RAM Maximize the use of available memory and
adapt to low-memory conditions
Table 3.1: Design principle satisfying each system constraint.
• Poor and intermittent communication: The mobility of devices operating in an
opportunistic setting introduces inherent communication problems. Devices may be
detected on the fringes of communication range, which causes subsequent communi-
cation to be unreliable and problematic; particularly for control packets that initiate
the connection [70, 208].
Moreover, mobile devices that are in communication range may eventually move out
of range. Depending on the wireless technology used, communication interrupts may
cause random backoffs, inordinately long delays, and failures that can hinder other
connection opportunities. Devices need to somehow determine that the communica-
tion opportunity has ended, and cleanly close open descriptors. Moreover, they need
to deal with cases where the opportunistic connection resumes after a brief pause.
• Slow persistent storage: Low-power persistent storage takes two forms: disk drives
that operate with a low disk RPM and spin down when not used, and Flash memory.
Slow persistent storage affects both the selection and data phases. Slow (random)
I/O causes the retrieval of metadata to take order of magnitude longer than if the
metadata was in memory. Slow I/O also serves to reduce the overall throughput of
a connection. We have found that reading and writing to slow persistent storage
(hard disk and Flash memory) during an opportunistic connection reduces wireless
throughput by approximately a factor of two [128].
• Limited RAM: Despite the continuous decrease in memory costs, RAM continues
to be a highly constrained resource on mobile devices. Constraints due to limited
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RAM manifest themselves in two forms and inhibit both the selection and data
phases. First, lack of RAM prevents applications from storing application data in
memory and thus requires accessing slower persistent storage during an opportunistic
connection. Second, querying, reading, and transmitting data during an opportunis-
tic connection typically results in a rapid series of memory allocation requests that
often consume all of the available memory and cause virtual memory swaps that
further slow access to persistent storage. Subsequent allocation requests during the
opportunistic connection must block waiting for the virtual memory swap to finish.
The problems stemming from limited memory are magnified by virtual machines such
as Java and .NET, which are becoming increasingly common on mobile devices. Both
Java and .NET rely on garbage collection to reclaim memory. Garbage collection
is known to be computationally expensive [209]. Although garbage collection can
be performed eagerly during periods of inactivity, it is typically performed lazily
and reclaimed on demand. Performing garbage collection during an opportunistic
connection can significantly reduce throughput.
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3.4 Design principles
With an understanding of the parameters that inhibit opportunistic communication, we
now present a set of design principles. The relationship between system constraints and
design principles is summarized in Table 3.1.
• Cache metadata
Storing metadata in main memory rather than persistent storage provides a quick
remedy to the effect of slow I/O to persistent memory. Measurements in KioskNet
show that even an in-memory näıve metadata implementation can reduce the dura-
tion of the selection phase by approximately a factor of five. Unfortunately, while we
assume that metadata can always fit in memory, we cannot guarantee that memory
will not be consumed by other applications or persist after a device reset. Appli-
cations should therefore treat in-memory metadata as a cache that provides hints
during the selection phase [181]. An invalid hint may have the side effect of forward-
ing redundant data; however, successful hints will significantly increase performance.
• Use all available free memory, but adapt to low-memory conditions
This principle follows naturally from the need to cache and minimize interaction with
slow persistent storage during an opportunistic connection. The ability to determine
the level of available free memory exists in nearly all smartphone and embedded
OSes. Applications should proactively populate their in-memory cache when memory
is unused.
While opportunistic communication systems should consume as much main memory
as available, they must be equally ready to release it back to the underlying OS
immediately after use. In virtual memory environments, failure to release memory
back to the OS will eventually result in frequent page swaps. In environments without
virtual memory, memory allocations will either fail or emergency garbage collection
will take place1. We have found that low-memory problems frequently occur during
opportunistic connections when large amounts of memory are requested.
1The default behaviour in most Java VMs is to wait until free memory drops below a predefined
threshold before triggering garbage collection.
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On recent smartphone platforms, including BlackBerry [6] and Windows Mobile [5],
applications can register for low-memory events from the underlying OS and proac-
tively release memory. While every non-trivial application should utilize these OS
functions, their use is critical in an opportunistic communication setting.
• Minimize redundant wireless data transfer
The most effective means of minimizing redundant data transfer is to avoid retrans-
mitting bundles. Although this principle may seem obvious, its design and imple-
mentation is non-trivial and must be considered in the early stages of software design.
In KioskNet, redundant data transfer is reduced through the use of a metadata ex-
change. Each connected component exchanges a list of bundle IDs identifying the
bundles that it contains. Each component then requests only bundles that it does
not have. In our current implementation, this exchange causes the selection phase to
last approximately 30 seconds for a 100 MB workload and nearly zero bundles are
redundantly transferred. MobiClique also minimizes redundant transfers without a
metadata exchange; the selection phase consists purely of a complex database query
and no network I/O. Each MobiClique device maintains a record of which bundles
have been successfully delivered to each device; only unsent bundles are forwarded.
This operation requires a four-way database join and can take over 30 seconds to
select less than 5 MB worth of bundles. Clearly, the design of this optimization can
have a significant impact on the performance of the system.
• Explicitly distinguish between periods of connection and disconnection
We strongly believe that exploiting periods of disconnection can yield substantial
performance gains. Although neither of our systems exploit this property to its full
potential, we foresee using disconnection periods to (1) refresh the metadata cache,
(2) compress/decompress data bundles, (3) pre-compute forwarding strategies, and
(4) performing explicit garbage collection.
• Use hysteresis
Poor and intermittent communication can cause connections to come and go fre-
quently. Reacting to lost and re-established connections requires each device to enter
the setup and selection phases before it can resume sending data. A system that uses
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opportunistic communication should not immediately react to the loss of a connec-
tion; the connection may resume after a short delay. When a connection is thought
to be lost, we have found that waiting 10 to 20 seconds before declaring it closed
works well.
3.5 Chapter summary
Drawing on our experiences with two existing systems, KioskNet and MobiClique, we have
discussed how the dominant form of future computing both enables, while its defining
characteristics inhibit, opportunistic communication. By examining each constraint in a
mobile device and its effect on opportunistic communication, we have enumerated a set of
design principles. Although these principles may seem like common sense, they are not
obvious when initially designing a system. We have learned them only by examining the
flaws in our own work and have re-implemented parts of both systems to correct these
problems.
In summary, we believe that developing applications for a resource-constrained envi-
ronment requires careful consideration of how and when memory is used and storage is
accessed, when a connection should be made and eventually closed, and most importantly,
how energy consumption can be minimized; developing in these environments requires a
sense of minimalism. We apply these principles to the design of a prototype CTN applica-







In this chapter we present the high-level architecture of a CTN. Guided by the design
principles outlined in the previous chapter and several software goals, we describe a software
architecture for a prototype CTN system in Section 4.2. We present the details of our
implementation and integrated experiment framework in Section 4.3.
4.1 Architecture
We approach the design of a CTN from the bottom up, starting with the need to pro-
vide private communication between participants. Existing DTNs achieve communication
privacy through a hierarchical PKI, rooted at a trusted system administrator [163]. This
approach clearly violates several CTN requirements. Hierarchical PKI schemes require a
centralized authority to issue certificates and bootstrap trust. All participants in the sys-
tem must know the certificate authority: both legitimate and malicious. This requirement
creates a central point of legal and physical attack. Although multiple trust hierarchies
could be created in an attempt to circumvent such attacks, disjoint groups of users be-
longing to different trust hierarchies would not be able to communicate reliably. Finally, a
central authority, if compromised, would quickly erode the censorship-resistant properties
of the network. Robustness would be lost by definition. Privacy could be lost if fraudulent
certificates are issued. The system would cease to scale, as new members could not join
the network. Moreover, any attempt to join the network would quickly reveal the identity
of the prospective participant.
To satisfy the CTN criteria, the architecture must be fully decentralized. Nodes in our
system operate by forming trust relationships with other mutually trusted nodes. Trust
is expressed by directly disclosing an identity to another node. Our architecture leverages
the trust relationships to create a simple, efficient scheme for organizing and expressing
demand for content contained within the CTN. These concepts are detailed in remainder
of this section.
4.1.1 Identity
A self-generated globally unique ID (GUID) and a corresponding self-generated pub-
lic/private key pair uniquely identify nodes operating in a CTN. The private key is always
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kept private by the node, and used to respond to authentication requests and for symmet-
ric key exchange much like in TLS/SSL [43]. The GUID and public key are distributed to
trusted nodes along with several other attributes that may change over time. These at-
tributes include one or more wireless MAC addresses used for device discovery, an optional
phone number for the device, and an optional human-readable alias. The role of the phone
number will be explained later in this chapter and is necessary for the work presented in
Chapter 6.
A CTN node does not share its identity with nodes that it does not trust. Sharing
MAC addresses with untrusted nodes would allow them to de-anonymize CTN participants,
and thus compromise their identity privacy. The only attribute that a node shares with
non-trusted devices is the GUID. We assume that trusted nodes would not readily share
identities other nodes due to the real-world social relationships that underpin the formation
of the initial trust relationship.
4.1.2 Trust relationships
Sharing censored, potentially illicit content with another person requires trust. We there-
fore assume that a CTN node will only ever communicate with nodes whose users are
mutually trusted. Our approach operates by forming pairwise trust relationships between
nodes whose users trust each other in the real world. Relationships are formed by invita-
tion through direct social interaction. By forming a trust relationship with a node whose
users trust each other in the real world, we assume that the node will never betray the
trust. That is, we assume that a node will never willingly disclose the identity of another
trusted node. This assumption is fundamental to the design of a CTN. We will discuss
exceptions to this assumption in Section 8.1.3.
Constraining communication to specific trusted nodes is a technique borrowed from our
prior work with the MobiClique system [144]; however, recall that this approach relies on
existing online social networks to infer and bootstrap trust and is therefore not suitable
for use in a CTN. In contrast, our simple approach to forming pairwise trust relationships
facilitates incremental deployment. In the aggregate, each pairwise trust relationship forms
an edge in the graph that we refer to as the trust topology.
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4.1.3 Content demand and organization
Content in a CTN consists of photos, movies, audio, and other files present on a mobile
device. Content may be retrieved from any source or produced locally, and is assumed to
be highly diverse in both its character and physical size. The primary role of a CTN is
to disseminate content from content holders to nodes that desire, or demand, the content.
We further assume that the content is censored or illicit in nature since non-censored
content can be acquired directly from Internet-based sources with significantly less effort
and resource cost. This assumption is important because it requires that identities of
participants and information about the content that they demand or possess be carefully
managed. Recall from Chapter 1 that the identity of a user is the primary asset of interest
to attackers. Therefore, non-trusted nodes can never be allowed to learn the identity of a
node carrying potentially illicit content.
We make two additional practical assumptions regarding user demand for content.
First, we assume that users’ preference for content is highly diverse. This property has
been observed in prior work studying personal music collections [98], online video consump-
tion [59], and BitTorrent downloads [203]. Second, we assume that demand can greatly
exceed the storage capacities of nodes and communication capacity of the network. The
underlying routing protocol must therefore be designed to discriminate amongst many
concurrent requests for the node’s resources, while maintaining compliance with the CTN
design criteria outlined in Chapter 1.
Demand for content
Nodes in existing mobile content sharing systems express demand for content through one
of two means. The first approach is to express demand for content through strategically
chosen keywords [76]. By disseminating keywords of interest to other nodes in the network,
nodes, in theory, retrieve content with matching keywords. This method has three major
flaws. First, a keyword-based scheme implicitly the taxonomy of the content to be the
entire lexicon of every language. Second, it requires that users tag every item, an onerous
task. Third, even if the content is optimally routed from source to destination, many items
may match a node’s keywords of interest. An incorrect selection of content by intermediate
nodes costs each node both energy and storage, and thus reduces the transmission capacity
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of the network. In the absence of malicious tagging, this method may work for popular
content. For example, the keywords “tiananmen square tank man” unequivocally corre-
sponds to the historical Chinese image. However, the multitude of keywords corresponding
to any content item easily illustrates the inherent inefficiencies of a keyword-based selection
scheme.
Other mobile systems mimic the publish-subscribe model and organize content accord-
ing to a pre-determined channels [16, 112]. Nodes subscribe to a channel and retrieve con-
stituent episodes from neighbouring devices carrying the desired channel content. Given
that the set of all content is extremely large with highly diverse producers, a static hierarchy
would clearly not be scalable.
Both the keyword-based and publish-subscribe methods are a form of late binding
between nodes and the content that they demand. A node that has demanded content will
be unaware of the specific content item(s) retrieved in satisfaction of their request until
the content is eventually delivered. In addition to the inefficiencies and poor scalability of
these schemes, we believe that this unavoidable ambiguity is sufficient grounds to dismiss
both approaches as impractical for use in a real-world system.
Our approach leverages the trust topology to provide a simple, efficient scheme for
expressing demand for content explicitly. Our approach is unique in that it tightly couples
nodes’ demand for content with the specific items being demanded within a known, finite
Content Space, defined next.
Content Space
The Content Space, CS, is the continuously growing set of all content in existence in the
system. We will refer to the elements of CS generically as content items, which are uniquely
identified by a Content ID (CID) derived from a hash of its contents. Several metadata
fields accompany content items. These are: a size, a content type, a filename name, and
human-readable description.
Constraining communication to an explicit set of trusted nodes creates a convenient
bound on the information that must be maintained about other nodes in the system. We
use this constraint to define CSi as the view of all content known to exist by node ni. Dur-
ing an opportunistic connection between two nodes, each node may exchange metadata
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corresponding to content from one or more sources. The first source of metadata is from
local content. Local content is content that exists on a node that is either partially or com-
pletely retrieved from other nodes. A metadata exchange should also include the metadata
for content known to exist on other nodes that are reachable by the node. Reachability is
defined in Section 5.2.4. These metadata updates also include the GUID of the node that
owns the content.
The protocol underlying the exchange of content during an opportunistic connection will
be explained in detail in Chapter 5. At this stage in our discussion, it is important to note
that sharing metadata is not a strict requirement for participation in a CTN. For example,
nodes electing to never transport content on behalf of others may simply restrict their
metadata transmission to locally-held content. However, not sharing metadata prevents
retrieving metadata for others, which we will show is a necessary condition for long-term
participation within a CTN with nodes that are sensitive to resource costs.
Each node expresses demand for content by explicitly listing the CIDs of demanded
items in its demand vector. Content items are assumed to be large enough to exceed the
link capacity of opportunistic connections between nodes and therefore must be transported
across the network as fragments. Each element of the demand vector contains a bitmap of
fragments that have already been retrieved.
Each node maintains a mapping of node GUIDs that own (or partially own) content
items to the corresponding content metadata. This mapping contains GUIDs for both
trusted and non-trusted (anonymous) nodes. However, metadata corresponding to content
that is partially owned is only maintained for trusted nodes. This mapping facilitates
efficient lookups of both the content owned by a specific node. A reverse mapping between
the CID and node GUIDs is also maintained to allow efficient searches of nodes that own
specific content items.
In practice, a node may add or delete items from the device at any time. A node’s Con-
tent Space may therefore become stale over time. To overcome this situation, we associate
a timestamp with the metadata corresponding to every non-local content item. The times-
tamp is updated every time the metadata is detected. The timestamp is subsequently used
to delete metadata based on age. For example, suppose that node A frequently contacts
node B. When A first contacts B it retrieves all of B’s Content Space. Each association
of a content item with B includes the current timestamp. Node B subsequently deletes
some content. Since node B does not maintain a record of content metadata known to
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A, it is not expected to notify A of content deletions. Instead, during a subsequent meta-
data exchange, A updates the timestamp of content observed on B with the current time.
When A’s storage capacity becomes constrained and it needs to prune the Content Space,
A should delete the content items with the oldest observed timestamp first.
The Content Space may grow exponentially as new nodes enter the system and trust
relationships expand. Our current prototype implementation prunes the Content Space
based on a least recently encountered policy: when the Content Space grows beyond a user-
specified threshold, the metadata for content belonging to the least recently encountered
node is deleted. Metadata for content on non-trusted nodes that, by definition, have never
been contacted inherits the contact statistics of intermediate trusted nodes. Alternative
strategies for pruning the Content Space can also be implemented in our system, and is
discussed as future work in Section 8.2.1.
4.2 Software architecture
We motivate the software architecture of a prototype CTN system by first outlining several
high-level goals that influence our software design and implementation. These goals refine
the CTN design criteria outlined in Chapter 1 and the design principles outlined in the
last chapter.
• Platform agnostic: Unfortunately, the software APIs exposed by today’s mobile
software platforms are highly heterogeneous and non-standardized [125]. The pro-
totype CTN software must accommodate this heterogeneity to the greatest degree
possible.
• Hardware agnostic: Today’s mobile devices are commonly equipped with Wi-
Fi, Bluetooth, and cellular radios, with different capabilities, usage paradigms and
corresponding APIs. The logic underlying the CTN software should be agnostic to































































Figure 4.1: Software architecture of the BlackBerry CTN prototype.
4.2.1 Components
This section describes the major components of our prototype CTN system. The software
architecture of the system is illustrated in Figure 4.1.
Connection
Connection objects reside at the lowest level of the CTN stack. A Connection object is
an abstract representation of a network interface. The Connection API encapsulates two
67
sub-APIs. The Neighbour API is an abstract representation of a neighbouring device.
The device may be any device and not necessarily a participating node in the CTN. The
Neighbour object encapsulates the information needed to establish a connection with that
device. This information may include a MAC address of a neighbouring Bluetooth device
or an IP address of another Wi-Fi-enabled device. The Neighbour Set API is an abstract
representation of a collection Neighbour objects.
Connections have two overlapping operating modes. The first, neighbour detection
mode, is responsible for initiating neighbour discovery at a specified frequency. This may
include transmitting UDP beacons, or doing a Bluetooth device inquiry scan. After de-
tecting a set of neighbouring devices, the Connection object passes the corresponding
Neighbour Set up the stack to the Client Core through a neighbour detection event. The
Client Core is the heart of our prototype implementation, and will be described later in
this section.
Connection objects that are capable of detecting neighbouring devices are able to ini-
tiate and accept connections to and from other devices (assuming that the neighbouring
device is still within communication range). Outbound connections are initiated by the
Client Core by calling connect() on a Neighbour object. Upon receiving a connection, the
Connection object constructs a single Neighbour object that encapsulates the connection.
This Neighbour object is passed up the stack to the Client Core as a neighbour connec-
tion event. Once a connection is established between a pair of CTN nodes, the Neighbour
class allows communication with the connected neighbour through conventional send()
and recv() primitives.
Connection objects that are capable of detecting neighbouring devices may create
Neighbour objects without having to first detected them nearby. That is, given a set
of data needed to connect to a neighbouring device, a Neighbour object can be created
to encapsulate the data. For example, if the WLAN IP address of a neighbouring node
is known, then a Neighbour object can be created by the Wi-Fi Connection object. This
function of the Connection API is essential to handing off communication with a neigh-
bouring node from one interface to another. The most common hand-off being between
Bluetooth to Wi-Fi. This process is discussed in Section 4.3.2.
Connection objects may optionally register themselves as operating in control channel
mode. The architecture permits any interface may operate as a control channel. However,
in practice, messages sent on control channel interfaces should have much lower end-to-end
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delay than messages transmitted through an opportunistic delay tolerant network. Like
the process of accepting a connection, any control messages received by a control channel
are passed to the Client Core for subsequent processing.
Client Core Message
Control messages exchanged between pairs of nodes are essential to managing the state
of the trust topology that underlies the CTN. The Client Core Message API provides a
common interface to producing and consuming these control message.
A Client Core Message has several attributes: the GUID of each of the source and
destination nodes, a message type, a length, a variable length payload, and a delivery
deadline. The presence of a delivery deadline stems from the fact that control messages
are delay tolerant and may be delivered to recipients over any available network interface.
Depending on the available interfaces, messages may be delivered opportunistically through
short-range wireless links or transferred over WAN links. It is the responsibility of the
Client Core to schedule a control message for transmission over specific network interfaces
to ensure that the delivery deadline is met.
Although control messages contain both a source and destination GUID that allow them
to be delivered across multiple hops, we believe that in practice most control messages will
be delivered via a single hop. We discuss how control messages are delivered in the next
chapter.
Message Store
The Message Store is responsible for providing persistent storage of control messages. The
Message Store, similar to the other data stores, exposes a view of its underlying data
structures. Elements of the view are sorted by earliest delivery deadline, allowing the
Client Core to efficiently determine if a delivery deadline has been passed.
Contact
A Contact is an abstract representation of a node in the system. Contact objects must
maintain and provide access to elements of a node’s identity. These elements include
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any known MAC addresses, the node’s GUID, and its public key. A Contact includes
the node’s human-readable alias and phone number. Contact objects also encapsulate all
known data about the state of the node in the system, which is used for routing. This
state includes the last time that the node was encountered, the estimated inter-contact
period, (a common metric for ranking nodes [29, 90, 173, 204]), and the last time that
various routing protocol functions were performed with the node. Finally, contact objects
are responsible for serializing their contents to a standardized format for exchange between
nodes running different mobile software platforms.
Contact Store
The Contact Store is responsible for maintaining a record of the nodes underlying secure,
trusted communication in the CTN. These are encapsulated in the Contact objects. Like
the Message Store, the Contact Store provides multiple views of the underlying trust
topology. Nodes may be trivially sorted by the least recently seen node or by their alias.
However, it is often useful to arrange nodes by their potential value to the user. We discuss
strategies used by the Contact Store to rank nodes in the next chapter. Implementation
considerations of views are discussed in Section 4.3.3.
Event Handler
The Event Handler provides a bridge between the Client Core and the user. The Event
Handler handles all events that are not handled by the Client Core, which are mostly
events that require user attention. The Event Handler also receives events generated by
the user that need to be processed by the Client Core.
Like the data stores, the Event Handler also exposes a view of its internal state. The
view is primarily used by the UI layer to view lists of pending events.
Content Space
The Content Space object is responsible for organizing and managing content in the CTN.
The Content Space at a node has three primary functions. The first function is to maintain
the demand vectors of all contacts know to that node. Conceptually, content exchange
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takes place over the censorship-resistant communication substrate provided by the trust
topology. Architecturally, the Content Space is tightly coupled with the Contact Store.
Every node in the Contact Store has a corresponding demand vector in the Content Space.
The second function of the Content Space is to provide a mapping between node GUIDs
and collections of content. These collections correspond to the content known to have
existed on that node at some point in the past (it may have been deleted to free up space),
and may represent both partial and complete content items. The Content Space also
maintains the reverse mapping of content items to a set of owners. This mapping allows
both users and the Client Core to efficiently determine the set of nodes that own a desired
content item.
The third function is to monitor the local file system of the device for content. Con-
tent may be created, modified, or deleted at any time. Newly created content in the file
system is securely hashed to produce its CID. The CID and metadata corresponding to
the newly content are automatically added to the local collection of known content. The
Content Space also maintains a mapping of filenames of local content to their correspond-
ing metadata. In the event that a file is deleted from the device, the Content Store deletes
the metadata corresponding to the removed file. However, if other nodes own the content
item, then the metadata is preserved and only the local node’s GUID is removed from its
list of owners.
The Content Space exposes the most functionally diverse view of all the components.
The Content Space view may filter content that is either local or remote. View can also
sort content based on size, number of outstanding fragments, quantity of outstanding data,
or the number of owners.
Client Core
The Client Core is the only major architectural component to have a concrete implemen-
tation. All other components discussed in this section are APIs only. Concrete implemen-
tations of each API are platform specific.
The Client Core has three key roles: to process Events or hand them off to the Event
Handler, to implement the routing protocol between a pair of connected devices, and to
ensure that control message delivery deadlines are met.
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Events from the user are delivered to the Client Core via an event queue within the
Event Handler. These events correspond to the operations by the user that result in the
creation and subsequent transmission of a control message. These events may include text
messages exchanged between users (illustrated in Figure A.4(d)) or state updates, which
we describe as future work in Chapter 8. Events sent by the user are always assumed to be
handled asynchronously by the Client Core and no response is returned to the user. Client
Core Messages derived from User Events are scheduled for transmission by adding them
to the Message Store with a specified delivery delay.
The second source of events comes from the Connection objects. As previously dis-
cussed, these events include neighbour detection events, neighbour connection events, and
control message events. Neighbour detection events are accompanied by a Neighbour Set
object that contains a Neighbour object for each neighbouring device. This event is handled
synchronously by the Client Core and executes on the Connection object’s single thread;
thus blocking the neighbour detection process while the single thread is busy within the
Client Core. Upon receiving a Neighbour Set, the Client Core selects a subset of Neigh-
bours by querying the Contact Store with the physical address of the Neighbour. We refer
to the subset of trusted Neighbour objects as a candidate set. The Client Core iterates
through the candidate set and attempts to establish a connection with each Neighbour.
Once a connection is successfully established with a neighbouring, trusted CTN node, both
nodes initiate a pairwise, tit-for-tat protocol. Both the strategy for ranking nodes and the
pairwise protocol are discussed in the next chapter.
Neighbour connection events signal that a connection has been made from a neighbour-
ing node. The Client Core using the Connection object’s thread also handles this event
synchronously. We will justify this design decision in Section 4.3.2. A Neighbour object
that encapsulates the interface-specific connection accompanies this event. The Client Core
immediately drops connections from nodes that either have an unknown physical address,
and are untrusted by definition, or fail to initiate a secure connection using the receiver’s
public key. If the identify of the connected node is known (and by definition trusted),
and a connection is successfully established, then the pairwise communication protocol
is established. As a convention, the node that initiates the connection also initiates the
pairwise protocol.
Control message events received by a Connection object mirror those received from the
UI layer. They currently only include text messages received from another node, which are
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subsequently passed to the Event Handler for eventual consumption by the user.
The Client Core has a single utility thread that is responsible for performing tasks
during periods of non-connectivity. This task periodically connects to each data store to
perform cleanup tasks, which are implementation-specific. However, when a Neighbour
Set is present and the Client Core is actively engaged in opportunistic connections with
other CTN nodes, all functions of this thread are suspended except for a single check
to the Message Store to determine the next control message deadline. If a deadline has
expired, the utility thread retrieves the control message(s) and delegates them to the first
Connection object that operates in control message mode.
User Interface
The user interface (UI) is not part of the CTN core architecture. Although the CTN
can operate independently of a UI, the UI is essential for forming and managing trust
relationships and expressing demand for content. As previously discussed, elements of
the UI consume events from the Event Handler and pass new events down the stack via
the Event Handler. UI elements are allowed to manipulate the underlying data stores
through their respective APIs. UI elements visualize the state of each store by retrieving
an abstract view from component. The implementation details of the UI for our prototype
implementation is discussed in Section 4.3.3 and illustrated throughout Appendix A.
4.2.2 Communication protocols
Communication between two CTN nodes differs depending on the state of the devices’
trust relationship.
Bootstrapping secure communication
Communication with another node requires trust. As we have previously discussed, trust
is established through the mutual exchange of identities. These identities contain all of the
information needed to both identify and initiate communication with a node. An identity
can contain many attributes that uniquely identify a node. A telecom provider under order,
for example, can easily and quickly map the presence of a phone number to an identity
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from a repressive government regime. An identity must therefore be exchanged between
two nodes over a private channel.
We bootstrap security in our prototype CTN through direct social interaction between
two CTN users. When two, presumably mutually trusted, users contact each other and
would like to form trust relationship, the invitee sets the device as operating in invitation
mode. This mode temporarily allows incoming (encrypted) connections from unknown
devices. The inviter then identifies the other in its current Neighbour Set. The inviter is
then prompted through the Event Handler and UI to enter an integer value. This value is
then verbally or visually shared with the invitee. The integer value is subsequently used by
the node as a symmetric key to bootstrap an encrypted connection with the neighbouring
node. Upon connection establishment, the invitee is prompted through the device UI to
enter the integer value. If the value is correctly entered, the Client Core can decrypt
the connection stream. After successfully establishing an encrypted connection, the nodes
proceed to exchange identities. This signals the end of the bootstrapping phase.
This approach is a quick means to bootstrap a private communication channel to ex-
change identities. However, some elements of an identity can not be protected. A third
party eavesdropper can easily discover hardware addresses by passively intercepting link
layer frames. However, we believe that the use of encryption obfuscates the communica-
tion channel sufficiently to create plausible deniability that the communication session was
not used for illicit purposes. The same argument applies to our standard communication
protocol, which uses stronger encryption. We revisit the topic of security and privacy of
our system in Chapter 8.
Standard communication
The mutual possession of identities allows two nodes to connect to each other without
user intervention. This is the standard mode of communication in a CTN. All connections
are initiated by the Client Core. For the purposes of discussion, we’ll refer to the device
that initiates the connection as the client and the other node as the server. The client
begins by generating a random key, kc. The key is then encrypted using the public key
of the server, (the public key is part of its identity), and transmitted to the server over
the channel. Assuming that the client’s connection is accepted, the server using its private










































Figure 4.2: Control message encryption and decryption protocol.
ks. This key is encrypted using the public key of the client and the server transmits the
encrypted key back to the client. The client decrypts the transmission to reveal ks. At this
stage neither node has authenticated the other. Both nodes hold a version of kc and ks.
If either party does not hold the required private key, then the decrypted key will differ
from the source key. We therefore authenticate each node by producing a single shared
symmetric key kcs = kc ⊕ ks, which is used to initialize an encrypted stream between the
two nodes. Both nodes finish the setup process by transmitting a nonce to the other node
encrypted using kcs. If kcs on both the client and server match, then the nonce will be
successfully echoed back to the node. After the connection is successfully established, the
two CTN nodes initiate the pairwise tit-for-tat protocol outlined in the next chapter.
Control messages are created by the Client Core and delegated to a Connection object
for transmission. Control messages are intended to be transmitted asynchronously. The
Client Core is only notified of a successful or failed delivery. However, privacy and source
authentication of the control message is still very important. Prior to delegating a control
message to a Connection object, the Client Core computes a digital signature of the message
using its private key. The signature and the control message are then encrypted directly
using the recipient’s public key (control messages are limited to 32 KB in size). When the
control message is delivered to the recipient node, the message is decrypted using the node’s
private key. Before accepting the control message, the node decrypts the signature using
the source node’s public key and verifies the secure hash of the plaintext control message. If
the signature is rejected, then the control message is discarded and no response is returned
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to the source node. The message is otherwise accepted and processed by the Client Core
or the Event Handler. This protocol is illustrated in Figure 4.2.
4.3 Implementation
In compliance with our first software goal of platform independence, we chose to implement
our software architecture in Java. Our core implementation is CLDC compliant [81] and
therefore runs on a wide range of Java enabled devices and both Android and BlackBerry
smartphones. Both the Android and BlackBerry platforms have the capability of running
an autonomous CTN application [125]. We chose to implement device specific components
of our prototype CTN on BlackBerry. Our implementation as of April 2012 is 32,245
non-comment lines of code and will be released under the Apache open source licence
upon publication of this thesis. The Bouncy Castle cryptography library [182] used for
encryption and authentication adds an additional 72,098 non-comment lines of code to
the project. Unfortunately the poor performance of Bouncy Castle forced us to disable
the use of encryption in both the experiments and field trial that we will discuss in the
next chapter. Other system projects have reported similar performance problems with
the open source library [87, 199, 207]. Given that approximately two-thirds of the code
resides within the core, we estimate that an Android version could be easily written in
approximately three weeks of development time.
The application runs continuously in the background of a BlackBerry device. The pro-
totype has a user interface that allows the user to view the state of the Content Space,
Contact Store, Message Store, and the contents of any current Neighbour Sets (i.e. neigh-
bouring devices). Appendix A contains screen captures of the prototype CTN system.
4.3.1 Data storage
Persistent data storage in our prototype implementation takes two forms. The data un-
derlying the Contact Store, Message Store, and Content Space is stored in memory resi-
dent data structures and flushed to Flash memory using the BlackBerry Persistent Object
APIs [151]. Changes to the Content Store and Message Store are infrequent, so changes are
immediately flushed to Flash memory. Changes to the Content Space data structure are
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both frequent and take place primarily during opportunistic connections. Moreover, the
data structure can become very large as the Content Space grows. Flushing the Content
Space data to persistent memory during an opportunistic connection significantly reduces
throughput. The Client Core therefore suspends Content Space commits until the termi-
nation of the data phase of an opportunistic connection. In the event that a device is
reset during an opportunistic connection, then any recent updates in content ownership or
metadata are therefore lost. Information pertaining to other nodes can be retrieved during
a subsequent connection.
All content items and fragments are stored as files on the device’s local storage and/or
the removable SD card. In the event of a device reset, updates to the local node’s state can
be reloaded directly from local storage by iterating through the file system. The state of
the local file system is authoritative by definition and replaces any existing Content Space
data.
4.3.2 Supported network interfaces
Our BlackBerry prototype implementation includes three concrete implementations of the
Connection interface: Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and an SMS interface (see Chapter 6). The Blue-
tooth connection class configured to do periodic Bluetooth device inquiry scans. Bluetooth
is an ideal radio for neighbour detection due to the low energy cost of a scan [69]. We
show in Chapter 7 that the charging habits of most users is sufficient to perform Bluetooth
scans continuously without depleting their battery. Upon completion of a scan, the con-
nection object populates a Bluetooth Neighbour Set object with Bluetooth Neighbour
objects containing the Bluetooth MAC address of detected devices, and passes the abstract
neighbour set to the Client Core.
After receiving a set of neighbouring devices, the Client Core selects a subset of neigh-
bours whose MAC addresses correspond to trusted Contacts (nodes) in the Contact Store.
After selecting this candidate set of trusted nodes, the Client Core attempts to connect
to a node. Strategies for ranking and selecting nodes is described in Chapter 5. Blue-
tooth’s pairing requirements make it impractical for device-to-device communication. We
must therefore use the Wi-Fi interface for communication between devices. Unfortunately,
BlackBerry does not support communication in Wi-Fi ad hoc mode [6]. Our current Wi-
Fi connection implementation therefore only operates in Wi-Fi infrastructure mode, and
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nodes must be associated with a wireless network to exchange large quantities of data
directly.
To connect to a neighbouring device over Wi-Fi we require its IP address. Until recently,
BlackBerry devices were unable to receive broadcast UDP packets, leaving no mechanism
to discover the dynamic IP addresses of older, neighbouring devices. To overcome this
problem we created the Bluetooth Lookup Service (BLS). The BLS is an online service
that maps that maps a Bluetooth MAC addresses to the LAN and WAN IP addresses of
neighbouring devices. We describe the BLS later in this section. We expect that future
versions of the system will utilize Wi-Fi Direct, which is available as of version 4.0 of the
Android platform [131].
The SMS connection class is a wrapper for an SMS-based transport protocol (SMS-
TP). The SMS-TP is stand-alone component of our system, and is described in detail in
Chapter 6. Like the implementation of the CTN core, the SMS-TP is also CLDC compli-
ant and communicates with the underlying cellular radio APIs through an SMS Handler
abstract interface. We have implemented two concrete SMS Handler classes. The first class
communicates with the standard BlackBerry native APIs for transmitting SMS messages.
The second class is used for experimentation and utilizes a custom Internet-based SMS to
transmit messages, which we describe in Section 4.3.4. Unlike the Bluetooth and Wi-Fi
connection classes, SMS does not have the concept of a neighbour, nor does it constrain
communication to nearby devices. The SMS connection can be used to communicate with
any other node at any time. Unfortunately, as we will see in Chapter 6, SMS does not
provide sufficient throughput to exchange content. We therefore limit the SMS interface
for use only as a control channel. Upon expiration of a control message deadline, the Client
Core will schedule the control message for transmission over the SMS interface. Upon suc-
cessful delivery of a control message over SMS, the message is deleted from the Message
Store.
It is important to note that the use of SMS violates the censorship-resistant robustness
and unlinkability constraints due to its dependency on cellular network infrastructure. The
use of this interface is therefore optional as control messages can alternatively be delivered
directly through opportunistic connections. However, given the massive and growing pop-
ularity of SMS [78, 145], we believe that the occasional use of SMS to exchange control
messages poses minimal risk, especially considering that the messages are encrypted. Our
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Figure 4.3: Aggregate Wi-Fi throughput vs. number of concurrent Wi-Fi connections.
the SMS transmission behaviour of real-world users [115, 201]. We demonstrate the benefit
of using SMS as a control channel in a CTN in Chapter 5.
Each Connection object contains a single thread that is responsible for receiving in-
coming connections. Connection objects that are capable of detecting neighbouring devices
contain a second thread that is responsible for scanning for neighbouring devices. Although
the Client Core is thread-safe and can support an arbitrary number of concurrent connec-
tions, we only allow two concurrent connections. One connection may be initiated by the
thread originating from inside the Bluetooth Connection object, and the Wi-Fi Connection
object may received a second incoming connection. While the receive thread is capable of
spawning new threads for each incoming connection, our current implementation purposely
limits the number of incoming connections to one. This design decision was not arbitrary.
We conducted a micro-benchmark to measure aggregate Wi-Fi throughput on a Black-
Berry device with respect to the number of concurrent connections. The experiment was
conducted using a BlackBerry Bold 9000 device. This experiment was done using a simple
BlackBerry application that mimics the I/O characteristics and tit-for-tat behaviour of the
protocol described in the next chapter. A 10 MB file was transferred from a laptop to the
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BlackBerry device, which spawns a new thread containing a 1 MB receive buffer for every
incoming connection. The data is then written to Flash memory. After receiving the data,
the application then transmits the contents of a 10 MB file to the laptop. The tit-for-tat
process was randomized to ensure that connections were not all sending or all receiving.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the aggregate throughput for the Wi-Fi interface with respect to
the number of concurrent connections. Throughput is clearly maximized at two threads.
With one connection thread, the time spent blocked on Flash I/O reduced throughput.
With two threads, while one thread is blocked the other is receiving data. Interestingly,
this frequently causes the operating system’s watchdog timer to kill the application due to
over utilization of the CPU. With three connection threads we observed that throughput
is reduced due to file system contention.
Bluetooth Lookup Service
The BLS is a DNS-like service that maps a device’s Bluetooth MAC address to its last
known LAN and WAN IP addresses. Like the core and SMS-TP implementations, the BLS
is a standalone, CLDC compliant library that can be integrated into any other Java-based
mobile application. There are three major components of the BLS: a device-side daemon,
the online lookup service, and the lookup API.
The device-side daemon is a continuously running thread that is responsible for mon-
itoring changes to the device’s Wi-Fi connectivity. When connectivity is lost, the thread
is dormant. When the connectivity is restored or after a user-defined timeout period, the
daemon connects to the online lookup service and uploads a base-64 encoded, secure hash
of the device’s Bluetooth MAC address and its LAN IP address. The use of a secure
hash prevents the service from determining the true MAC address of any BLS user if the
centralized service is compromised by an attacker. Since MAC addresses uniquely identify
devices, and by association their users, it is essential to keep MAC addresses of known
CTN nodes private to preserve anonymity.
Upon receiving an update, the service updates the table entry for the given hash string
with the given LAN IP address. The service also extracts the WAN IP address from the
active socket connection with the client node, and updates the WAN entry for the given
hash string. A timestamp associated with each record indicates the freshness of the table
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entry. BLS entries expired after 24 hours and are automatically deleted from the BLS
database.
Mobile client may query the service for an entry using the base-64 encoded, secure
hash of a neighbouring MAC address. If an entry exists, the service will reply with the
LAN IP address, the WAN IP address, and a timestamp indicating its age. The mobile
client then examines the entry. If the clients share the same WAN IP address, then they
are most likely within the same LAN (i.e. both behind the same NAT). In this case, the
client should attempt to establish a connection with the LAN IP address. Conversely, if
their WAN IP addresses differ than the LAN IP address entry is irrelevant, and the clients
should attempt to establish a connection using the WAN IP address.
The use of the BLS in our prototype CTN implementation clearly violates the censorship-
resistant unlinkability constraint. The presence of NAT and firewalls also inhibits peer-to-
peer connection establishment between peers in different networks. Although this problem
could be mitigated by incorporating STUNT [64, 65, 158] functionality into the centralized
BLS server, we ignore it because the BLS is only intended to be temporary. As previously
mentioned, Wi-Fi Direct is now available on Android smartphones and a wide range of
consumer products [195]. Future versions of our system will support these technologies,
thus removing the need for the BLS.
4.3.3 User interface
The UI is an essential component of a CTN; however, as a autonomous, continuously run-
ning application, the UI is the least-frequently used component. The runtime memory
footprint of our implementation reflects this imbalance by maintaining a low memory foot-
print while attempting to preserve responsiveness to the user. A low memory footprint is
trivially achieved by through a strict separation of views from the underlying model. By
instantiating UI components when a mobile application is brought to the foreground and
subsequently releasing them to the garbage collector when the application is returned to
the foreground, the memory footprint of the UI while the application is running in the
background is negligible. However, a strict separation between view and model requires
elements of the view to be recomputed every time the application is brought to the fore-
ground. This problem manifests itself primarily when viewing the large data structures
underlying the Content Store and the Contact Store. The Content Store can easily contain
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tens of thousands of content items with various properties and potential sorting charac-
teristics. The Contact Store has comparatively far fewer elements than the Content Store;
however, we found it useful to sort this data structure based on nodes’ relationship with
content and their demands (methods for ranking nodes are discussed in the next chapter).
Although sorting is a well-studied problem with efficient solutions, repeatedly sorting these
data structures as the user navigates through the UI has a noticeable impact on the re-
sponsiveness of the application1. Our implementation solves this problem by maintaining
pre-sorted lists of objects within the view of each major architectural component. Consis-
tency of these cached view elements is maintained by each architectural component with
negligible computational overhead. Each architectural component maintains a reference
to the cached view elements using a Java weak reference, thereby allowing the garbage
collector to reclaim the objects when memory is needed the device JVM. Any sorted lists
within views that are memory resident are updated each time that a new object is updated,
added to, or deleted from an underlying data store.
As previously discussed, the resources consumed through wireless I/O and file I/O
during opportunistic connection can have a significant impact on the device. While the
user is interacting with an application on a CTN-enabled device, it is necessary to preserve
a quality user experience. That is, a device should not “lag” as a result of resource intensive
tasks being performed by a CTN. Our prototype implementation therefore monitors the
BlackBerry idle timer before the most common CPU intensive tasks. The idle timer is
reset upon every user gesture, allowing the CTN to reliably determine when the user is
actively interacting with the device. We found that introducing a 500 ms delay on socket
I/O, computing the hash of content items, and pre-sorting data structures for routing,
while the idle timer was less than five seconds, made a significant, positive improvement.
The value of five seconds was chosen based on personal interaction with the CTN-enabled
device. Periods of non-interaction that are shorter than five seconds in length generally
correspond to active interaction with the device. In the absence of this artificial delay, we
found that the device was frequently unusable.
1The UI latency associated with computationally intensive tasks is not a new problem to mobile applica-
tion developers. A common design pattern in mobile applications is to perform computationally intensive
tasks at the start of the application while the user is presented with a splash screen. Unfortunately, anec-
dotal evidence derived from previous experiments [143] indicates that users expect a mobile application
that is explicitly indicated as active by the device UI to be immediately accessible.
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4.3.4 Experimental framework
Our prototype implementation includes an experimental framework that is designed to
provide consistent, repeatable experimentation using real mobile devices. Conducting ex-
periments on real mobile devices is essential for capturing the computational and commu-
nication constraints present in a realistic deployment. The ability to conduct repeatable,
controlled experiments is used extensively to evaluate our routing protocol in Chapter 5.
Our experimental framework has two major components: experiment profiles and a
device-side component to download, interpret and manage an experiment. An experiment
profile is an XML document that contains aggregate experiment settings, node profiles and
individual content and settings, trust relationships, and an event schedule. Experiments
are initiated manually through a device-side UI, which retrieves an index of experiment
profiles from the web server.
Upon selecting an experiment profile, the experimental framework downloads and
parses the profile. Each node profile is uniquely identified by its Bluetooth MAC ad-
dress. After downloading the experiment profile, each node extracts custom settings from
its node profile, as well as a set of URLs of pre-generated content items that it downloads
prior to the experiment.
Trust definitions allow nodes to be configured into experiment-specified trust relation-
ships. An experiment profile may contain many trust definitions. Each node extracts only
the trust definitions for which it is a member.
Each experiment profile contains an event schedule, which is a timeline of events that
occur within an experiment. An event schedule contains many events; however, each
event is consumed by only one node. The node, when parsing the profile, discards events
unrelated to it. These events include: contact events, demand events, and exit events.
A contact event represents a successful Bluetooth scan that identifies one or more other
nodes and the duration of emulated collocation. Contact events may be discrete events or
repeating.
Demand events represent an expression of demand by a node for a content item with
a specified CID. This event is an emulation of a user clicking on a content item in the
UI to signal demand for the item. Unlike contact events, demand events can be executed
lazily due to the non-determinism in how metadata is propagated through the network at
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runtime. Although contact schedules can be defined precisely, metadata propagation is
subject to the runtime behaviour of the routing protocol. A user cannot express demand
for a content item that is not present in the node’s Content Space. If encountered, demand
events for unknown items are held until the content items are actually discovered.
Exit events signal the end of an experiment and terminate any recurring events. Con-
sumption of an exit event terminates the experiment and initiates the upload of logs to a
web server for subsequent analysis.
After parsing an experiment profile, each node purges all persistent system state from
the Contact Store, Content Space, and Message Store. Configuration settings are also
reverted to default value. Each node then initializes its Contact Store with its own local
identity, its trust relationships, and the identities of the nodes that it is configured to trust.
Each device then seeds itself with specified content downloaded from the web server onto
the device’s local, persistent storage (on BlackBerry, this is typically a removable SD card).
The newly downloaded content is immediately added to the Content Space on each device.
At the end of the initialization phase, each device is in a known state. Assuming that all
nodes are clock synchronized from the PC used to load the CTN software, all nodes begin
the experiment at a common specified time.
Our experimentation framework allows for both consistent, repeatable experimentation
across a large number of CTN nodes while taking into account the hardware limitations
of smartphones. Given the previously discussed limitations of opportunistic communica-
tion between resource-constrained devices, preserving hardware limitations is important to
maintaining accuracy. Garbage collection, for example, can have a noticeable impact on
throughput given that wireless I/O on low-CPU powered devices has been shown to be a
CPU-bound operation [128]. This performance bias introduced by experimenting on real
smartphone hardware is not represented by existing DTN simulators [35].
Internet-based SMS
SMS is a useful mechanism for exchanging small amounts of control information between
devices. However, providing cellular network connectivity to every device in a large, 55-
node experiment would be expensive. We developed an Internet-based SMS to emulate
SMS service in the absence of cellular network connectivity. The Internet-based service
consists of two components: an SMS Handler and an Internet-based SMSC. The SMS
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Handler architecturally sits below the SMS-TP stack and is responsible for sending and
receiving 140-byte SMS messages to/from the SMS-TP.
The Internet-based SMS stack addresses nodes by the string representation of their
Bluetooth MAC address. Upon receiving an address-message pair, the SMS Handler com-
ponent uploads the message to an SMSC component running on an Internet server. The
messages are stored in a persistent database, but expire if not delivered within 24 hours.
Periodically, a receiving thread within each SMS Handler queries the server with its Blue-
tooth MAC address checking for new messages. The server responds with all pending
messages destined for the given MAC address. Once a message is successfully delivered, it
is removed from the SMSC’s database.
4.4 Chapter summary
In this chapter we have outlined the software architecture and implementation details of
our prototype CTN system. To satisfy the CTN criteria, our architecture is incremen-
tally deployable and fully decentralized, but may optionally, and/or intermittently, utilize
infrastructure to exchange SMS messages for control purposes.
We have described how trust is established between nodes through direct pairwise
social interaction where identities are exchanged over short-range, secure wireless links
and never shared with non-trusted nodes. All communication between CTN nodes takes
place within the trust topology formed through these pairwise trust relationships. Our
architecture leverages the structure of the trust topology to create a simple, efficient scheme
for organizing and explicitly expressing demand for content contained within the CTN.
Our architecture purposely omits one major component: the protocol governing com-
munication between two mutually trusted devices during an opportunistic connection. The









The decentralized formation of trust relationships between nodes provides both a secure
means of exchanging identities and communication privacy. The merging of content meta-
data into each node’s Content Space provides a means for nodes to unambiguously express
their demand for content within the network. We now build upon this functionality, and
describe a protocol for pairwise communication during an opportunistic connection that
implements routing. As its name suggests, Laissez-faire is a hands-off approach to DTN
routing. Instead of routing content from content holders to nodes that demand the content,
Laissez-faire creates a free market for content between nodes. Under Laissez-faire, nodes
accumulate debt by obtaining content from other nodes. Conversely, nodes allocate credit
by giving content to, or carrying content for, other nodes. The goal of retrieving content
for others is to accumulate credit, so that future demand for content can be retrieved on
the node’s behalf in payment of debt. Under Laissez-faire, all nodes are assumed to operate
selfishly to satisfy their own demands.
Content exchange between two nodes during an opportunistic connection is a tit-for-tat
process. Each node takes turns requesting a fragment of a content item from the other.
When selecting fragments from a neighbouring node, we assume that nodes always prefer
to retrieve fragments that satisfy their own demand over fragments of content demanded
by other nodes. That is, satisfying a node’s own demands is always more important than
reducing debt and satisfying the demands of others. Although this strategy may not be
optimal, it is an assumption that we believe is reasonable to make.
This chapter makes two contributions:
• We propose the Laissez-faire framework, a hands-off, incentivized approach to CTN
routing. We believe that the optimism regarding node participation in existing DTN-
based mobile systems is incompatible with our goal of releasing the work as open
source software. As open source software, anyone in the world is free to modify
the code and manipulate the underlying routing protocol to their own advantage.
No such protocol is defined in Laissez-faire. Instead, nodes are only responsible for
maintaining their own records of content exchange, and to implement the operations
of a pairwise tit-for-tat protocol. Yet our approach still allows for end-to-end delivery
of content. We believe that the simplicity of Laissez-faire can serve as the foundation
for future DTNs targeted for average smartphone users.
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• We implement the Laissez-faire framework within the prototype CTN system de-
scribed in the previous chapter, and evaluate Laissez-faire across a cluster of smart-
phones using our experimentation framework and through a three-week, 36-participant
field trial. Although Laissez-faire does not mandate any specific routing behaviour,
we propose several practical strategies for retrieving content fragments. We demon-
strate the trade-offs between strategies under varying controlled and real-life network
conditions.
We introduce three simple strategies for ranking the demands of other nodes. Each
strategy is based upon minimizing either a node’s demand or debt relationship with
other nodes, or the buffer allocation cost of carrying content fragments to nodes.
Once nodes have been ranked, we select fragments for nodes using a fragment se-
lection strategy. We introduce four sample fragment selection strategies. Fragment
selection strategies are also used to eject fragments from the storage buffer when the
buffer reaches capacity. We compare both the node ranking strategies and fragment
selection strategies with a näıve approach that simple selects nodes and fragments
uniformly randomly.
This chapter begins with an overview of the protocol operations that may take place
during a tit-for-tat exchange. In Section 5.3 we introduce several practical mechanisms for
ranking fragments and the demands of other nodes in the CTN. In Section 5.4 we conduct
a preliminary evaluation under controlled network conditions using our sample strategies
for ranking nodes and selecting fragments. These experiments are followed by a field trial,
which we describe, and present the results of, in Section 5.5.
5.2 Protocol operations
During an opportunistic connection between nodes ni and nj, each node takes a turn
executing one of the operations detailed in the following subsections (in any order) or pass
their turn. However, the following ordering is used in our prototype implementation. When
both nodes have elected to pass their turn, then the tit-for-tat protocol is terminated and



























Figure 5.1: Laissez-faire protocol operations.
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The protocol operations and the transitions between them are also illustrated in Fig-
ure 5.1. Although nodes operate as peers, we denote the client as the node that initiates
the connection and the server as the node that accept the connection.
5.2.1 Control-Message-Push
As we have previously discussed, control messages are used to maintain and propagate the
state of the system to other nodes. Text messages, similar to text messages conventionally
sent over SMS, are also encapsulated as control messages. Text messages allow users to
take advantage of the secure communication architecture underlying the CTN to exchange
personal messages. Control messages are accompanied by a delivery deadline, have negli-
gible communication overhead, and may be assumed to always benefit the recipient. These
messages therefore have the highest priority and do not count against a node’s turn in the
tit-for-tat protocol. If pushing a control message were to count against a tit-for-tat turn,
then nodes, in the service of their own demands, would be better off spending their turn
retrieving a fragment than passing a small control message.
5.2.2 Fragment-Request
Retrieving fragments is the highest priority operation after exchanging control messages.
During this operation, a node may retrieve a fragment of content for itself or on behalf
of another node. Underlying the fragment exchange is a pairwise, byte-based accounting
scheme. Each byte transferred from nj to ni is deducted by nj from ni’s current balance,
until ni’s credit limit is reached. We refer to this quantity as the debt threshold. Enforce-
ment of the debt threshold is dependent on a node’s sensitivity to resource costs. Recall
from Chapter 1 that content activists are insensitive to resource costs, and are more con-
cerned with sharing censored content than receiving a reciprocal benefit. For nodes that
are sensitive to resource costs, fragment requests that meet or exceed the debt threshold
will be rejected, and ni is notified that it has reached its credit limit.
We assume that nodes have a large, diverse, insatiable demand for content, whose
aggregate size greatly exceeds link capacities and devices’ storage. This assumption rep-
resents the worst case scenario and is compatible with existing data on music and video
consumption behaviour [59, 98]. Therefore, nodes must strategically select fragments to
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maximize their own utility. We further assume that ni always retrieves its own fragments
before considering the demands of other nodes.
After retrieving its own demanded fragments, ni may consider the demands of other
nodes. Nodes that have reached their debt threshold are excluded from consideration.
When multiple other nodes demand content available at nj, ni must prefer to select frag-
ments for one node over another. Retrieving fragments on behalf of other nodes has a
cost. Fragments consume storage capacity on the device, potentially causing less valuable
fragments to be discarded. They also increase ni’s debt position with nj, consume a turn
in the tit-for-tat exchange, and consume energy during their retrieval. Fragments for other
nodes must therefore also be retrieved strategically to maximize ni’s utility. We refer to
these strategies for ranking the demands of other nodes as node ranking strategies, which
we explore in Section 5.3.1. Once a node is selected as the most ‘valuable’ node, we apply
the fragment selection strategy of ni to select fragments. We explore strategies for selecting
fragments in Section 5.3.2.
If a requested fragment is no longer available, the request must therefore be rejected.
Node ni may then perform another operation. A rejection caused by meeting or exceeding a
credit limit signals the end of the fragment request operation, since all subsequent fragment
requests will also be rejected. In general, nodes’ debt thresholds may expand or contract
over time depending on the degree of resource scarcity or as a node’s sensitivity to resources
changes. However, this work assumes that debt thresholds are static.
5.2.3 Demand-Vector-Push
If no fragments are available, the next logical operation is to transmit a demand vector to
nj to allow nj to retrieve fragments for ni from other nodes. In our current implementation,
demand vectors from nodes outside of a trust relationship (i.e. nodes that are 2 “hops”
away from nj), are unioned into a single demand vector by ni. This new demand vector is
then appended to the demand vector pushed by ni to nj.
After receiving a series of demand vectors, nj requests metadata corresponding to CIDs
of any unknown content. Retrieving metadata allows nj to discover new content without
the cost of a turn, and facilitates nj’s future retrieval of the content.
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5.2.4 Metadata-Update-Request
The Content Space is an integral component of a CTN. The metadata update request from
ni to nj retrieves the current Content Space known to nj. The state includes both the
complete and partial content held by the trusted node nj, and the complete content held
by other nodes within the CTN. During a metadata update request, nj transmits two hash
values to ni. The first value corresponds to all content, both partial and complete, that
currently exists on nj. The second value corresponds to all complete content that exists on
nodes outside of the trust relationship that are reachable by nj. We refer to the latter as
the reachable set. If the hash values match ni’s values, then both nodes have the same view
of the Content Space and the operation is complete. If the first hash fails then nj discloses
the all of the CIDs of the content on the device. As previously discussed in Section 4.1.3,
ni would subsequently update the timestamp of each content item associated with nj with
the current timestamp. Node ni would then update its hash for nj with the hash of the
newly received set of CIDs.
If the hash of the reachable set fails, then nj must synchronize ni’s view of CSk for each
node nk that is reachable by nj. The synchronization process begins with nj disclosing a
series of tuples that represent the content known to exist on each reachable node. Each
tuple contains the following data: 〈timestamp,GUIDk, hash(csk)〉 for each node nk, where
csk is the content known to exist on nk. Each timestamp corresponds to nj’s previous
encounter with nk. If the hash differs then nj should disclose csk to ni using the process
described above. However, if nk is trusted by ni, then the timestamp should be examined
to determine which set of metadata is the most current. If ni’s last contact time with nk
is earlier than nj’s last encounter, then nj transmits the complete state of csk to replace
ni’s stale state. Otherwise, if nk is not trusted by ni, then the timestamp is ignored by ni.
5.2.5 Demand-Vector-Request
In the event that all previous conditions are met, ni may solicit a fresh copy of nj’s demand
vector. Upon request, the node nj responds with its current demand vector.
Each node maintains a record of previously performed operations to minimize redundant
repeated operations. If a node fails to participate in the tit-for-tat protocol, its malfeasance
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can be punished by simply distrusting the node. We don’t consider this to be an issue given
the real-world trust relationship that underlines pairwise interaction in a CTN.
One key design requirement emerges from the Laissez-faire framework: the need to
rank both nodes and fragments.
5.3 Fragment selection
The Laissez-faire framework does not mandate any specific fragment selection mechanism.
As an open system, nodes are free to allocate and expend resources in an attempt to
maximize their own benefit. However, we assume that nodes prefer to retrieve their own
fragments over the fragments demanded by other nodes. In the absence of locally demanded
fragments, nodes should select fragments on behalf of other nodes.
In this section we first describe strategies for ranking other nodes, followed by strategies
for retrieving fragments on behalf of other nodes.
5.3.1 Node ranking strategies
With many nodes demanding content, we require a mechanism at each node to rank the
demands of one node over another and subsequently select a fragment. We present three
simple strategies for ranking nodes. Each strategy is based upon one of three major
properties within a CTN: demand for content, debt accumulated in satisfying demand,
and the physical space or buffer capacity allocated to storing content fragments.
The three node ranking strategies are:
• Decreasing demand: Through the Content Space, each node maintains a record
of the last known content (both partial and complete) present on other nodes in the
CTN. The demand strategy ranks a trusted node in decreasing order of the amount of
demanded content present at that node. Nodes that possess more of ni’s demanded
content are favoured over nodes that possess less demanded content. Once the nodes
are ranked, the highest ranked node is selected. Fragments for that node are then
selected by ni using ni’s fragment selection strategy.
95
• Decreasing debt: Recall that every node maintains its debt with every other trusted
node as well as an account of every other node’s debt to it. It also has a debt
threshold, the upper bound on the amount of debt another node may owe it. If,
during the process of ni satisfying a node nj’s demand, the debt threshold is met,
nj must reciprocate with content transfer to ni to reduce its debt before subsequent
content may be transferred. Delayed repayment of debt has the consequence of
introducing delay between two nodes that could otherwise be exchanging content, it
may also diminish the node’s perceived value during third party transactions. For
example, node ni may be unwilling to retrieve content on behalf of node nj from nk
if nj’s has reached ni’s debt threshold. The debt strategy is designed to proactively
reduce ni’s debt position with other nodes by favouring nodes with the greatest debt
position. Like the demand strategy, once a node ni selects the top ranked node nj
using this strategy, fragments for nj are selected by ni using ni’s fragment selection
strategy.
• Buffer: Neither the demand or debt strategies consider buffer displacement, which
is the storage cost of transporting fragments to a node. The buffer strategy is de-
signed to minimize buffer displacement by favouring nodes with the lowest expected
displacement cost of carrying demanded fragments to it. This cost of carrying a
fragment to a node is amortized over all nodes that demand the fragment.
We denote ĉj and cj as the exponentially weighted moving average inter-contact time
and last contact time with node nj. The expected duration until the next contact
with nj is computed as follows: max(0, ĉj − (now − cj)). We also denote dj as the
demand vector of nj. The buffer displacement cost of a fragment mi amortized over
all nodes that demand the fragment is computed as follows:
fragment size(mi)
(




In this formula, the fragment size(mi) is the size of fragment mi. The second
portion of the formula first examines the demand vector dj of each node nj who is
trusted by ni. For each node nj that demands the fragment mi, we examine ni’s
inter-contact time with nj and the last time that nj was encountered. We then select
the node from this set that is expected to be contacted last. The duration that mi
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must be stored for delivery to the selected node is the maximum buffer displacement
duration for mi. We then amortize the buffer displacement duration by the number
of nodes that demand mi.
The displacement cost excludes nodes whose debt threshold has been reached. Unlike
the debt strategy, where the value of fragments can be determined prior to a connec-
tion, the buffer strategy is time dependent. Displacement costs must be calculated
during a connection based upon the neighbouring node’s available fragments.
These strategies are also used to discard fragments when the device’s storage buffer has
reached capacity. Fragments destined for lower ranked nodes are deleted first.
5.3.2 Fragment selection strategy
During an opportunistic connection, a node may simultaneously demand many fragments.
Existing systems approach this problem by assigning a uniform value to all desirable frag-
ments [66, 86, 144]. Having equal value, fragments are retrieved at random until the
content item is completed. However, this approach is only practical for light workloads
and breaks down as content demand exceeds link capacity. The primary goal of all nodes
is to retrieve the fragments necessary to satisfy demand. Given that CTNs operate as
disconnected nodes, we assume that demand always exceeds link capacity and that nodes
must rank fragments.
We introduce the concept of a fragment selection strategy to govern the process of
selecting a fragment from a neighbouring node. The following sample strategies form the
basis for subsequent evaluation in Section 5.4 and Section 5.5. However, it is important
to emphasize that, like node ranking strategies, nodes are free to implement any fragment
selection strategy that they choose.
• Least data remaining first: This strategy favours fragments of a content item with
the fewest bytes remaining. This selection strategy has the side effect of favouring
smaller content over larger content. For example, a small image at 0% completion is
favoured over a large video file at 90% completion.
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• Greatest data remaining first: Alternatively, a node may prefer to make progress
on content items with the greatest outstanding amount of data. This strategy prefers
fragments of large content to fragments of smaller content. Each received fragment
reduces the quantity of data remaining, thus reducing the value of subsequent frag-
ments for that content item.
• Least fragments remaining: This strategy prefers fragments of a content item
with the fewest remaining fragments. Unlike the least and greatest-data-remaining-
first strategy, this approach is agnostic to the size of the content.
• FIFO: This strategy prioritizes fragments in order of request time. The longer the
content has been demanded, the higher priority the fragment is. In our prototype
implementation, this simply corresponds to the position of a CID in a node’s demand
vector. This strategy is therefore agnostic to both the content size and completion
status.
In practice we anticipate that the FIFO strategy would be the most popular since it
is the most intuitive and closely resemble existing content acquisition systems, such
as BitTorrent1.
5.4 Evaluation under controlled conditions
We conduct a series of experiments to evaluate Laissez-faire under controlled network
conditions. As no prior work exists to infer how disconnected, mobile users would (a)
form trusted relationships with other nodes, (b) demand content from other nodes in a
disconnected network, or (c) contact other trusted nodes, this state of our evaluation
is designed to illustrate the intrinsic properties of different node ranking and fragment
selection strategies. We extend our analysis through a field trial in Section 5.5.
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Figure 5.2: Experiment topologies
5.4.1 Methodology
Our evaluation takes place over five simple communication topologies in increase order of
complexity. These topologies are illustrated in Figure 5.2. Each edge in the graph indicates
a potential communication path between nodes. In each experiment the communication
graph is a time-varying multigraph; edges are activated and deactivated at specified in-
tervals for a fixed 90 second connection duration. Given that human mobility is highly
diverse [61], this is clearly not a realistic contact schedule. We chose this schedule to isolate
the influence of human mobility on our study. Since our communication topology is static
and nodes are assumed to share metadata honestly, the trust topology has no impact on
our evaluation. All nodes are configured to be mutually trusted. Each experiment was
repeated ten times.
We conduct our experiments using BlackBerry Bold 9000 devices. Each device is
equipped with a 8 GB micro SD card and we seed it with 1 GB of randomly generated
unique content, ranging from 1 MB to 16 MB in size. Each device is configured with a debt
threshold of 128 MB and 256 MB of storage is allocated to storing fragments demanded
by other nodes. We also assume that once a node expresses demand for a content item,
it is never retracted. That is, items are never removed from a demand vector unless they
have been retrieved.
Metrics
This evaluation focuses on three key metrics: the delivery ratio, the delay, and the fragment
drop ratio. The delivery ratio is the proportion of node content demand that is satisfied
over the course of a trial. The delay is the mean duration between the user signaling
1Most BitTorrent clients schedule downloads by FIFO unless the user has manually adjusted the priority
of a torrent.
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demand for an item and having the demand satisfied. These metrics are analogous to the
delivery ratio and delay metrics in existing DTN routing protocol evaluation [80]. The drop
ratio is the proportion of fragments retrieved by a node that are discarded either because
the node demanding the fragment has received the demanded content item through some
other path and no longer needs the fragment or if the node’s storage buffer has reached
capacity and fragment(s) must be dropped. The drop ratio therefore captures the degree
of wasted communication in the system. Fragments that are deleted after having been
transferred to another node are not considered a wasted acquisition. These fragments are
therefore not counted as dropped.
Discussion on metrics
Although our metrics for evaluating CTNs are compatible with existing DTN metrics,
they can be biased by both our CTN communication requirements and the topology of the
network. Nodes in a CTN may only demand content that has previously been discovered
through a trusted node. Although this is an expected result that follows from not com-
municating with non-trusted nodes, it has the effect of narrowing the set of content that
is exposed to a node. Both delivery ratio and delay are positively biased by the fact that
nodes may only demand content contained on, or through, a trusted node, rather than
any arbitrary node in the network. A node cannot, for example, demand a highly popular
content item unless it can be obtained through the nodes that it trusts. Moreover, in a
real-world deployment, it would not be surprising if mutually trusted nodes encountered
each other, on average, more frequently than nodes that are two or more hops apart in the
trust topology.
The positive bias is strongest in the degenerate CTN, a CTN consisting of two mutually
trusted nodes. In this network, assuming that the two nodes contact each other, the
delivery ratio will be convergent to 1.0 and the delay will be purely influenced by the
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Figure 5.3: Comparison of fragment selection strategy for a three-node topology.
5.4.2 Effect of fragment selection strategy
Experiment 1
We conduct a simple experiment to compare the differences between fragment selection
strategies discussed in Section 5.3.2. To isolate the effect of different node ranking strate-
gies, we limit this experiment to the simple three-node topology. In a three-node topology,
a node either retrieves its own fragments or fragments for the single node not being com-
municated with. We also introduce an additional fragment selection strategy: Random.
The random fragment selection strategy selects (and discards when the buffer capacity is
reached) a uniformly random fragment. The random strategy is analogous to the approach
used in existing systems. All nodes in this and the following experiments are assumed to
be sensitive to resource costs.
In each trial, edges in the triangle communication topology are selected uniformly
randomly and enabled for 90 seconds. Upon termination of a connection, the node that
initiated the connection uniformly randomly selects a varying number of known content
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items from another node in the network. The number of content items selected is chosen
to yield a specific content demand rate. Figure 5.3 illustrates the delay and delivery ratio
for each fragment selection strategy vs. the aggregate rate of new content demand in the
network.
Not surprisingly, a FIFO ordering outperforms all other methods in terms of both
delay and delivery ratio because it is designed to greedily minimize this property. The
least-fragments-remaining strategy behaves similar to FIFO for low rates of demand, but
degrades as demand exceeds the communication capacity of the network. Once the link
is saturated demand at each node accumulates. When faced with multiple new demands,
this strategy selects one at random, independent of its age. The remaining two strategies
starve either large (least-remaining) or small (greatest-remaining) content demands and
have comparatively low delivery ratios. Demanded content that is retrieved arrives after a
significantly longer period than the other strategies. Fragment duplication in this experi-
ment is approximately zero since nodes nearly always demand content from the neighbour-
ing node. The random fragment selection strategy barely functions when demand exceeds
the capacity of the network. By uniformly randomly selecting (and discarding) fragments,
we were only able to deliver a few content items over the entire experiment with very high
delay. The poor performance of the random strategy was omitted from Figure 5.3. Al-
though at times user-preference may supersede efficiency, favouring, for example, smaller
audio files over larger video files, the remainder of this stage of our evaluation will be based
upon the FIFO fragment selection strategy.
5.4.3 Effect of node ranking strategies
We conduct four independent experiments to illustrate the properties of each node ranking
strategy.
Experiment 2: Demand, debt, and buffer homogeneity
Our first experiment is designed to evaluate the behaviour of each node ranking strategy
under homogeneous conditions. Our procedure for this experiment is identical to Ex-











































































































































































Figure 5.4: Analysis of node ranking strategies.
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comparison. However, instead of selecting a fragment, the random node ranking strategy
selects a uniformly random node.
Figure 5.4 illustrates the delay and delivery ratio with respect to the mean content de-
mand rate over each topology. Over our simplest, most connected communication topology
(a), the choice of strategy has little effect on the system; nodes are almost always able to
retrieve their own content directly. As aggregate demand increases, nodes predominantly
retrieve their own content (that they do not drop). However, content that is retrieved is
almost never delivered since the destination node has almost always retrieved the fragment
themselves. This results in an increase in the drop ratio.
A node’s closeness centrality is the sum of the distances to all other nodes. Thus, the
more central a node is, the lower its total distance to all other nodes. As node centrality
decreases, we observe that strategy begins to have an effect. At low rates of demand
they are statistically equivalent; however, even in a four-node topology we see that the
random strategies’ indiscriminate selection and ejection of fragments results in both an
increased delay and drop ratio as well as a substantial decrease in delivery ratio. We omit
the random strategy from the delay graphs for topologies in c, d, and e in Figure 5.4
to avoid its poor performance being misinterpreted good performance. Unlike the other
three strategies, the random strategy is unable to transport content across two hops when
aggregate demand exceeds the network’s capacity. All content successfully retrieved using
the random strategy is retrieved only from adjacent nodes, typically at the start of the
experiment before demand has accumulated. This results in an artificially low mean delay.
As the aggregate rate of demand increases, we observe that the demand strategy out-
performs the others in terms of delay. By retrieving fragments on behalf of nodes holding
demanded content, this strategy has the tendency to accumulate content, which can be ex-
changed with the node during the next encounter without significantly affecting the nodes’
debt relationship. However, these results are not statistically significant. Overall, we also
observe a reduced fragment drop ratio under the buffer strategy. This result is primarily
due to the strategy’s greedy approach to reclaiming buffer capacity: larger fragments are
always discarded before smaller ones. The space reclaimed through the deletion of large
content items can often accommodate several new items.
Topologies c and d introduce bottlenecks into the path, causing a significant decrease in
the delivery ratio and a corresponding sharp increase in drop ratios. The bottleneck further
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Figure 5.5: Experiment 3 (demand heterogeneity) configuration.
hour, introducing significant disparity in delay between 1 hop away and content on the other
side of the bottleneck(s). In our final topology, we decrease node centrality by introducing
additional edges in the contact graph. All nodes are reachable by two disjoint paths of at
most two hops. At low demand rates, nodes in this topology experience delays and delivery
ratios comparable to those in topology b. However, we observe a significant increase in
the variability largely due the corresponding increase in drop ratio. Surprisingly, both the
delivery ratio and drop ratio increases in topology e compared to topology d. This result
is due to the increase in the number of paths in the network. While more content may be
transferred, there is a greater probability that fragments are retrieved from another node.
Strategically selecting fragments based upon node’s unique demands, debt, and buffer
capacity seems to outperform the näıve, random approach used by existing systems. How-
ever, under varying degrees of demand, all three strategies are statistically equivalent at a
99% confidence level. Our final three experiments are designed to highlight the conditions
where each strategy excels.
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Experiment 3: Demand heterogeneity
Our final three experiments are based upon topology e in Figure 5.4. Each experiment is
designed to favour the use of a specific node ranking strategy. All nodes are configured
to select fragments using the FIFO fragment selection strategy. In all three experiments,
node 2, as illustrated in Figure 5.5, demands ten random content items present on node 5,
the only node not directly connected to it. In all three experiments, there are four disjoint
paths between the two nodes.
The intermediate nodes demand content from specific nodes as indicated in Figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5 also illustrates the debt relationship that exists between nodes in the experiment
topology. All nodes except node 6 have significant demand for content on node 5, and would
therefore retrieve their own fragments first. Node 6 will therefore always retrieve content
from node 5 on behalf of one of the other four nodes in the experiment. The rate of
demand is approximately twice the link capacity of the network. Node 2 is the only node
that demands nothing from node 3, and is therefore going to select content only for other
nodes during connections with that node. The contact schedule is uniformly random as
in the previous experiment; however, node 2 has been modified to reduce its inter-contact
time with node 1 to half the value of any other node. This modification to node 2 causes
node 1 to always be favoured under the buffer node ranking strategy. The experiment
terminates when node 2 receives all of its content, which results in a constant delivery
ratio of 1.0 at node 2.
Recall that goal of each node is to obtain content with the least delay. Figure 5.6(a)
illustrates our results from the perspective of node 2. Delay is clearly lowest using the
demand node ranking strategy. Using the demand ranking strategy, node 6 initially favours
content that is demanded by node 3 since node 3 is the only node that possesses content
demanded by node 6. However, once node 2 begins to retrieve fragments from node 3, it
will be preferred by node 6 over the other remaining nodes. Subsequently, an increased
amount of content will be routed from node 5 to node 2 via node 6. Given the poor
performance of the random node ranking strategy did not result in a delivery ratio of 1.0,















































































(c) Mean delay in delivering content to node 2 in experiment 5 (het-
erogeneous inter-contact time and constrained buffers).
Figure 5.6: Delay for each heterogeneous configuration.
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Experiment 4: Debt heterogeneity
We now create a scenario designed to favour the debt node ranking strategy. In this
experiment, each node’s demand for content is uniformly distributed over the network.
Nodes demand content at a rate that is approximately the same as the link capacity of the
network. However, nodes 1, 3, 4, and 6 are initialized to have reached their debt threshold
with node 5. They will not be able to retrieve any content from node 5 until they have
reduced their debt position. Moreover, these nodes will not retrieve any content for node
2 until they have both reduced their debt and satisfied their own demand. The content
demands of node 5 therefore have a strong influence on the system. All other debt positions
are initially neutral.
Figure 5.6(b) illustrates the results of this experiment. By collecting content on behalf
of node 5, each node increases the quantity of content that may be retrieved by its other
neighbours who all rank the demands of node 5 highest under the debt node ranking
strategy; all nodes need content demanded by node 5 to reduce their debt position with
the node. Although the demand and buffer node ranking strategies also result in the
successful completion of the experiment, they do not perform as well as the debt node
ranking strategy because they are inhibited by initial debt in the system. The debt node
ranking strategy has the effect of proactively pushing content towards node 5. As in
the previous experiment, the random node ranking strategy performs poorly, and the
experiment terminates once a single content item is delivered to node 2.
Experiment 5: Contact heterogeneity with constrained buffers
Our final experiment is designed to provide conditions where the buffer strategy excels. In
this experiment, we reduce each node’s buffer capacity from 256 MB to 16 MB, enough
to hold a single copy of the largest content items in our system. In this experiment, we
artificially reduce the calculated inter-contact time between nodes 1 and 2 to create a
favourable path through node 1 between nodes 2 and 5. That is, when calculating the
buffer displacement cost of carrying content fragments between nodes 1 and 2 using the
buffer node ranking strategy, both nodes artificially reduces the weight by half. However,
it is important to note that the true contact schedule between nodes and the subsequent
inter-contact time is unchanged in this experiment. Edges in the contact graph (topology
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e) are activated uniformly randomly as in the previous experiments. Thus this experiment
does bias the true delay in delivering content to node 2.
Figure 5.6(c) illustrates the results of this experiment. During each connection between
nodes 1 and 5, node 1 preferred to retrieve content for node 2 over any other node in the
system due to the comparatively lower storage cost. During connections between nodes
1 and 2, node 2 immediately retrieves content fragments that had been retrieved on its
behalf. Similarly, node 2, when connected to nodes 3, 4, or 6 prefers to retrieve content
for node 1, again because of the comparatively lower storage cost. Under the heavy buffer
constraints of this experiment, no content could be delivered under the random strategy.
Each of the three experiments was designed to favour a specific node ranking strategy.
The results should not be surprising. In Section 5.5 we re-evaluate the performance of the
three node ranking strategies through a field trial.
5.4.4 Robustness of Laissez-faire to free-riding nodes
Participation in a CTN requires that nodes allocate and expend resources for other nodes.
However, there may exist free-riding nodes that are unwilling or unable to share resources.
We conduct a final simple experiment to assess the impact of free-riders on delay and
delivery ratios. We assume that once a node reaches its debt threshold then no further
fragments will be delivered to the node. As in the previous experiments, we continue to
assume that all nodes are sensitive to resource costs. If all nodes are content activists and
insensitive to resource expenditure, then free-riders have no impact on the system. This
experiment uses the homogeneous conditions outlined in Experiment 2. The experiment
terminated after one hour. We reduce the debt threshold to 64 MB to exaggerate the effect
of free-riding and configure nodes to randomly select one of the three node ranking strate-
gies. As in the previous experiments, we configure each node to use the FIFO fragment
selection strategy. Only one content item is requested after each connection to produce a
mean aggregate demand rate of approximately 64 KB/s.
Given that free-riding nodes will be cut-off by resource-sensitive nodes once their debt
threshold is reached, the result of this experiment may be easily predicted. However, we
conduct 10 trials. In each trial, we uniformly randomly select a single node to be the












































Figure 5.7: Delay and delivery ratio for free-riding and non-free-riding nodes.
them to never disclose metadata. Nodes that are known not to have any content after a
metadata update has been performed are never solicited for a fragment. However, these
nodes collect metadata and request content at every opportunity.
The delay observed for free-riding nodes are comparable to our previous observations.
However, free-riding nodes had significantly lower mean delivery ratios: approximately 20%
compared to the near 90% mean delivery ratio of non-free-riding nodes. Once a free-rider
has met the debt threshold of their neighbouring nodes, subsequent requests for content
fragments will be rejected. Figure 5.7 illustrates the delay and delivery ratios for both
free-riding and non-free-riding nodes for each topology.
The delay and delivery ratio for non-free-riding nodes is unchanged for topology a. This
result is not surprising since the introduction of a free-rider in this simple topology does
not increase the average path length between the other pair of nodes.
Non-free-riding nodes experienced much higher delays under topologies b and e than
their free-riding counterpart. This result is primarily due the decreased number of paths
between the content source and destination. In the case of topology e, the effect is greatest
when either of the central, four-degree nodes is selected as the free-rider. Because free-
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riding nodes are not affected by this selection, we observe a large difference in the variation
in delay between free-riding and non-free-riding nodes.
We observed significant variation in delay under topologies c and d. In these topolo-
gies, when one of the central nodes was selected as the free-rider, the non-free riders are
partitioned into two sub-networks with either two or three nodes. Because free-riders do
not propagate metadata, nodes partitioned by a free-rider do not detect metadata on the
opposite side of the topology. This results in nodes only being able to demand content
from adjacent nodes, which further results in abnormally low delay and high delivery ratios
in some trials.
5.5 Field trial
We conduct a field trial to evaluate our prototype CTN system and the Laissez-faire frame-
work under real-world conditions. Two high-level goals influenced the design of our field
trial. Because we intend to release our system as open source software upon completion
of this thesis, it is essential that serious software bugs be caught and fixed. The field trial
served to validate our prototype implementation under unpredictable, real-world scenarios.
Our second goal was to evaluate the Laissez-faire framework subject to the mobility
of real users. Since communication between nodes in Laissez-faire is dependent on the
trust relationships between nodes, we chose to configure all nodes in the field trial to be
mutually trusted. The resulting trust, and therefore, communication topology forms a
clique graph. This enables all nodes in the field trial to communicate with each other,
which maximizes the potential communication capacity of the network. For the purposes
of experimentation, participants were not allowed to revoke trust for other nodes in the
experiment. The trust topology was static throughout the field trial (with the exception
of adding nodes as participants were given devices). Section 5.5.3 studies the population
where nodes are not all mutually trusted.
5.5.1 Methodology
Our field trial consists of 36 participants recruited from the graduate student and fac-
ulty population of the School of Computer Science at the University of Waterloo. Each
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participant was given a BlackBerry Bold 9000 smartphone, preloaded with the fully func-
tioning prototype CTN BlackBerry application. We have included a slightly modified copy
of the application tutorial distributed to our field trial participants in Appendix A. This
document explains how the application works and describes each component of the appli-
cation using screen captures. The field trial lasted for three weeks. During this period,
participants were asked to keep the device with them at all times and to keep it charged.
Our prototype implementation allows users to select both their preferred node ranking
strategy and the fragment selection strategy. However, we disabled the ability to change
this setting during the field trial. Upon installation, each node uniformly randomly selects
both a node ranking and fragment selection strategy. These choices are fixed for the
remainder of the trial.
Upon installation, the application scans the device’s SD card and indexes any content
items that are present on the device. Our implementation of the Content Space subse-
quently monitors the BlackBerry file system for new content. Participants in the field trial
were encouraged to take photos and record videos with the BlackBerry camera, record
voice notes, or attach the device to their computer to load with content from the Internet.
However, prior user trials have proved that users should not be depended upon to use
an experimental application [144]. We therefore loaded the prototype with an additional
component called the Field Trial Daemon. The daemon had four important roles. The first
role was to create content for dissemination through the system. Every hour between the
hours of 8am to 10pm, the daemon would generate a file of random data. The size of the
file was uniformly randomly selected from the set of {1 MB, 2 MB, 4 MB, 8 MB, 16 MB}.
Any content created by the user caused the 1-hour timer to reset. In a previous field trial of
the MobiClique system, only a smart portion of users interacted with the application [143].
However, to our surprise, 19 of the 36 participants generated some content over the course
of this field trial.
In our field trial, only 15 of the 36 participants manually expressed demand for a content
item. Of the 15, nobody expressed demand for more than 13 items. The second role of
the daemon is, therefore, to simulate user demand for content. Every hour the daemon
is responsible for selecting a content item from the Content Space and setting its demand
state to true. Should the user manually express demand for content, the hourly demand
timer is reset. For verisimilitude, the selection process mimics the popularity distribution of
content downloads observed in BitTorrent [203]. Each content item added to the Content
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Space is assigned a uniformly random integer ‘popularity’ value between [0, 9] (0 being
the highest popularity). The popularity value is embedded in the metadata of a content
item that is stored on the device and is transferred to other nodes. When the daemon
needs to demand a content item, it first selects a random integer using a Zipf distribution
(exponent 0.66). The daemon then uniformly randomly selects a content item from the
Content Space with the selected popularity. If no content items exist with the desired
popularity, the process is repeated until an item is retrieved or there exists no items to
demand. If there is no content to demand, this function of the daemon is suspended until
a metadata update occurs and metadata corresponding to non-owned content is obtained.
The third role of the daemon is to upload the logs produced by the field trial to our
experiment server. Logs are uploaded on an hourly basis, and allow us to monitor the
health of every node. This let us capture software errors in the protocol stack within 1
hour of them occurring. Being able to rapidly identify and correct software errors was
invaluable to ensuring the data derived from the field trial was valid. Once a software
error was fixed, we uploaded a new application binary to the experiment HTTP server.
The final role of the daemon is to detect the presence of a software update by comparing
the version of the application to the version number available for download. If a new
version was detected, the daemon would notify the user of the update and to prompt them
to download it. Upon download the application automatically installed and rebooted
the device. This process would concurrently post the version number of the installed
application so that we could monitor the deployment progress of an update. With few
exceptions, most users observed the notification and downloaded the update within 3 hours
of an update.
5.5.2 Analysis
Our field trial began Thursday, January 26, 2012 and terminated at noon on Friday, Febru-
ary 17, 2012. Over this period the 36 participating nodes demanded a total of 51.284 GB
of data. Only 11.569 GB of data was successfully retrieved, resulting in an overall delivery
ratio of 0.226. Although this may not sound like a large quantity of data, it is nearly an
order of magnitude more data than what was exchanged by the average node per day dur-
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(b) Mean delay to satisfy demand for each node.













Figure 5.9: CDF of delay to satisfy demand over all content items.
content both demanded and satisfied for each node is illustrated in Figure 5.8(a). We ob-
serve that most nodes demanded approximately the same quantity of content since demand
is automatically expressed on an hourly basis. Two nodes were isolated for entire duration
of the experiment, and consequently did not obtain any metadata or demand any content.
Interestingly, several highly connected nodes retrieved nearly 1 GB of content. We observe
this cluster of nine nodes later in this section. Although this quantity of data is small in
comparison to a typical BitTorrent download [203], we believe that it is reasonable for an
initial deployment of an experimental system. We have included the traces in Appendix B
that illustrate the timeline of when demand was expressed and when demand is satisfied.
When demand is expressed, the quantity of outstanding demand is increased by the size
of the content item. When demand is satisfied the outstanding demand decreases. We
encourage to interested reader to review the timelines to better appreciate the limitations
of these results.
We observed a global mean delay of 73.433 hours. The delay for each user is illustrated
in Figure 5.8(b). The large error bars correspond to nodes that received very few content
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(d) Delivery ratio by node ranking strategy.
Figure 5.10: Analysis of delay and delivery ratio vs. node ranking and fragment selection
strategies.
received some content items within a few hour. This result is apparent in the CDF of delay
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(b) Delivery ratio for each node.
Figure 5.11: Analysis of delay and delivery ratio for each node in the nine-node cluster.
Impact of node ranking and fragment selection strategies
Overall, we observed that least-data-remaining fragment selection strategy resulted in a
delivery ratio of approximately half the other fragment selection strategy. However, we
observed no significant difference in delay between the four fragment selection strategies.
Figures 5.10(a) and Figure 5.10(b) illustrates these two results. When selecting content
to retrieve on behalf of others, ranking nodes using the buffer strategy both increases the
delivery ratio and reduces delay! No fragments were discarded from any device over the
three-week period. We are therefore unable to assess the effect of node ranking or fragment
selection strategies on drop ratio at this time.
Highly connected clusters
We briefly examine the performance of the system for two clusters of highly connected
users. We believe that these clusters of nodes represent each of the CTN use cases outlined
in Section 1.2.1. For the purposes of this discussion, we refer to nodes within the cluster as
‘internal’ nodes and nodes outside of the cluster as ‘external’ nodes. The ‘internal delay’
is the delay in satisfying a demand for content that resides on a node within the cluster.
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(d) Delivery ratio by node ranking strategy.
Figure 5.12: Analysis of nine-node cluster.
The first cluster corresponds to a research lab with nine students that were actively
engaged in the study. These participants were the source of most of the user-generated
content. Most user-initiated demands for content came from this group. One student in
this cluster spent a significant amount of time at home. Another arrived very late in the
day, which reduced the collocation duration with other participants. Overall this cluster
demanded 8.787 GB of content and retrieved 4.806 GB to achieve a delivery ratio of 0.547
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(c) Delivery ratio of content demanded from within
the two-node cluster.
Figure 5.13: Analysis of an isolated two-node cluster.
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illustrated in Figure 5.11(b). Interestingly, the increase in delivery ratio is accompanied
by a corresponding increase in internal delay, as illustrated in Figure 5.11(a).
Figure 5.12 illustrates the delivery ratio and delay for each fragment selection and node
ranking strategy for this close-knit cluster. Again we observe that the least-data-remaining
fragment selection strategy results in an extremely poor delivery ratio. This is due to its
preference for small files, which starves the retrieval progress of larger files. We therefore
conclude that when a node is retrieving fragments for itself, it should utilize either the
FIFO or least-fragment-remaining fragment selection strategy. When retrieving content
on behalf of others, a node should utilize the buffer strategy to rank nodes. A strategy
that is biased towards nodes that are expected to be encountered the soonest results in
more content being delivered with lower delay.
The second cluster corresponds to two collocated study participants that did not detect
or exchange content with any other nodes except for the node operated by the study
organizer. These two participants were the last to join the experiment. When distributing
the BlackBerry devices to these two participants we seeded one of the nodes with nearly
3 GBs of known metadata. Unfortunately, their isolation prevented any external content
demands from being satisfied. This trend is illustrated in Figure 5.13(a).
Unlike the previous clusters, delay is this cluster is very low - driven up by long period
of disconnection between February 4th to 7th as observed in Figure 5.13(a). Mean delay
was 4.65 hours. The minimum delay among these nodes was an impressive 126.47 and
216.54 seconds. These delays obviously correspond to content that was demanded while
the other node was collocated. This result is illustrated in Figure 5.13(b). Not surprisingly,
the internal delivery ratios for these two well-connected nodes is 0.95 (Figure 5.13(c)). The
reason why they are not 1.0 is because the nodes were separated prior to their collection at
the end of the experiment. If they had detected each other, they would have immediately
satisfied each other’s internal demands.
The role of an SMS-based control channel
In the previous chapter we introduced the SMS Connection object as an optional control
channel in our prototype CTN system. The use of SMS, which uses cellular network
infrastructure, clearly violates our design goals by providing a means for attackers to
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identify CTN participants. The security repercussions of using SMS will be revisited in
Chapter 8.
Although our current prototype implementation does not depend on SMS, we believe
that SMS could have great value to users that are not engaged in nefarious activities
and are, presumably, less concerned with the protection of their identity2. Nodes could,
for example, use SMS to signal changes to their Content Space or disseminate updated
demand vectors when fragments are retrieved or demands change. Future applications of
an SMS-based control channel are further discussed as future work in Chapter 8.
This section provides empirical data to quantify the value of an SMS-based control
channel in the system. We observe that a total of 691 control messages were exchanged
during the field trial. The vast majority of these messages originated from the study
organizer for experimentation purposes when adding new nodes to the system. These
control messages would not be used in a real deployment. However, they have same
characteristics as control messages used in a non-experimental setting. In total, 595 control
messages originated from the study organizer to initialize and configure the experiment.
The remainder of the control messages correspond to several active participants sending
text messages to each other. We observed a median control message delivery delay of 87.32
seconds. This value was primarily influenced by a one-minute delivery deadline set by the
Client Core. When a new control message is created, it is first scheduled to be delivered over
an opportunistic connection. If after one minute the recipient node has not be encountered
then the control message is scheduled for transmission over the SMS-based control channel.
The polling interval of the Internet-based SMS Handler on the receiving node, that was
set to 30 seconds, also introduces delay. The mean value was significantly higher due to
control messages that were created while the recipient nodes were disconnected from the
Internet and thus unable to fetch messages from our Internet-based SMSC. The delivery
ratio of control messages was 1.0.
We assume that nodes cannot be relied upon to deliver messages for others. Therefore,
control messages are better delivered directly from the source to destination node. We now
evaluate the delay and delivery ratios of the 691 control messages in an emulated scenario
where an end-to-end SMS-based control channel does not exist. In this experiment, we
extract the time that each pair of nodes contacts each other during the field trial. We
2In practice, the use of CTNs for non-nefarious activity should be encouraged because it would provide
some degree of plausible deniability for users that are successfully identified as participating in a CTN.
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also extract from the field trial traces the creation time of each control message. Using
the creation time of a control message and the contact traces between nodes, we emulate
the process of delivering control messages in the absence of end-to-end connectivity. This
emulation assumes that all control messages between a source and destination node are
delivered during an opportunistic connection.
For control messages sent from the study organizer, we observed a delivery ratio of
only 0.32. This low value is influenced by several nodes that were never detected by the
study organizer after being initially added to the experiment. A control message that was
custom to the experiment was created for each subsequent new member. Not contacting
nodes that were added to the experiment at an earlier time caused the control messages to
never be delivered. Of the messages that would have been delivered, we observed a mean
delivery delay of 3.92 days3! The text messages exchanged between nodes had a mean
delay of 7.24 hours and a delivery ratio of 1.0. This is due to the physical proximity of
the participants that sent the messages. Messages that were sent during the day would be
delivered quickly. Messages sent at night would be delayed until the following day.
5.5.3 Analysis of non-global trust
In both our controlled experiments and the field trial, all nodes were configured to be
mutually trusted, and thus all nodes were capable of communicating with each other.
Following our field trial, we conduct a final one-week controlled experiment that segregated
nodes into eight groups, where the nodes in each group are mutually trusted. Our prior
work segregated users based on their interests on Facebook [144]. Unfortunately, the
demographics of our field trial participants did not facilitate this comparison. Instead, we
segregate nodes based on their research area. In the absence of any prior work (to the best
of our knowledge) that examines how users in a similar network, under the same conditions,
would organize themselves, we believe our approach is a reasonable compromise. We then
connect trust groups based on known social relationships between participants. In the
absence of social ties, nodes with the lowest inter-contact time were designated mutually
trusted nodes.
3This value was artificially inflated by the study organizer periodically walking around the building at
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Mean total satisfied: 176.495 MB
(b) Delivery ratio for each node.
Figure 5.14: Analysis of delay and delivery ratio for each node segregated into different
trust groups.
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Recall that our experiment framework allows us to specify discrete contact events. We
use this feature to ‘playback’ the contact traces from our field trial. Unlike our previous
controlled experiments in Section 5.4 that used a repeating contact interval, contact events
in this experiment correspond to actual contact events that occurred during the field trial.
However, given that many nodes are now placed in disjoint trust groups, many contact
events may have no consequence because the nodes may be non-trusted and thus unknown.
Overall, we observed a significant reduction in mean delay! The delay for each node is
illustrated in Figure 5.14(a). The mean delivery ratio of 0.592 is also significantly higher
than the delivery ratio of 0.226 observed in our previous field trial. However, the reduced
delay and higher delivery ratio comes at a cost of significantly less data exchanged between
nodes. The quantity of data exchanged for each node is illustrated in Figure 5.14(b). Due
to the constrained trust topology, connection opportunities that existed in the previous
trial were not possible in this experiment. The scope of metadata dissemination is con-
sequently lower, forcing nodes to demand content that is present on the devices of fellow
group members. Since trust was artificially derived from nodes of participants in the same
research area, most group members are physically collocated. The combination of these
properties is responsible for these gains.
5.6 Chapter summary
This chapter has introduced the concept of a hands-off approach to DTN routing. Our
approach differs from existing DTN routing protocols that mandate specific node behaviour
that is generally intended to maximize the aggregate performance of the system, rather
than the performance experienced by a specific node. Participation in these networks
requires a mobile device to allocate storage, energy, and other limited resources, for the
benefit of others. These resources are often highly constrained [129], and will continue to
be for the foreseeable future. We believe that the network-centric approach to resource
allocation used in existing work is incompatible with users’ expectations of how resources
on their personal device should be consumed. Further, if users are able to modify the
source code of the network, a major design goal of our work, they do so for their own
selfish benefit.
Under Laissez-faire, nodes operate independently, and presumably selfishly, to maxi-
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mize their own utility. We believe that a selfish, individualist approach to routing, where
each the node can control how their own resources are allocated is fundamental to the
practical deployment of open source DTN systems targeted to average smartphone users
that are sensitive to resource costs.
We present a set of basic operations that allow nodes to exchange control messages,
request fragments, and propagate both content metadata and nodes’ demands for it. Par-
ticipation in our prototype CTN system only requires that nodes implement this simple
tit-for-tat protocol.
We proposed several example strategies for ranking nodes and selecting fragments.
Although nodes are free to implement their own strategies in the pursuit of maximizing
their own utility, we found that the FIFO and least-fragment-remaining selection strategies
performed best. We also found that when retrieving content on behalf of other nodes, the
buffer node ranking strategy that favours nodes that are frequently contacted performs
best.
Finally, we showed how an optional SMS-based control channel can be used to propagate
small amounts of control information between nodes. Although, our current prototype does
not depend on the control channel, we outline several areas of future work where we believe
that a control channel would offer significant benefit in Chapter 8. In the next chapter we








In the previous chapter we demonstrated that an SMS-based control channel can both
reduce delay and increase the delivery ratio of control messages within a CTN. This chapter
motivates the design of a transport protocol underlying an SMS-based control channel
through a characterization of SMS on a major Canadian cellular network. We then evaluate
the performance of the transport protocol under a range of network properties.
6.1 Introduction
The Short Message Service (SMS) is a phenomenally popular global wireless service. In
2010 alone, nearly 6.9 trillion SMS messages were sent [145]. This number is expected to
climb to 8.7 trillion by 2015 [78]. Today SMS has grown beyond its traditional use as a
mobile-to-mobile text messaging service and has become an integral component of many
mobile applications. For example, the service is commonly used to conduct electronic
surveys, provide e-voting services, send calendar notifications, search the Internet, and
exchange status updates with servers on the Internet [50]. This list of uses promises to
grow with no sign of slowing down.
We build an efficient and reliable data transport protocol on top of SMS for use as
a control channel within a CTN. SMS provides end-to-end connectivity among otherwise
disconnected CTN nodes that choose to enable it. This chapter makes two major contri-
butions:
1. We motivate the design of our transport protocol through a characterization of the
SMS service of a major Canadian cellular network provider. We explore the com-
plex behaviour of this service from the perspective of mobile applications that use
SMS to exchange data between devices. Through experimentation with a variety
of commodity smartphones and USB-tethered cell phones, we classify the channel
characteristics of SMS and identify key variables that affect its performance. Unlike
networks such as the Internet, SMS can introduce significant delays, messages are
rarely lost, and message reordering is common. Thus, conventional transport proto-
cols, such as TCP, are unsuitable for use over SMS. By examining the service from
the perspective of a mobile device sending bursts of messages, this work differenti-
ates itself from prior work that has focused purely on aggregate statistics observed
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service providers. Our measurement tools are freely available for further study of
other cellular networks [124].
2. We design and implement an efficient SMS-based data transport protocol that we
call SMS-TP. SMS-TP provides reliable data transport while attempting to minimize
message overhead and maximize data throughput. We have implemented SMS-TP
as a stand-alone library in Java Micro Edition. Our implementation is compliant
with the Java Connected Limited Device Configuration (CLDC) and can therefore
be embedded into a wide range of applications running on Java enabled cell phones,
smartphones, and PC environments (using a USB tethered cell phone). The current
implementation is licenced under the Apache Licence and can be downloaded from
our website [124]. While we do not claim that our transport protocol is optimal,
our protocol significantly outperforms existing, available, alternatives. We show that
by adapting to the unique channel conditions of SMS, SMS-TP can reduce message
overhead by as much as 50% and increase data throughput by as much as 545% over
the existing method used by existing mobile applications to exchange large amounts
of data over SMS.
The remainder of this chapter presents an overview of SMS and prior work. Section 6.3
describes our measurement study and we present out experimental results in Section 6.4.
Section 6.5 describes the design of SMS-TP. We evaluate the protocol in Section 6.6. We
summarize the chapter in Section 6.7.
6.2 Motivation
6.2.1 The benefits of SMS
The growing adoption of SMS in mobile systems is due to a number of factors that make
SMS a desirable medium for mobile data exchange:
• Ubiquity: SMS is a globally accepted standard and available to cellular subscribers
in nearly every developed and developing country in the world. Today, GSM service
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alone is available in over 220 countries across 860 networks [63]. Moreover, alterna-
tives to SMS, such as the Enhanced Message Service and GPRS/EDGE, are poorly
supported or sparsely deployed outside of developed regions [94].
• Reliability: Like traditional mail servers, SMS uses a central server called the Short
Message Service Center (service center) to provide reliable store-and-forward message
delivery between two mobile devices [81, 99]. When a message is accepted for delivery,
the sender is reasonably guaranteed that the message will either reach its destination
or expire after a few days.
• APIs: The ability to programmatically send and receive SMS messages is a standard
feature of all major mobile development platforms [125]. SMS Gateways, which bridge
the Internet and cellular networks, have also proliferated, thus enabling applications
on the Internet to easily send SMS messages to mobile devices.
• Device-to-device communication: SMS provides mobile devices the ability to
communicate with each other directly. Unlike cellular data services, where devices
are typically behind a NAT and allocated an IP address using DHCP, SMS provides
mobile devices the ability to communicate with each other directly using their phone
number. Thus mobile devices can both send and receive data without the need to
poll a central server for updates.
Although many mobile applications are adopting SMS to exchange data, we observe
one distinct commonality: nearly all applications constrain their use of SMS to its 140-byte
payload (160 7-bit encoded characters). Several recent examples include [31, 114, 177, 184].
Applications that must exchange more than 140 bytes of data do so by fragmenting their
data and sending it using a series of messages [168, 179]. These applications use a simple
stop-and-wait protocol, which we describe in detail in Section 6.5.1. As mobile devices
continue to become an integral part of daily life [92], we believe that applications will
increasingly exploit the benefits of SMS and exchange increasingly larger amounts of data
- particularly in developing regions where the cellular network is often the only means of
communication. Our work aims to make efficient use of this message stream, modeled as
a communication channel.
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6.2.2 Alternatives to SMS
Today, there are two major alternatives to SMS that mobile applications can use to re-
liably exchange data: cellular data services and the Enhanced Message Service (EMS).
As a data channel, SMS is greatly inferior to cellular data services such as EVDO, and
GPRS/EDGE. SMS has significantly lower data rates, higher latency, a small, fixed mes-
sage size, and messages can be lost during transport. However, data services are expensive
and sparsely deployed in many parts of the world. In developing regions, cellular data
services are often non-existent [94], leaving SMS as the only cost-effective, viable option
for data communication.
EMS is an application level extension to SMS [1]. Although EMS is defined to support
up to 255 concatenated messages, the limited set of devices that support EMS typically
constrain EMS messages to 918 bytes. EMS also suffers from poor service provider inter-
operability, and EMS messages typically cannot be exchanged between devices on different
cellular networks. While EMS is an improvement over SMS and results in a lower message
overhead and higher throughput, the lack of standardization and limited data size make it
unsuitable for use as a general-purpose transport layer.
6.2.3 Prior work
Previous studies on SMS have primarily focused on the security and vulnerability of the
service. The feasibility of denial-of-service attacks and bulk messaging are examined in
References [48, 183, 196]. Other work examines the increased load on the cellular network
and the GSM signaling channel introduced by SMS [57, 71, 72, 120].
Zerfos et al. examine the characteristics of SMS from the perspective of a cellular service
provider [115, 201]. In this work, Zerfos et al. present an analysis of SMS traces collected
by a service provider in India over a three-week period. The network traces consist of
over 59 million messages exchanged by more than ten million users, which, at the time,
represented approximately 10% of India’s total mobile subscribers. In this analysis, Zerfos
et al. classify the uses of SMS and measures how conversation threads progress across
a series of messages. This work provides a preliminary classification of the behaviour
of messages as they traverse the cellular network. In particular, the authors observe that
nearly 5.1% of messages are lost during transit due to timer expiration or denial of delivery.
132
They found that 73.2% of messages reach their recipient within a ten-second delay, 17%
require more than one minute, and the remainder take over an hour and a half. Their study
also examines the service under flash crowd scenarios, which are experienced by cellular
networks during major holidays.
While this work provides valuable insight into the aggregate behaviour of SMS, it
lacks the critical details needed to design a transport protocol. We therefore conduct a
measurement study to acquire the necessary data to design a transport protocol. Our work
complements the Zerfos et al. study by examining SMS under bursty workloads and by
examining the root causes of delay variation.
6.3 Characterization
The goal of this section is to define the channel characteristics of SMS, where this channel
models a stream of SMS messages sent from a source to a destination. From this charac-
terization we can derive algorithms that make efficient use of the channel. We begin this
section with a system overview that motivates the key characteristics of our study, followed
by a discussion of our experiment parameters and methodology.
6.3.1 SMS overview
We begin our characterization of SMS with a brief overview of the service and describe the
process of sending a point-to-point SMS message from one mobile device to another. This
discussion is meant to highlight the variability in delay inherent to the cellular network and
to motivate our experimental approach. Although this discussion is made in the context
of GSM, SMS operates in a similar fashion over CDMA-based networks [157].
Consider a mobile device, otherwise known as a mobile station (MS), in an idle state in
a particular cell. To send an SMS message, the MS begins by initiating a channel request
over the random access channel of the base transceiver station (base station) with which it
is currently associated. Since the random access channel is a shared channel using slotted
ALOHA, communicating over it can introduce random back-off delays. The base station
controller responds to the request by allocating a dedicated control channel, allowing the
MS to initiate transmission of its message. The transmitted message is relayed through the
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base station and base station control to the mobile switching center. The mobile switching
center then forwards the message to the service center where the message is stored waiting
for transmission to the recipient. Further details can be found in [49, 136, 160].
After sending the message, the MS returns to an idle state. While idle and camped in a
cell, the MS monitors both the paging channel and the broadcast channels for changes to
the settings of the current cell and the neighbouring cells. If a neighbouring cell has been
identified as optimal, the MS will associate with the new cell’s base station. The details of
base station selection are further discussed in [160].
To deliver an SMS message to the final recipient, MSdest, the service center signals the
mobile switching center that it has a message to deliver to that MS. The mobile switching
center then requests base station controllers in the location area to page the MSdest. Once
the MSdest receives the page, it requests a dedicated control channel over the random access
channel as before. Once the MSdest receives a dedicated control channel it replies to the
mobile switching center with a page response. The mobile switching center then begins to
forward the SMS message to the MSdest.
6.3.2 Channel characteristics
Our study focuses on understanding the following characteristics of SMS from the per-
spective of mobile applications using the service: transmission time, delay, loss rate, and
message reordering.
Transmission time
The transmission of an SMS message requires that the MS first allocate a dedicated
control channel for transmission. Provided that the cellular network is provisioned to
handle the channel request, transmission time is primarily affected by the cellular signal
strength between the MS and base station. If the signal strength is too low, communication
between the MS and base station may be intermittent or fail entirely. Transmission time
is also affected by delays introduced by random back-off when requesting a channel over
the random access channel [49, 136]. The transmission time of a message is measured as
the time required for an application to make a blocking call into the OS, for the device
to establish a dedicated control channel, and to successfully transmit the message. This














Figure 6.1: Evaluation of the transmission time of an SMS message.
channel contention on the random access channel or failure to allocate a dedicated control
channel. Our study also examines the transmission failure rate and the time required for
a transmission failure to be detected.
Delay
Every SMS message must enter the service center before it is transmitted to the MSdest.
The message is delayed within the service center before the MSdest responds to a broadcast
page, establishes a dedicated control channel, and responds to the page. If a message
cannot be delivered to the receiver, further delays may be introduced while the service
center waits to reattempt delivery. We measure the delay of an SMS message as the time
between the sender initiating transmission and the receiver receiving the message.
Loss rate
Like other store-and-forward protocols, the service center is responsible for storing a
message until it can be successfully delivered to its recipient(s). The message is not deleted
from the service center until it is successfully delivered or cannot be delivered and expires.
The expiration time of an SMS message is controlled by the cellular provider and is typically
set to one day. Although MSdest can artificially inflate the loss rate by disabling the cellular
radio or by leaving coverage, we assume that MSs remain within cellular coverage and are
not engaged in a call or other activity that would inhibit the ability to establish a dedicated
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control channel and exchange SMS messages. We measure the loss rate as the probability
that a message is accepted by the network but not delivered to the MSdest.
Message reordering
Messages may be reordered within the cellular network for a variety of reasons. Mes-
sages may traverse different paths that exhibit different transfer times, path lengths, and
capacities. To increase capacity and robustness, the service center may be replicated; re-
ordering may then occur as a natural side effect of parallelism. We consider two metrics
when measuring reordering. The first metric considers the percentage of messages that are
simply out-of-order. A message is out-of-order if its sequence number is less than the high-
est sequence number of its predecessors. For example, if sequentially numbered messages
0,1,3,2 are received, message 2 is reordered, which indicates a 25% message reordering rate.
This is equivalent to the reordering definition in [135], where ‘late’ packets are declared
reordered. Our second reordering metric considers the overall delay introduced as a result
of reordering. We refer to this as reordering delay. For monotonically increasing message
IDs, reordering delay is calculated as the difference in time between the arrival of a re-
ordered message i and the minimum receive time of message i+ 1, i+ 2, ... Referring to our
previous example, if message i was received at time ti then the overall delay introduced by
reordering would be t2 − t3 since message 2 was clearly buffered while 3 was delivered.
6.3.3 Methodology
We evaluate the channel characteristics through a series of experiments to isolate param-
eters that can influence SMS.
Setup
Our experimental setup consists of a pair of Nokia 3390 cell phones tethered to Linux PCs
and three pairs of different SMS capable smartphones: the BlackBerry Pearl 8220 (Pearl),
BlackBerry 8820 (8820), and the BlackBerry Bold 9000 (Bold). The experimental setup
for the tethered cell phone case is illustrated in Figure 6.2. The three BlackBerrys allow us
to run our test driver as a native application on the device, and thus bypass any overhead


















Figure 6.2: Tethered cell phone experimental setup.
BlackBerry also contains a different cellular radio, which allows us to assess the effect that
the device may have on SMS service. The Pearl contains a MMM6000 radio from FreeScale
Semiconductor with a Sky77526 power amplifier from Skyworks. The 8820 also contains a
MMM6000 radio and a Freescale PMM6037 power amplifier. The Bold contains an RPF
09040B radio from Marvell Technology that supports 3G [6]. We equip each device with a
SIM card from a major Canadian GSM service provider (Rogers Wireless [7]). Although
our study is based solely on measurements from one service provider, we observed similar
characteristics during preliminary experimentation in Paris, France. We expect that the
networks even in developed regions will exhibit different properties [201]. We will revisit
the properties of alternate networks through simulation later in this chapter.
On each smartphone we use the cellular network to provide accurate clock synchroniza-
tion. The Linux PCs synchronize with a local NTP server. On each PC and smartphone
we install a software test driver that is responsible for either sending or receiving SMS mes-
sages. The sending application formats SMS messages and transmits them to the receiver.
Each SMS message contains a unique timestamp that represents the start of the experi-
mental trial and a monotonically increasing message ID. This information, along with the
transmission start and end times, are recorded in a file each time a message is transmitted.
Through a simple user interface, the sending application can be configured to perform a
variety of tests, which we will describe in the next section. Finally, this application collects
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statistics and manages each SIM card’s SMS quota1. The receiving application is respon-
sible for parsing the received messages and extracting the timestamp corresponding to the
trial and the message ID. This application also records the data to a file for later analysis.
On the PC, we communicate with the cell phone using an open source application called
Gammu [4].
On the smartphones, both the sending and receiving applications record the cell ID
and signal strength of the base station that the device is currently associated with. This
data is sampled at a rate of 2 Hz and is written to a file on each device. This information
was not available on the cell phone.
Throughout all experiments, each device was plugged in to an external power source.
Preliminary experimentation found that removing external power had no affect on any
output variables or signal strength. However, it is conceivable that future energy-aware
cellular radios could exploit periods where external power is available to improve QoS by,
for example, increasing their transmission power level.
Parameters
The performance characteristics of a stream of SMS messages may be influenced by the
following tunable control parameters:
• Intra-burst time: To counter denial-of-service attacks and other suspicious be-
haviour, the mobile switching center could deny a MS’s request for a dedicated con-
trol channel it if makes too many or too frequent requests. We define the intra-burst
time for a message mi as the amount of time that has passed since successfully
transmitting message mi−1.
• Transmission index: The mobile switching center or service center could introduce
delays depending on the number of messages recently or currently being serviced.
We define the transmission index of a message as its order in a series of back-to-back
messages, or burst. Bursts of messages are differentiated by an inter-burst time that
is much larger than the intra-burst time. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 6.3.













Figure 6.3: Relationship between intra-burst and inter-burst times.
• Device: Different cellular radio technologies have different tolerance for low signal
strength and interference. We therefore believe that the choice of device could have an
effect on the quality of service experienced when sending or receiving SMS messages.
• Time-of-day: The time of the day or the day of the week could influence random
access channel contention, dedicated control channel allocation, and workload on the
service center; thus altering the channel characteristics.
In addition to these control parameters, the following parameters cannot be controlled.
• Signal strength: The signal strength between the MS and the base station can
fluctuate for a variety of reasons, such as: movement by the MS, changing weather
conditions, attenuation by buildings, or interference by other MSs. A drop in signal
strength can cause the MS to associate with a new base station, which may have an
impact on the service.
• Base station: Different base stations can exhibit different levels of random access
channel contention and available capacity. Although base station selection heuristics
are designed to select the “optimal” base station, sub-optimal selections may impact
SMS performance. The process of changing base stations may also affect SMS.
• Local subscriber traffic: Without access to service provider’s records2 it is impos-
sible for us to measure the effect that subscribers have on each other. We assume that
2Although some service providers have been willing to share data [201], none of the service providers
we contacted were willing to share data pertaining to their SMS service. This is not surprising given how
lucrative the SMS market is [93].
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Not applicable 4 x 1000 messages =
4,000
500 ms Not applicable
Table 6.1: Summary of experiments.
the SMS infrastructure is sufficiently provisioned to ensure that subscribers have lit-
tle affect on each other; however, at the edges of the network, channel contention can
affect both the random access channel and allocation of dedicated control channels.
We compensate for local fluctuations by experimenting over long periods.
• Cross traffic: Cross traffic within the cellular network may cause excessive loads at
the service center. In this study, we assume that the service provider is sufficiently
provisioned to mitigate any effect due to cross traffic.
Unfortunately, the ability to programmatically sample the signal strength and current
base station are not available on all mobile devices, nor are they part of the Java CLDC
standard [81]. We measure these properties to gain insight; however, incorporating them
into our final SMS-TP would violate our CLDC compliance constraint and inhibit the
portability of our SMS-TP implementation.
We now describe experiments that isolate the effect that these parameters have on each
channel characteristic.
Experimentation
We conduct three experiments that isolate the effect of each parameter on our channel
characteristics. In all experiments the sending and receiving devices are located in a low-
density urban environment, physically stationary, and stored near an external building
window to minimize interference. The devices are separated by approximately five km to
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guarantee that they are not associated with the same base station and compete for access
to the same random access channel. This simple requirement was verified to be satisfied
during experimentation. These experiments are summarized in Table 6.1.
Network Variation Experiment: The first experiment evaluates the effect of the
time-of-day and the device used. This experiment consists of four week-long trials. In
each trial we use a different device to transmit bursts of 55 messages per hour over the
entire week. The value of 55 messages per hour creates statistically relevant samples while
not exceeding the SMS quota on a single SIM card. In this experiment we configure
the intra-burst time to be 500 milliseconds. The inter-burst time is configured to be
3600−
∑55
i=0(ti + 0.5) seconds to ensure that 55 messages are transmitted each hour.
Message Timing Experiment: Our second experiment examines the effect of intra-
burst time by performing four additional week-long trials with varying intra-burst times.
In this experiment we evaluate four additional intra-burst times: one, two, five, 10, and
20 seconds. As in the previous experiment, our inter-burst time is an hour minus the
time needed to transmit all messages. Each hourly trial in this experiment consists of 55
messages for the same reason. Although in this experiment, we are not explicitly focused
on decomposing any effect due to the time-of-day, it is necessary to conduct the trial over
the entire week to control for the effect of time-of-day. Similarly, in this experiment we
only use the 8820 devices to control for the device.
Message Index Experiment: Our final experiment examines the effect of the trans-
mission index. The previous two experiments are limited to bursts of 55 messages. This
experiment consists of four additional trials where 1000 messages are exchanged between
a pair of 8820s. This experiment uses the same 500 ms intra-burst time as in the second
experiment.
Throughout these experiments we assume that the effect caused by time-of-day is in-
dependent of the week of the year. While this is an assumption that previous studies have
shown to be wrong [9, 115], it is not feasible to conduct experiments every day of the year.
This assumption is therefore necessary to assess the other input variables. To avoid periods
of potential abnormality, we do not perform our experiments over any national holidays or
major events.
We also assume that the behaviour of an SMS message is independent of the GSM

































Mean transmission time 99% CI
Global mean
Figure 6.4: Mean transmission time with respect to intra-burst time. Note the magnified
y-axis.
Although the Java SMS libraries included with BlackBerry support transmitting SMS
messages on different ports, this feature is not common to all mobile platforms. Preliminary
experimentation demonstrated that changing the GSM port has no effect. We therefore
exclude the GSM port as an input variable and assume that this result holds for all GSM
ports.
6.4 Experimental results
Over the course of our experiments we successfully exchanged 74,990 messages between
pairs of cell phones and BlackBerry smartphones. We now present our analysis by consid-
ering each of our channel characteristics.
6.4.1 Transmission time





































Figure 6.5: Mean transmission time for each device.
Intra-burst time: We evaluate the effect of intra-burst time on transmission time
by performing a series of student t-tests that compare each trial’s confidence interval (CI)
to the sample population mean. The 99% CIs for each intra-burst time are illustrated in
Figure 6.4. Given that each CI contains over 9000 samples, we may ignore the fact that
the 10 second test does not contain the population mean and conclude that transmission
time is independent of the intra-burst time at a 99% confidence level.
Transmission index: We consider the effect of transmission index through a standard
one-way analysis of variance that compares the transmission index of a message to the
transmission time. In this analysis we assume that transmissions are independent events.
The input to this analysis is the week-long 8820 trial from the network variation experiment
and the extended 8820 data from the message index experiment. Recall that the week-
long trial consisted of sending 55 messages per hour over an entire week, and the second
experiment consists of four additional trials where 1000 messages are exchanged between
a pair of BlackBerry 8820 devices. The combination of these two datasets consists of
13,878 SMS messages over approximately 194.45 hours. The independent variable in this































Figure 6.6: Transmission failure rate for each device.
For transmission time to be independent of the transmission index, we expect to see more
variability within samples than between them. Our analysis revealed an F-test statistic
of 0.078, which indicates that there is significantly more variability within samples of a
particular transmission index than between them and that transmission time is therefore
independent of the transmission index. We observed similar results in both the week-long
Pearl and Bold datasets.
Device: The mean transmission time for the Nokia cell phone, Pearl, 8820, and Bold
experiments was 6.02, 4.12, 3.84, and 3.94 seconds respectively. These results are illustrated
in Figure 6.5. Using a student t-test we found that there was no significant difference
between smartphones at a 99% confidence level. The increased time needed to transmit
using the cell phone was due to the overhead incurred through communication with the cell
phone. Using Nokia’s FBUS protocol, messages are sent asynchronously by first injecting
the message into the phone’s outbox. The phone is then polled to verify that the message
has been sent. Sending the message took on average 1.5 seconds and a one-second polling
period added an average delay of 0.5 seconds.




























Figure 6.7: Mean delay for each device.
experiments we observed a mean transmission failure rate of 3.07%. The failure rate for
the Pearl, 8820, and Bold were 2.93%, 3.10%, and 3.18% respectively; again the rates are
statistically identical. These results are illustrated in Figure 6.6. However, in the cell phone
trials we observed a surprisingly low failure rate of 0.7%. The difference stems from the
experiment driver’s interface with the cellular hardware. After Gammu injects the message
into the phone’s outbox, the phone makes several attempts to establish a dedicated control
channel and deliver the message. It takes on average 11.14 seconds for the transmission to
fail. In contrast, the Java API on the smartphones simply throws an exception to notify
the experiment driver that a transmission failed. Detecting a failure on the smartphone
takes a mean time of only 3.71 seconds.
Time-of-day: We observed no significant correlation between the time-of-day and the
transmission time. However, we did find that transmission failures are correlated with the
time-of-day. Approximately 51% of transmission failures occur during the business hours


















Figure 6.8: CDF for SMS message delay.
6.4.2 Delay
Because SMS messages are delivered sequentially, delay is tightly coupled with reordering.
That is, messages may be delayed as a consequence of being reordered in a delivery queue.
The relationship between delay and reordering is examined in Section 6.4.4.
Overall, in the experiments using an intra-burst time of 500 ms, we observed a mean
delay of 289.34 seconds in the cell phone trials, and mean delays of 67.23, 39.14, and
25.30 seconds for the Pearl, 8820, and Bold respectively. These results are illustrated in
Figure 6.7. With over 9,000 samples each, this indicates a significant correlation between
delay and the device used. These results are illustrated as a delay CDF in Figure 6.8.
We also found that delay was correlated with the intra-burst time and the time-of-day,
as discussed next.
Intra-burst time: Using the 8820, we found that the mean delay for messages with
a 500 ms intra-burst time was 48.80 seconds. Mean delay falls to 39.12 seconds using a
one-second intra-burst time and stabilizes at 37.57 seconds using an intra-burst time of


































500 ms intra-burst time
2 second intra-burst time
Figure 6.9: Mean message delay for 500 ms and two-second intra-burst times.
the 500ms case. These results are illustrated in Figure 6.9. Interestingly, we also observe,
though this result is not shown, that intra-burst times higher than two seconds offer no
improvement in delay.
A service center is capable of delivering multiple messages over one dedicated control
channel [49], we examine how delay affects the rate that messages arrive at the receiver.
Surprisingly, despite high delays within the network, bursts of messages are almost always
delivered at a rate of one message every 4 to 6 seconds, independent of the intra-burst time.
We illustrate this finding through the CDF of message inter-arrival time in Figure 6.10. We
observe that messages sent with an intra-burst time of 500 ms may be classified into three
groups based on their inter-arrival time at the receiver. Approximately 80% of messages
arrive within 5 seconds of another messages. A second group consisting of approximately
18% of messages arrive between 5 and 15 seconds after another message. We therefore
note that, in the worst case using a 500 ms intra-burst time, 98% of messages arrive at
the receiver within approximately three times the median inter-arrival time. This mes-
sage inter-arrival behaviour has the effective appearance of messages arriving in batches,













500 ms intra-burst time
2 second intra-burst time
Figure 6.10: CDF of inter-arrival time (8820 using 500ms and 2 second intra-burst times).
inter-arrival times. We exploit this observation in the design of our transport protocol in
Section 6.5.2.
The remaining 2% of messages have an inter-arrival time greater than 15 seconds. The
high inter-arrival time of these messages is due to reordered messages that suffer abnormally
high delays. We examine reordering in Section 6.4.4. Although we are unable to determine
when a device establishes and releases a dedicated control channel, we believe that the
consistency in inter-arrival times illustrated in Figure 6.10 is strong evidence that the
device takes advantage of the channel to retrieve as many available messages as possible.
Time-of-day: The mean delay varies significantly over the course of a day. Across all
trials, we observed that delay is lowest during the hours of 8 pm to 9 am. On the 8820,
mean delay over 11 hour period was 42.87 seconds. During the business hours of 9 am to
6 pm mean delay increases to 104.29 seconds and falls to 21.69 seconds during the night.
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Mean delay 99% CI
Mean
Figure 6.11: Mean message delay over the day (8820 using a 500ms intra-burst time).
6.4.3 Loss
The loss rate differs significantly between the cell phone and smartphone trials. In the
smartphone trials we lost only two messages, which represents a loss rate of essentially 0%.
However, the cell phone trials produced a loss rate of 3.89% (approximately 50 messages per
day), which is consistent with the results presented in Reference [115]. Moreover, message
losses were uniformly distributed over each hour of the day. Although we observed slightly
more losses on Friday than on any other day of the week, we found that there is no
significant difference between days of the week at a 95% confidence level.
The significant gap between the cell phone and smartphone trials was again due to
communication errors with the cell phone. By polling the cell phone for updates, we
believe that the device was unable to respond to paging requests by the cellular network.
Then, after a series of failed retransmissions, the messages that expired within the service
center and were deleted. Communication errors with the cell phone also caused 2.91% of


































Figure 6.12: Message reordering rate for each device.
6.4.4 Reordering
Throughout all trials using an intra-burst time of 500 ms, we observed an overall reordering
rate of 3.41%. The reordering rate for cell phone, Pearl, 8820, and Bold are 3.01%, 3.73%,
3.07%, and 3.83% respectively. These results are illustrated in Figure 6.12. Given the
small relative between the four devices, we assume that message reordering is independent
of the device. Our analysis of reordering, therefore, aggregates samples from trials with an
intra-burst time of 500 ms.
We found that message reordering is strongly correlated with base station changes and
the time-of-day.
Base station change: We classify each reordered message according to the number
of seconds before or after a change in base station at either the sender or receiver. For
clarity, this classification technique is illustrated in Figure 6.13. Over the course of our
study, we observed 16 unique cell IDs. On average, a device actively sending or receiving
messages spends 603.10 seconds associated with a base station before switching to another.
The median amount of time that an active device spends in a single cell was 33.71 seconds.
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Figure 6.14: CDF of base station association times.
We illustrate the CDF for base station association time for both the sender and receiver in
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(b) Probability of a reordered message relative to base station change.
(Receiver)
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Transmission time of reordered message
Mean reordering delay (99% CI)
Overall mean reordering delay
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(b) Mean delay introduced by reordering.
Figure 6.16: SMS message reordering rate and delay.
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On the sending side of our experiment, we found that there was no correlation be-
tween base station change and probability of message reordering. We found that messages
were equally likely to be reordered when sent before or after a base station change. This
observation is illustrated by nearly identical distributions in Figure 6.15(a).
On the receiving side there is a significant correlation between base station change
and probability of message reordering. We observed a dramatic difference between the
distributions of reorderings. As illustrated in Figure 6.15(b), nearly 70% of reordered
messages are transmitted 100 seconds before the receiver switches to a new base station.
Messages that are sent after the receiver makes a base station change are significantly less
likely to be reordered. On the receiver we did observe a close relationship between base
station association time and the probability of reordering. Figure 6.14 reveals that nearly
80% of base station associations last less than 100 seconds. However, a closer examination
of the probability of reordering with respect to when a base station change takes place
reveals a non-uniform distribution. Messages that are transmitted closer to the time of a
receiver base station change are more likely to be reordered. This distribution is illustrated
as the ‘Before’ function in Figure 6.15(b). Interestingly, nearly 50% of the messages that
are received out of order were received within the 45 seconds prior to a base station change.
Despite a rigorous examination of signal strength and base station change patterns, we have
no explanation for this observation.
Time-of-day: Finally, we consider the relationship between the delay introduced by
message reordering and time-of-day. Recall that for monotonically increasing message IDs,
reordering delay is the difference in time between the arrival of a reordered message i and
the minimum receive time of message i+ 1, i+ 2, ... Over the course of a day, we observed
a distinct difference between the frequency of base station changes and the probability
of reordered messages. We illustrate the difference in Figure 6.16(a). In this figure, we
compare the daily CDF of base station hand-overs with the CDF of reordered messages.
The CDF curves illustrate that there is an higher probability of a reordered message than
a base station change between the hours of midnight to 3 am and 1:30 pm and 6 pm.
This relationship is reversed during the period of 6 am and noon. Although this difference
is only minor, we note that message reordering and its associated delay are not purely
dependent on base station changes.
To evaluate reordering delay we group reordered messages according to the hour that
they were transmitted. Overall, we observed a mean reordering delay of 235.98 seconds.
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This delay is in addition to a mean delay of 99.56 seconds. Therefore a reordering introduces
a nearly 240% increase in overall delay. Figure 6.16(b) illustrates the 99% CIs (two-tailed
t distribution) for each hour of the day. In this figure we immediately see that there is
significant difference between the hours of the day. However, by categorizing reordering
delay into three periods of the day, midnight to 9 am, 9 am to 6 pm, and 6 pm to midnight,
the intra-day variation is more obvious. We found that 13.8% of reordered messages are
transmitted between midnight and 9 am, 69.1% are transmitted between the hours of 9
am to 6 pm, and the remaining 17.1% occur between the hours of 6 pm to midnight. The
99% CIs for the three groups are: (90.27, 136.78), (192.49, 223.64), and (290.35, 398.24)
seconds. With relatively large distances between the CIs we can conclude that there is a
significant difference in reordering delay between the different periods of the day at a 99%
confidence level.
6.4.5 Summary of results
We briefly summarize the key results of our characterization. Table 6.2 highlights the key
findings of our characterization and how each results impacts the design of the transport
protocol. Table 6.3 provides the mean values for each channel characteristic for each test
device.
6.5 Transport protocol design
Although we predict that SMS messages will continue to decrease in monetary cost, the
service was not yet free at the time of this work. In addition to the design criteria outlined
in Table 6.2, our design must minimize the message overhead needed to exchange data.
Minimizing message transmissions also reduces the amount of energy consumed on both
the sender and receiver. Finally, our design is further motivated by the concurrent need to
maximize data throughput over the SMS channel.
In preliminary experimentation we found that bidirectional SMS communication, where
devices are simultaneously exchange SMS messages with each other, degrades performance
significantly: transmission times are increased by nearly a factor of three and delays can
increase by nearly an order of magnitude, nearly 45% of messages are reordered, and the
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Key Findings Design Impact
Transmission time
The transmission time of SMS messages are
independent of the intra-burst time, the trans-
mission index, and the time-of-day.
The protocol does not need to regulate the
transmission rate.
Message delay
Delay is highly correlated with the device used
and the time-of-day that the message is trans-
mitted.
The protocol must tolerate highly-variable de-
lay.
Delay is independent of the transmission in-
dex of a message.
The protocol can be agnostic to the quantity
of messages transmitted.
Devices utilize a dedicated control channel to
retrieve multiple messages from the service
center. Despite high delays and message re-
ordering, messages are received at a steady
rate in batches.
The protocol may assume a relatively con-
stant message arrival rate.
Message loss
Assuming that both the sending and receiving
devices are camped on the cellular network,
messages sent from one device to another are
lost, in the worst case, 3.89% of the time.
Message delivery is not guaranteed. The pro-
tocol must detect and correct missing frag-
ments of data.
Message reordering
Messages are reordered at a mean rate of
3.41%. The probability that a message is re-
ordered increases significantly during business
hours.
The protocol must be tolerant of a high degree
of message reordering.
Message reordering is strongly correlated with
base station change.
No impact. Although message reordering
could be reduced by actively monitoring cel-
lular signal strength, the ability to program-
matically monitor the signal strength of a base
station is not available on most mobile plat-
forms [125].
Table 6.2: The impact of SMS channel characteristics on design of a transport protocol.
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Device Tx time Delay Loss Reordering
Nokia 6.02 sec 289.34 sec 3.89% 3.01%
Pearl 4.12 sec 67.23 sec 0% 3.73%
8820 3.84 sec 39.14 sec 0% 3.07%
Bold 3.94 sec 25.30 sec 0% 3.83%
Table 6.3: Summary of device measurements.
loss ranged between 9% to 16%. While this result is a side effect of GSM channel contention
and not a fundamental property of SMS, (and thus not considered in our study), we must
minimize bidirectional communication in our protocol design.
6.5.1 Existing method
The method used by existing mobile applications to exchange data over SMS is both
simple and reliable. Applications that must exchange more than 140 bytes of data do so
by fragmenting their data and sending it using a series of messages [168, 179]. Because
losses are known to occur in the cellular network [201], applications achieve reliable data
transport by utilizing a per-message ack. After sending each message, the sender initiates
an ack timer and blocks for a delivery receipt (ack) before sending the next message. If
the timer expires before the ack is received, then the message is retransmitted. In our
evaluation, we set the ack timeout to 160 seconds (approximately twice the measured
RTT). Alternatively, the sender may utilize the delivery receipt mechanism in SMS to
receive confirmation of delivery from the service center instead of the receiving device.
The sender continues to send messages in series until the data is fully delivered. The
one-to-one relationship between messages and acks avoids of timers at the receiver. This
protocol is therefore simple to implement.
In this protocol, each message includes a small, fixed-sized header that allows the
fragments to be reassembled at the receiver. This header includes both the total size of
the data and the sequence number of the current fragment. In our implementation, we
represent the size and sequence number as two bytes each. The remaining 136 bytes of the
message are always used, with the exception of the last message, which is not required to
use the entire 136 byte payload.
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Although this method is both easy to implement and reliable, it is inefficient. This
method at least doubles the number of messages required to transfer the data and signifi-
cantly increases the transfer time.
6.5.2 Protocol
The communication protocol between two SMS-TP clients is designed to support a wide
variety of applications and user-defined settings while maximizing the payload of a single
message.
Flow control and error control
SMS-TP provides flow control and error control through a simplified version of the NET-
BLT protocol [36, 37]. In NETBLT, the sender communicates with the receiver by ex-
changing a series of large data aggregates called buffers. When transferring a buffer, the
sender fragments it into a set of packets. The packets are then sent across the network
to the receiver where they are reassembled into the original buffer. When the last packet
in the buffer arrives, the receiver checks to see if all the packets in the buffer have been
correctly received. The receiver then sends an ack to the sender containing a bitmap that
indicates the packets that have been received or lost.
NETBLT has several distinct advantages that make it suitable for use in an SMS-based
data transport protocol. Bidirectional transmission of SMS messages between devices is
minimized through the use of a selective ack that is sent when all packets have been received
or a timeout occurs. The selective ack also tolerates message reordering, random losses,
and variable inter-arrival times. The low loss rate of SMS ensures that the few acks sent by
a NETBLT receiver will almost always be delivered. Finally, NETBLT transmits messages
in a continuous burst. Given that our findings indicate that messages can be transmitted
rapidly, this attribute of NETBLT significantly simplifies the complexity of our protocol
implementation.
Our approach differs from NETBLT by using only one buffer that is at most 32 KB; thus
removing the need to coordinate buffer transfer and to reassemble buffers at the receiver.























Figure 6.17: Example scenario for acknowledgement timer at the sender.
the receiver. The sender initiates communication by sending a single message to the receiver
that contains the size of the overall data, an integer representing the current transaction
ID, and the first chunk of data to exchange. Upon receiving the initial message, the receiver
may accept or reject the session by sending an ack back to the sender. If either message is
lost, the sender will retransmit the original message three times before failing and reporting
the failure. We refer to the period of time needed for the sender to initiate communication
and receive the initial ack as the setup delay.
After receiving the initial ack accepting the transaction, the sender begins transferring
each remaining chunk of data within the body of an SMS message. When sending each
message, the sender adapts to transmission failures by resending messages; however, the
sender is not aware of losses or reordered messages in the network. The sender continues
to transmit messages until there is no more data to send. The protocol is illustrated with
a sample five-fragment scenario in Figure 6.17.
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Algorithm 1 SMS-TP algorithm at the sender.
setup delay = 120 seconds
send initial chunk
timesent = timenow
set timer(timenow + setup delay)
while true do
event← waitforevent
if event = message received then
record acked chunks {All messages received are acks}
if all chunks acked then
exit {Success}
else
if event = initial ack then
setup delay = timenow − timesent
end if
send all nonacked chunks {All chunks except the initial chunk}
reset timer(timenow + setup delay)
end if
else if event = timer expired then
if retry count > 3 then
exit {Failure}
else
retry count = retry count+ 1
sent all nonacked chunks





The sender maintains an ack timer initialized to 120 seconds. Each message sent by the
sender causes an ack timer to be reset. Because delay is independent of the transmission
















Figure 6.18: Example scenario for acknowledgement timer at the receiver.
messages. We therefore set the timer duration to be twice the setup delay. Although this
value may not be optimal, we found that in practice, a relaxed timer at the sender prevented
redundant message retransmissions. We also observed that redundant retransmissions
arrive after the original message approximately 96% of the time. When the timer expires,
the sender begins retransmitting all non-acked chunks. The pseudocode for this algorithm
is given in Algorithm 1.
On the receiving side, the data chunk contained within each received message is placed
into a pre-allocated buffer. The transport protocol must then decide whether or not a
selective ack should be sent. We propose the following algorithm that exploits our finding
that message bursts arrive in batches with a steady inter-arrival rate. Upon delivery
of each message, the receiver computes the exponential moving average of message inter-
arrival time. After receiving a message, the receiver sets a timer to β times the inter-arrival
time. Recall from Figure 6.10 that 98% of messages transmitted back-to-back arrive within
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Algorithm 2 SMS-TP algorithm at the receiver.




if event = message received then
add message to receive buffer




if duplicate message then
send selective ack
end if
intra = α(intra) + (1− α)(timenow − timerecv)
reset timer(timenow + intra ∗ β)
end if
timerecv = timenow
else if event = timer expired then





retry count = retry count+ 1




three times the median inter-arrival time. We therefore consider β = 3 to be a reasonable
selection. Messages that are delayed beyond this threshold are probably lost. Figure 6.18
illustrates the same five-chunk sample scenario where the ack timer is used by the receiver.
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Upon expiration of the ack timer, the receiver immediately transmits an ack that indi-
cates the chunks that have been received. The receiver then enters an exponential back-off
by resetting the timer to γ times its previous value. The choice of γ is less critical than
the choice of β. We found γ = 2 to be a reasonable selection; however, pathological net-
works, such as networks that are severely under provisioned, may require a more aggressive
back-off rate.
If no messages are received after three ack retransmissions, then the sender is assumed
to be gone and the receiver discards the current buffer. This technique allows the receiver
to adapt to fluctuations in delay that cause message inter-arrival times to vary. The
pseudocode for this algorithm is given in Algorithm 2. As in NETBLT, when the last
chunk has been placed in the buffer, the receiver sends a complete ack to the sender.
Because this final ack may be lost, the receiver maintains record of the completed data
and retransmits completed acks as needed. If a duplicate chunk is received, then the
receiver assumes that a previously transmitted ack was lost and immediately transmits an
ack representing the current state to the receiver.
Figure 6.19: SMS-TP message format.
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Message format
Each transmitted SMS message contains a small fixed size header and message payload.
The first byte consists of a two-bit protocol version, a three-bit message type, and three
flag bits. The first flag bit signals that the payload is compressed and the last two bits
are currently unused. In the future we foresee using one-bit to signal that the payload is
encrypted.
Messages exchanged between two SMS-TPs consist of short messages, standard mes-
sages, and control messages. The format of these messages is illustrated in Figure 6.19.
Short messages consist of data that is small enough to fit into a single SMS message. We
have included this special case to reduce the header size by two bytes. Standard messages
are designed to provide fragmentation and reassembly of larger data. These messages con-
sist of a 5-byte header, and a 135-byte payload. We have chosen to limit the maximum
data size supported by SMS-TP to 32 KB. We believe that 32 KB (243 SMS messages) is
a practical upper bound on data size. Systems that must exchange larger amounts of data
may fragment their data into 32 KB sized units or switch to a cellular data service such as
GPRS/EDGE. Finally, control messages are used to transport the selective acks described
above.
6.5.3 Architecture
The software architecture of SMS-TP , as illustrated in Figure 6.20, was primarily influ-
enced by the need for platform portability and code modularity. To run on a variety of
resource constrained devices, the architecture minimizes memory allocation and copying
by reusing objects, timers, and threads as often as possible. To provide clean integration
with existing mobile systems and applications, SMS-TP also provides a series of APIs that
abstract platform heterogeneity from the internal operation of the transport protocol.
The SMS-TP consists of the following high-level components.
SMS-TP API: The SMS-TP API is the application interface into the SMS-TP. This
API allows host applications to send and receive data, register a view, configure, and
start and stop the SMS-TP. This interface provides five sub-interfaces: the SMS Data,























SMS Data SMS Address SMS Logger SMS View
Figure 6.20: Software architecture of SMS-TP including example SMS Handlers.
implement the SMS Data interface. This interface allows fully received data to be passed
directly to applications without allocating new memory. The SMS Address interface is
designed to ease integration of the SMS-TP into existing applications. An address consists
of a phone number used to send an SMS to a device and an optional GSM port number.
This interface is implemented by objects in the host application that are responsible for
maintaining addresses and removes the need for redundant copying of addresses (typically
strings) into the SMS-TP. The SMS Logger is a simple interface that allows the host
application to specify how the SMS-TP should log its activities. The SMS View API
provides a call back mechanism for the host application to be notified of changes to the
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internal state of the SMS-TP. This interface is primarily intended to support a GUI in the
host application. More detail on the SMS-TP API is available in our implementation [124].
SMS Handler API: Each mobile platform has a unique method for sending and
receiving SMS messages. The SMS Handler API is designed to abstract these differences
from the internal operation of the SMS-TP.
SMS Send Work: This component contains the data sent from host application data
and is responsible for providing SMS message sized chunks of data to the SMS Sender
for transmission. Chunks are retrieved from the work object by a linear sequence number
starting from the beginning of the given data. This component also maintains the state of
a transaction, which includes the messages that have been successfully received, the last
time ack was received or message was sent. The symmetric component is SMS Receive
Work, which reassembles messages into application data on the receiver’s side.
SMS Sender: The SMS sender is one of the two threads in the SMS-TP. The primary
function of this component is to dequeue data passed into the SMS-TP for transmission,
compress it if configured to do so, wrap the data in an SMS Send Work object, and
transmit chunks of the data as SMS messages. The sender stores SMS work objects in
a table, which is keyed by a one-byte integer work identifier that is chosen in increasing
order by the sender to uniquely represent a transaction.
The SMS Sender maintains two sending queues: a high priority queue for control mes-
sages and a second queue for sending messages containing application data. Messages are
placed in both queues by the sender thread and by the Control Message Handler when
processing received acks. The sender is also responsible for recovering from transmission
failures. In many cases, this involves simply pushing the SMS message back onto the
sending queue.
SMS Receive Work: On the receiving side of the SMS-TP, data is reassembled within
an SMS Receive Work object. This component maintains a receive buffer for the full data
size and a bitmap of all received messages. When sending an ack, this special message is
retrieved from the work object and transmitted to the sender. As mentioned above, this
component implements the SMS Data interface, which allows completed data to be passed
to the host application unmodified.
SMS Peer: The SMS Peer stores a set of partial Receive Work objects from a specific
source address (phone number). This component also temporarily stores the work identifier
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of completed work. This prevents new Receive Work objects from being allocated when
highly delayed messages arrive after the work has completed. When an SMS Peer contains
no work objects or completed work identifiers, it is considered empty and is deleted.
SMS Receiver: The SMS Receiver is the second thread in the SMS-TP. The primary
role of this component is to block on the arrival of an SMS message. When a message is
received it takes one of two paths: control messages are passed to the Control Message
Handler and data messages are passed to an SMS Peer corresponding to the message’s
source address. If a received message completes a work object, then the work object is
removed form its peer container and placed in the application receive queue.
A secondary role of the Receiver is to enforce upper bounds on both the data size and
the number of concurrent work objects that can be handled by a receiver. SMS messages
that are received for a Receive Work object that is either larger than a user specified limit
or exceed 32 KB are discarded.
Control Message Handler: The Control Message Handler implements the commu-
nication protocol between two or more SMS-TPs. This component has access to both the
sending and receiving data structures and is responsible for handling and dispatching all
inter-NIC control messages.
6.5.4 Implementation
We have implemented the transport protocol as a library written in Java Micro Edition.
Although Java is a portable language, most platforms provide auxiliary libraries to access
device specific functionality or provide more memory-efficient data structures [125]. Our
implementation is compliant with the Java CLDC and can therefore be embedded into
existing applications running on Java enabled cell phones, smartphones, and PC environ-
ments. Our implementation is licenced under the Apache Licence and can be downloaded



































SMS-TP (alpha = 0.5, beta = 3, gamma = 2)
Calculated optimal
Figure 6.21: SMS message overhead for the SMS-TP vs. stop-and-wait protocol and
theoretical optimal.
6.6 Evaluation
Our evaluation of SMS-TP consists of two stages. First, we evaluate the performance of the
transport protocol using two sample Java applications that exchange data between a pair
of SMS-TP enabled devices. This evaluation mimics the behaviour of a real deployment.
The second stage of our evaluation simulates SMS service using a range of delay and loss
rates.
6.6.1 Sample applications
Our first application is written in standard Java for Linux and the second is written in
for BlackBerry. We use both the cell phone and BlackBerry 8820 to conduct our evalu-
ation. Both devices were configured as in our previous experiments in Section 6.3. For
measurement purposes, all devices’ clocks are synchronized to either an NTP server or
the cellular network. Each application operates as either sending or receiving mode. The
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sending application generates random data and sends the data to the receiver using the
SMS-TP library, giving the receiving device’s phone number as the destination address.
The receiving application blocks waiting for data from SMS-TP. Upon receiving data, the
data is written to a file.
We evaluate SMS-TP by repeatedly exchanging data of size 512 bytes, 1 KB, 2 KB, 4
KB, 8 KB, 16 KB, and 32 KB. The results are compared to a calculated optimal case. In the
optimal case, we simulate the transmission of each data bundle under perfect conditions.
We use a constant mean transmission time and delay, with no losses, no reordered messages,
and no transmission failures. Given these generous assumptions, it is not necessary to use
SMS-TP: the optimal case does not require a header on each message and it can fragment
data into full 140-byte SMS messages. The optimal case maximizes its use of pipelining to
transfer messages as fast as possible. Our evaluation also includes an implementation of
the approach used by existing applications, which we will describe next.
We conduct our evaluation during the hours of midnight to 6 am for consistency in our
measurements. Our evaluation is focused on two key variables: message overhead and data
throughput. When measuring throughput, we assume that the transaction is over when
the receiver finishes writing the data to file, and not when the sender receives the final ack.
Message overhead
The message overhead (99% CI) for transferring each data size for each of the three cases
using the 8820 is illustrated in Figure 6.21. We found that the overhead using the cell
phone was statistically equivalent. As expected, we found that SMS-TP offered a nearly
50% gain over the existing method. This gain is due to our consolidation of acks into a
single selective ack sent when the receiver has received all of the messages, or a timeout
occurs. There were no retransmissions as a result of ack timeouts in our evaluation of the
existing method. In the worst case, the message overhead of SMS-TP was only 8.5% below
the optimal case.
Throughput
We found that SMS-TP yields a significant improvement in data throughput over the
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(b) SMS-TP throughput using a smartphone.
Figure 6.22: Throughput analysis of SMS-TP.
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smartphone in Figure 6.22(a) and Figure 6.22(b) respectively. Using the cell phones, we
found that SMS-TP improves throughput by as much as 499% when transferring 32 KB of
data. Using the smartphone, we found that throughput leveled off when transferring 8 KB
or more of data. Using the smartphones, our protocol improves throughput over the stop-
and-wait protocol by as much as 545%! The significant gap in throughput between the cell
phones and smartphones is primarily due to communication failures with the cell phone
that occurred approximately 5% to 10% of the time and inhibited the phone’s ability to
both send and receive messages and deliver messages to the PC over the serial connection.
We expect that in the absence of the communication failures, data throughput using a
tethered cell phone would improve dramatically.
We also found that in the worse case SMS-TP performs worse than the optimal case
by approximately 40%. Given the generosity of the assumptions made in the optimal case,
we believe that this is a good first step. Narrowing this gap (if possible) will be an area of
future study.
6.6.2 Simulation
In the second phase of our study we examine the effect of loss rate and delay on the
message overhead and the throughput of SMS-TP through simulation. We select these
characteristics from within the 90 percentile of values observed by Zerfos in [201]. Our
simulation therefore examines the performance of SMS-TP when deployed in a developing
region.
Our simulation consists of two unmodified instances of SMS-TP, each initialized with an
SMS Handler that simulates both the device and cellular network. Each message enqueued
for transmission by an SMS-TP instance is subject to transmission and propagation delays
using specified mean and standard deviation values. Messages are also discarded by the
simulator at a configurable loss rate. Messages that are not discarded are delivered to the
destination SMS-TP instance, which can respond using the same simulated channel. The
simulation library is included as part of SMS-TP distribution [124].
Our evaluation consists of three loss rates: 1%, 5%, and 10%. Delay also varies between
30 seconds to 180 seconds. In each trial we use a mean transmission time of 3.8 seconds
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(b) Control message overhead of the SMS-TP vs. delay.
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Figure 6.24: Throughput for SMS-TP for variable message loss rates vs. delay.
Message overhead
The mean total message overhead is illustrated in Figure 6.23(a) (95% CI). Under a 1% loss
rate and low delay, the simulation is statistically equivalent to our previous results. Under
low-loss and high-delay conditions, message overhead increases by less than 10%. Under
high-loss and high-delay conditions, the receiving instance of SMS-TP will occasionally
send a premature ack, which causes the sender to retransmit copies of messages that may
still be in transit. The increase in acks (control messages) as a percentage of total message
overhead is illustrated in Figure 6.23(b).
Throughput
Under low-loss, low-delay conditions, the simulation yields similar throughput: approxi-
mately 20 bytes / second for our 16 KB trial. These results are illustrated in Figure 6.24.
The pipelined approach to message transmission mitigates the effect of message losses on
throughput. Even under high-loss conditions, throughput remains within 20% of the low-
loss throughput boundary. When subject to high delays throughput falls to approximately
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10 bytes / second and message losses have negligible affect on throughput. Interestingly,
under high-loss, high-delay conditions, SMS-TP outperforms the existing method, evalu-
ated under low-loss, low-delay conditions, by a factor of two.
6.7 Chapter summary
This chapter has presented the design and implementation of an efficient and reliable
SMS-based data transport protocol. We motivated the design of our transport protocol
through an empirical study that characterises the behaviour of the cellular network under
bursty workloads. This study complements existing SMS studies by considering factors
that affect SMS: intra-burst time, transmission order, the device used, time-of-day, signal
strength, and base station changes. This is the first work that measures SMS from the
perspective of mobile applications using the service. Among many interesting results, we
were surprised to find that the cellular network does not inhibit rapid transmission of SMS
messages, message delay varies significantly over the day, and that messages transmitted
back-to-back are almost always delivered in batches at a steady rate. Although our findings
are based on one network and a limited number of devices, preliminary experimentation
on GSM networks in both the United States and Europe suggest that other networks
and devices will exhibit similar properties. As the first study to examine SMS from the
applications’ perspective, rather than from within a service provider’s network, we believe
that our work will serve as a basis for future study.
The transport protocol has been implemented as a stand-alone Java ME library that
is CLDC compliant and runs on a wide range of cell phones, smartphones, and PC envi-
ronments. Our implementation has a memory footprint of only 33 KB and can be easily
integrated with existing mobile system. Using this implementation, we show that the
transport protocol outperforms existing techniques by reducing message overhead by as
much as 50% and by increasing data throughput by as much as 545% over the approach
used by existing mobile applications.
While the SMS-TP is clearly an invaluable component of our CTN system, this work
can have impact anywhere that alternatives to SMS are either expensive, poorly deployed,
or do not exist. Our SMS-TP implementation is currently used to provide high-priority,
moderate-latency communication to rural kiosks in the KioskNet system [66] and to ex-
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change cryptographic information between mobile devices in NearbyFriend [207]. We be-








The last chapter introduced an optional SMS-based control channel that can provide
end-to-end connectivity between non-collocated device. This chapter introduces a second
optional component, the Energy Management Oracle, that serves as a fail-safe mechanism
to prevent devices participating in a CTN from depleting their battery. By querying the
oracle before executing an energy intensive operation, the prototype CTN application can
adapt its execution to preserve battery life. The design of the oracle is influence by a
large-scale user study, and evaluated using a custom-built experiment platform.
7.1 Introduction
The proliferation of smartphones is driving a rapid growth in mobile applications. The
design of these applications is governed by several constraints that are unique to mobile
computing environments. Of these constraints, energy is the one resource that when de-
pleted will render all of the applications on the mobile device, including emergency and
essential applications such as the phone, inoperable. Unfortunately, while global demand
and use of mobile applications continue to expand, the energy density of smartphone bat-
teries has grown at a comparably insignificant rate [180]. Energy is therefore a critical
resource that must be carefully considered in the design of mobile applications.
CTNs are among a class of applications that must operate with little or no user-
intervention, must operate over long durations, and consume large amounts of energy.
Delay tolerant networking applications, such as those in References [13, 113, 144, 175], are
also examples of this class of application. Each application must forward data bundles
autonomously and operate continuously since being offline prevents data exchange with
neighbouring devices. These applications also consume large amounts of energy due to
their use of wireless network and file I/O during opportunistic connections, and can easily
deplete a battery if left unchecked. We are therefore faced with the question of how to
maximize benefit to the user while minimizing impact.
We approach this complex question through a large-scale user study that examines
the charging characteristics of smartphone users. Using this information, we build the
tools and libraries that allow mobile application developers to adapt to increasing energy
constraints. The contributions of this work are threefold:
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• We build a dataset containing the smartphone usage and energy consumption char-
acteristics of 20,100 BlackBerry smartphone users. Our dataset contains over 1150
years of cumulative data from users spanning 23 time zones and every BlackBerry
device-type released since early 2006.
• We exploit user energy traces in our dataset to build the Energy Emulation Toolkit
(EET). Using this tool, developers of energy intensive applications can test their
applications’ energy consumption behaviour against existing energy traces. Devel-
opers may then alter their design or tune algorithm parameters to reduce energy
consumption and ensure that their application does not deplete users’ batteries.
• By classifying users into one of three groups according to their unique energy con-
sumption characteristics, we demonstrate that energy level can be predicted to within
7% error within an hour and within 28% error a full day in advance. Using our predic-
tion algorithm, we build the Energy Management Oracle (EMO) library. By querying
the EMO before executing an energy intensive operation, applications can adapt their
execution to achieve a near optimal successful execution rate.
We begin this chapter with a summary of related work. We then present an overview
of our usage study and the dataset that we have built. Section 7.4 presents the design
and evaluation of the EET tool. Section 7.5 describes our user classification scheme, our
energy level predictor, and the EMO library. We summarize this chapter in Section 7.6.
7.2 Related work
Although energy consumption has been widely studied [12, 95, 96, 121, 138, 149, 167],
little is known about the charging characteristics of users. Rahmati et al. were the first
to qualitatively and quantitatively assess how users consumed energy. They provide pre-
liminary insight into charging behaviour, user interfaces for power-saving settings, user
knowledge, and user reaction to battery levels [147]. Their experiment consisted of ten
users using unfamiliar devices over a one-month period. Their experiment driver also re-
duced the life of the device to about 40% of its usual lifetime. Falaki et al. have measured
the energy consumption and application usage behaviour of 33 Android and 222 Windows
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Mobile devices [52]. Our BlackBerry user study complements Falaki’s work; however, our
dataset is approximately two orders of magnitude larger. Moreover, all of our 20,100 users
are running our experiment software on their personal devices for periods up to several
months in duration. We believe that our work is a more representative study. Finally, our
experiment driver is event driven, does not record data to flash memory, and consumes less
than 1% of additional battery life. Its operation is transparent to the user.
Cignetti et al. present the design of an energy model that estimates energy consumption
with respect to the actions performed in an application [34]. Given that today’s mobile
devices are highly concurrent and that energy intensive tasks may take place without
user intervention, actions performed by users are insufficient indicators of future energy
levels. Bellosa examines OS-directed power management in Reference [21]. In this work,
system activity is throttled to achieve a desired energy consumption goal. This work is
practical for homogeneous server workloads, but would not work under the heterogeneous
workloads of a personal computing environment. Moreover, throttling of any component
would be noticeable to the user and could adversely affect user experience. This approach
also requires knowledge of the energy consumption rates of the underlying hardware to
accurately throttle the energy consumption rate of the system. Ravi et al. exploit a user’s
location to predict when the user will charge their device [149]. Based on this prediction
and the current energy consumption rate, their work determines the portion of the battery
that can be used by other applications and warns the user of potential battery depletion.
7.3 Smartphone usage study
Our measurement study is focused on understanding how smartphone users interact with
their devices and how they consume and replenish energy. We begin with a brief overview
of the measurement study driver and data that we collect. We then discuss the primary
challenges in implementing the driver and producing a large-scale dataset of this kind.
7.3.1 Measurement driver
Most user-centric experiments distribute smartphones to a mere 10-30 users: fellow re-
searchers, staff members, or undergraduates. Although this has been a convention for
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the past several years of mobile computing research (primarily due to convenience), this
method of experimentation has several significant flaws:
• Experiment-enabled devices are typically given to participants on a temporary basis,
which can affect users’ interaction with the device and degrade the accuracy of user-
centric results.
• Participants are often unwilling to use an experiment-enabled device as their pri-
mary/personal device. This can further bias the accuracy of an experiment.
• Participants are often intimately aware of their role in an experiment, which may
further bias the results either positively or negatively. Participants may, for example,
interact with or charge the device differently if they know that their actions are being
recorded.
Our measurement study is shaped by three high-level objectives. First, to achieve a high
degree of accuracy, we require more participants than previous studies [52, 147]. Second,
to obtain many participants our measurement driver must run on a heterogeneous set of
mobile devices with a diverse set of capabilities. Finally, our driver runs autonomously on
participants’ personal mobile devices and must therefore be production-grade software.
We develop two BlackBerry applications to collect the desired data: the Standard
Logger and the Background Logger.
Standard Logger
The Standard Logger is an event-driven BlackBerry application that runs continuously in
the background of a device. Upon installation, the logger records the following information:
• Backlight activity: we infer user-interaction with a device by exploiting the device’s
LCD backlight being on as an indication of user interaction. Using callbacks from
the OS, the logger records the time that the backlight turns on and off.
• Idle counter: the OS maintains a counter since the last user gesture. The counter
is reset whenever the user presses a button, touches the screen, or moves a trackball
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Figure 7.1: Screen capture of the Standard Logger.
on the device. The logger records the counter’s value when the backlight turns off to
determine the duration that the backlight is on but the user is not interacting with
the device.
• Charging activity: users’ battery charging behaviour can be determined by record-
ing when a device is plugged and unplugged from an external power source such as
a USB cable or power adapter.
• Battery level: the logger records the battery level every ten minutes to determine
how users consume energy throughout the day.
• Soft shutdown: the logger records signals that the device is powering on and off to
account for inconsistencies in the data. For example, a user may power off a device
when the battery is low, plug it in, unplug it at a later time, and power on at a full
charge.
• Device-type: to differentiate BlackBerry devices we record the device-type and OS
version.
The logger contains a UI that allows study participants to observe aggregate statistics
and a histogram of their usage pattern throughout the week. Figure 7.1 illustrates a screen
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capture of the Standard Logger. Through a menu users may upload the data manually or
authorize automatic weekly uploads to a collection server on the Internet.
Background Logger
The Standard Logger alone was not capable of achieving our desired scale. We therefore
partnered with a major BlackBerry software developer to augment their existing software
quality logging tools with a simplified version of the Standard Logger. We refer to this
augmentation as the Background Logger. The Background Logger collects the same infor-
mation as the Standard Logger and uploads the data to the company’s servers each week.
We will refer to both loggers generically as the Logger in the remainder of this chapter.
Assumptions
The Logger makes one fundamental assumption: that the user does not run applications
that programmatically enable and disable the device’s backlight while resetting the device’s
idle time by simulating user input (keystroke injections). Given that application developers
rarely use both operations, we consider these to be reasonable assumptions in our study;
however, we do take steps to detect and discard invalid data.
7.3.2 Challenges
Achieving our three high-level experiment objectives was challenging. We believe that
other mobile researchers can benefit from our insight on the following top four challenges.
Volatile file systems
Logging data to a file is a standard technique to ensure persistent storage in the presence
of power failures or other interruptions. However, file systems can be unmounted at any
time either manually by the user or automatically when connected to a PC. Adapting to
this problem by frequently flushing I/O buffers to persistent storage can have a significant
impact on battery life. The Logger therefore exploits two trends among BlackBerry users
to provide reliable logging and save energy: users maintain a high battery charge level and
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rarely fully power off their devices. Our technique buffers log data in volatile memory until
uploading it to our collection server each night.
Energy constraints
An application that has a noticeable impact on energy consumption will not be successful.
In preliminary experimentation, we found that users were intimately aware of their device’s
normal battery life; any noticeable or perceived decrease in battery life would be attributed
to the experimental application. As observed in previous studies, polling a device’s state
can have a detrimental impact on battery life [147]. The Logger exploits callbacks from
the operating system whenever possible to reduce the energy cost. Unfortunately, an event
driven model can produce inconsistent sequences of events. For example, when powering
off a BlackBerry, we frequently did not receive an event signaling that the screen was off
until after powering the device on. Similar scenarios were observed when charging. When
analyzing the output of an event driven application, one must take into account possible
race-conditions in the underlying OS.
Third-party application intervention
User-centric studies must take into account intervention by third party applications. For
example, an application that records a user’s battery consumption can be affected by
a spyware application that is accidentally installed on the device [202]. Unfortunately,
collecting a manifest of all applications present on the mobile device would be in violation of
the user’s privacy. Instead, during the analysis phase of our study, we checked for statistical
abnormalities, such as increased energy consumption or excessively long activity blocks.
When an abnormality was found, the data was flagged for review, manually inspected, and
discarded if suspected to be fraudulent.
Non-linear time
Time synchronization, a task often taken for granted, is the most challenging problem to
overcome in autonomous logging. A device’s clock can be updated through three means.
Plugging a device into a personal computer and synchronizing with a ‘device manager’ can
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change the clock. Users can manually change the time or time zone at any time. A device
may also synchronize its clock with the timestamp broadcasted by the cellular network.
Changes to the device clock manifest as the appearance of non-linear time. Unfortunately,
there is no way to programmatically detect changes to the device clock. We mitigate errors
introduced by time changes by detecting when the device is connected to a computer and
analyze these events separately from non-connected events. In a large-scale study, users
can also traverse many different time zones. UTC time should be used to provide the
absolute time of an event. Experiments must also record the device’s time zone and when
a time zone change takes place.
Malicious users
Malicious users are a unfortunate side effect of large-scale studies. If left unchecked, ma-
licious activities can significantly bias the accuracy of an experiment. Over the course of
our study, approximately 3.8 years worth of data from the Standard Logger was discarded
due to a variety of malicious activities: file manipulation, programmatic manipulation, and
simulated user attacks. File manipulation attacks are the easiest to detect. These attacks
involve modifying the contents of files, renaming/copying files, or deleting files, and can
be countered by storing a hash of the contents of each file and through a sequential file
naming scheme. Programmatic attacks involve a third party application that manipulates
the device to counter the experimental application. In this case, some users installed an
application that randomly enabled/disabled the device’s backlight 24 hours a day, 7 days
a week, and simulate keystrokes to reset the device’s idle time. This attack was detected
by visual inspection of the user’s weekly usage pattern.
Simulated user attacks are the hardest to detect. These attacks involve downloading
experimental software onto a simulated device(s) and then replaying an existing usage log
or running a programmatic manipulation attack. This attack was detected by recording
the IP address of each set of uploaded data. Multiple uploads from a single IP address
are flagged for review. These types of attacks are highly dependent on the experiment
parameters. The best approach to detect malicious users and mitigate negative results












































(b) Distribution of participating BlackBerry devices.
Figure 7.2: Aggregate dataset statistics.
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Software credibility
Gaining the trust of participants is the most difficult challenge of all. Although most
users have little technical background, they are acutely aware of the consequences of faulty
software on their personal phone1. Experimental software designed for users’ personal
devices must be production-grade software, carefully planned, and bug free. Errors or
failures that do exist must be perfectly hidden from the user and have a bounded impact
on the user’s use of the device. For example, in an early version of the usage logger, when
the device associated with a Wi-Fi network, it would flush the current I/O buffer, close
the current logging file handle, and attempt to upload the data. If the connection failed, it
would retry every minute while the device was within Wi-Fi connectivity. Unfortunately,
if the device was associated with a Wi-Fi network but did not have access to the Internet,
the logger would produce thousands of small files on the device.
The application, once installed, should startup automatically and require no user in-
tervention. Moreover, the user should not be aware that of the application’s presence.
However, the application must provide a simple user interface that exposes critical infor-
mation to the user, such as the amount of data that has been collected and uploaded. If
possible, the application should provide some incentive to continue participating in the
study. Figure 7.1 illustrates one example.
7.3.3 Aggregate summary
Over six months of data collection, we constructed a dataset that consists of 1150 years
of cumulative interaction and energy consumption behaviour from over 20,100 smartphone
users. Approximately 15 years of suspicious data from 213 users (a significant quantity of
data in its own right) was discarded due to the reasons previously discussed. The CDF of
users’ participation duration illustrated in Figure 7.2(a). Our participants span 23 time
zones and all BlackBerry device-types released since early 2006 [6]. These devices span a
wide range of hardware characteristics and similar devices can be found from other man-
ufactures. The proportion of logs collected for each BlackBerry device-type is illustrated
in Figure 7.2(b). Our dataset is approximately two orders of magnitude larger than any
previous work.
1This statement is based purely on anecdotal evidence, but I believe it is an easy argument to make.
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7.4 Successful execution prediction
Using energy consumption traces stored within our dataset, this section examines how
knowledge of user charging characteristics can improve the design and implementation of
energy intensive applications. We begin with an overview of the Energy Emulation Toolkit
(EET) followed by an evaluation using a simple sample application.
7.4.1 Energy Emulation Toolkit
The EET is designed to predict the successful execution rate of energy intensive applica-
tions given an energy consumption requirement and a specified duration of execution. An
application is considered to have ‘successfully executed’ if it is able to run to completion
without draining a device’s battery.
The EET operates by iterating over all smartphone users in a target population of
either: all users, users with a specific device-type, or users within a specific user-type.
We will examine the characteristics of each user-type in the next section. For each user,
the EET assembles their energy traces as a linear timeline and begins stepping through
in five-minute intervals. Through each step of the timeline, the EET initiates a test to
determine if an application invoked at the current time, t, with the specified requirements
would succeed. A value of 1 or 0 is recorded for the 30-minute bucket corresponding to t’s
position in the week to represent a successful or failed execution. The successful execution
rate of an application can therefore be provided as a function of the starting time or as an
aggregate mean rate.
Implementation
We implement the EET as a stand-alone PERL module that can be imported into any
existing PERL program/script. The EET module is initialized with the root directory of
the dataset and invoked using a single function call that accepts the energy consumption
requirements, the duration of execution, and a value that indicates the target population.
Because the EET scans energy trace files linearly it accumulates little state during execu-






























































(b) Twelve-hour execution duration (569 mW over 12 hours).
Figure 7.3: Successful execution rate by user-type.
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Application Duration Rate
GSM phone call (900 mW) 1 hour 95.2%
Video playback (1.1 W) 2 hour 84.3%
Bluetooth Class 2 (idle) (2.5 mW) 24 hours 100%
Bluetooth scan (1 minute scan period) (75 mW) 24 hours 100%
Table 7.1: Sample successful execution rates.
7.4.2 Evaluation
The EET can be applied to both simple and complex applications. Table 7.1 provides
examples of simple applications and their mean successful execution rate.
We demonstrate the use of the EET through a simple application that mimics the
behaviour of our prototype CTN application under a very simple, predefined workload.
This application consists of a thread that scans for neighbouring Bluetooth devices every
one minute. On every second scan, the application connects to a server over Wi-Fi and
uploads 100 KB of memory-resident data. This process mimics a metadata exchange. Once
per hour the application reads a 100 MB file from flash memory and uploads the contents to
the server over Wi-Fi. It then downloads 100 MB of data from the server and subsequently
writes the data to persistent flash memory. This process emulates sending and receiving
content. We implement the simple application, run it on a testbed of BlackBerry devices,
and measure the energy consumed. Assuming that the energy consumed by the hourly
network and flash memory I/O is amortized over the full hour and found that the average
consumption rate is 569 mW. We illustrate the successful execution rate for the sample
application over a six-hour and twelve-hour duration for each user-type in Figure 7.3(a)
and Figure 7.3(b) respectively. We will not analyze these sample figures because the results
for each user-type will be obvious to the reader by the end of Section 7.5.3.
7.5 Energy prediction
The EET can provide developers useful insight into the expected behaviour of the appli-
cation when deployed on real devices. Using the EET, developers can alter their software
design or tune parameters to reduce energy consumption and the likelihood that the appli-
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cation will deplete the user’s battery. Unfortunately, the EET cannot benefit applications
whose energy consumption rate is not known a priori. We address this problem using the
EMO library in Section 7.5.5.
We begin our design of the EMO by first describing the high-level energy characteristics
of a device. We then describe our user classification method in Section 7.5.2. We outline
three identified user-types in Section 7.5.3, and present an analysis of our user classification
based energy level predictor in Section 7.5.4. We conclude this section with an analysis of
the EMO library.
7.5.1 Energy characteristics of a device
Charge and discharge durations: These are the durations that a device is plugged
into or unplugged from an external power source. This property has a direct impact on a
device’s battery life. Devices that charge for longer durations could have a higher expected
battery level than those that do not. Similarly, devices that discharge for long durations
could have a battery level that is lower than expected.
Charge initiation time/level: The charge initiation time is the time of day when
the user begins to charge their device. Regularity in charge initiation time could be used
to infer when energy is likely to be replenished. A relationship between charge initiation
and battery level could also be used to predict battery level.
Battery level: Patterns in battery level over the course of a day or week could be an
ideal parameter for predicting future battery life.
Charge and discharge rates: These rates are the percentage of total battery capacity
that is replenished or depleted while plugged or unplugged from a power source. We
observed a significant correlation between the discharge rate, device-type, and the time of
day. This result is not surprising considering the energy consumption disparity between a
device sitting idle at night and a device that is used frequently throughout the day.
Other characteristics: Although our dataset contains a rich body of smartphone



















Figure 7.4: CDF of participants’ mean charge and discharge duration.
7.5.2 Classification method
Our user classification method is an iterative process to determine the subset of high-
level energy characteristics that differentiate users based on their predictive ability. On
each iteration we cluster users using the selected high-level energy characteristics. We
then use the mean prediction error derived from the clustering to evaluate the selected
characteristics. Given that the choice of prediction algorithm is dependent on the choice of
input parameters, a circular dependency exists. We therefore begin our process by defining
a baseline prediction algorithm.
Baseline prediction algorithm
The design of our baseline prediction algorithm was shaped by the high-level goal of pro-
viding predictions over long durations that may extend over multiple charge and discharge
cycles. The prediction algorithm must therefore adapt to three dominant trends identified
during an aggregate analysis of our dataset. First, the charge and discharge durations
vary widely among users. The CDFs of both the mean charge and discharge duration are
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Algorithm 3 Predict(tcurr, bcurr, tlast, tpred, γ)
Require: tlast ≤ tcurr, tcurr < tpredict
bpred ← bcurr
while tcurr < tpredict do
if γ = CHARGING then
tduration ← δcharge[bucket(tlast)] {Retrieve expected charge cycle duration.}
else if γ = DISCHARGING then
tduration ← δdischarge[bucket(tlast)] {Retrieve expected discharge cycle duration.}
end if
if tlast < tcurr then
{Algorithm invoked mid-cycle}
tduration ← tduration − (tcurr − tlast)
end if
{Iterate through each bucket over the charge or discharge duration.}
for bucket β ∈ tduration do
if γ = CHARGING then
bpred ← min(100, bpred + ρcharge[β] ∗ |β|) {Increment the predicted battery level.}
else if γ = DISCHARGING then
bpred ← max(0, bpred− ρdischarge[β] ∗ |β|) {Decrement the predicted battery level.}
end if
end for
tcurr ← tcurr + tduration {Advance time by duration of cycle.}
tlast ← tcurr {The end of a cycle is the beginning of another.}
γ ←6 γ {Alternate the charging state between CHARGING and DISCHARGING.}
end while
return bpred
illustrated in Figure 7.4. These durations vary throughout the week. Second, the mean
discharge rate varies significantly over the course of day: a device sitting idle at night
consumes energy at a lower rate than a device that is active throughout the day. More-
over, there is a large disparity between the mean charge rate (46.8%/hour) and the mean
discharge rate (4.2%/hour).
Our prediction algorithm is specified formally in Algorithm 3. We sub-divide each
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Algorithm 4 bucket(tcurr)
bucket size = 1800 {30 minutes}
day = get day of week(tcurr) {Where 0 ≥ day < 7}
hour = get hour of day(tcurr) {Where 0 ≥ hour < 24}
second = get second of hour(tcurr) {Where 0 ≥ minute < 3600}
return day ∗ 86400/bucket size+ hour ∗ 3600/bucket size+ bsecond/bucket sizec
week into 336 discrete 30-minute buckets and initialize the algorithm with four vector
parameters: δcharge, δdischarge, ρcharge and ρdischarge. The δ vector contain the mean charge
and discharge durations for cycles initiated during a specific bucket. If δ is undefined in
a given bucket, then the algorithm uses the mean value of the target population. The
ρ vector contains the mean charge and discharge rate for each bucket. Again, if a value
within ρ is undefined then the mean charge and discharge rate over the target population
is used. Each invocation of the algorithm requires the following parameters: the current
charge or discharge state (γ), the time that the current charge or discharge cycle (tlast)
began, the current time (tcurr), the current battery level (bcurr), and the desired prediction
time (tpred). Using the time that the current charge or discharge cycle began, the algorithm
examines δ to determine the expected durations of the cycle and the time that the next
cycle will begin. While stepping through each cycle, our algorithm increments (charge) or
decrements (discharge) the predicted battery level (bpred) at the rate specified in ρ for the
duration specified in δ.
Clustering strategy
With a baseline prediction algorithm we now evaluate the prediction accuracy derived
from different user features. This iterative process involves selecting a subset of energy
characteristics to cluster users and applying the prediction algorithm to each user-type
cluster. Each user point is placed in an n dimensional space using the mean value of each
of the n characteristics selected. At the end of each iteration we evaluate the gain/loss in
prediction accuracy and select a new subset of characteristics.
Clustering was performed using the k-means algorithm with the mean Euclidean dis-
tance between variables as our distance metric. In each iteration we loop through the











































Figure 7.5: Prediction error by cluster size. Clusters of size 3 and above yield statistically
equivalent prediction error.
tpred = {1, 2, 6, 12, 18, 24} hours using three-way cross validation. We calculate prediction
error by iterating through each user’s energy trace file in five-minute steps and apply the
algorithm using the device’s current state. The prediction error for each prediction is taken
as the absolute difference between the predicted battery level and the true battery level
in the underlying dataset. The mean prediction error over all trials and users is averaged
over each cross validation stage to produce the mean prediction error for a given subset of
characteristics and cluster count (k).
At the end of this iterative process we found that clustering users by their mean week-
day and weekend charge and discharge durations yielded the highest prediction accuracy.
Prediction accuracy was the greatest for three clusters as illustrated in Figure 7.5. We call




















































































Figure 7.8: CDF of smartphone discharge duration by user-type.
7.5.3 User classification
Before a formal evaluation of the predictor, we briefly describe each user-type and their
differentiating characteristics.
Opportunistic chargers: Opportunistic chargers are the most common type of smart-
phone users and represent approximately 63% of the population. These users are primarily
characterised by frequent, short charge durations during the hours of 8am to 5pm. The
CDF of charge duration for opportunistic chargers is illustrated in Figure 7.6. Of the three
user-types, these users are the most aggressive energy consumers, consuming nearly 4.8%
of their device’s energy per hour. The discharge rates for each user-type throughout the
week are illustrated in Figure 7.7.
Light consumers: Light consumers have the lowest energy discharge rate among all
three user-types. These users represent approximately 20% of the population. These users
charge for longer durations than opportunistic chargers, but discharge their devices over
a longer duration. The CDF of discharge duration is illustrated in Figure 7.8. Despite















































(b) CDF of smartphone battery level when initiating a charge.


































Figure 7.10: PDF of smartphone charge initiation time.
battery level of 56.0% as illustrated in Figure 7.9(a). These users also allow their battery
to drop to its lowest level before initiating a charge. On average, a light consumer initiates
a charge when their battery level has dropped to 34%. The CDF of battery level when a
charge is initiated is illustrated in Figure 7.9(b).
Nighttime chargers: Our final class of user is those that charge at night. These users
represent 17% of the population. The charging behaviour of the user is best illustrated in
Figure 7.10 as the PDF of the time that users initiate a charge. The daily spike between the
hours of 10pm to 11pm illustrate that these users initiate a charge (probably) before going
to bed. Given that these users charge predominantly during the night, their mean charge
duration is significantly higher than the other two groups, as illustrated in Figure 7.6.
Although nighttime chargers consume only 0.5% more of their battery per hour than light
consumers, their long charging durations serve to maintain a mean battery level of 72.5%.




































































































(b) Discharge duration for each user-type and device-type.
Figure 7.11: Durations by user and device-type.
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Device independence
We briefly address the impact of device hardware on our two clustering parameters: charge
and discharge duration. Using a t-test, we found that there was no significant difference
between device-types at a 99% CI. These results are illustrated in Figure 7.11(a). With the
exception of the 8700, nearly every 99% CI contains the each cluster’s population mean.
We observe similar results in the discharge case, as illustrated in Figure 7.11(b). Although
there is more variation among the CIs for each device, we observe that nearly every CI
contains the cluster’s population mean. The user’s charge and discharge characteristics are
clearly independent of the device-type used.
7.5.4 Predictor analysis
We evaluate the accuracy of user classification-based prediction (Clustered Predictor) by
comparing it to predictions based on the entire participant population (Aggregate Predic-
tor), device-type (Device Predictor), and predictions made on an individual basis (Individ-
ual Predictor). Using the baseline prediction algorithm, we alternate between predictors
by initializing the algorithm with the δ and ρ statistics of the training population. The ini-
tialization process for each predictor is described below. Although there are many possible
predictors, we believe that this set demonstrates the benefit from a user classification-based
prediction scheme.
We evaluate the Aggregate, Device, and Clustered Predictors through three-way cross
validation of our dataset. We train each predictor on two thirds of the population, the
training set, and apply the predictor to the remaining third of the dataset, the target
set. For the Individual Predictor, we train the predictor on each participant’s trace then
evaluate it against the same trace. Applying the predictor on a participant’s traces requires
that we iterate through all energy trace files in five-minute steps. At each step through the
trace log, we apply each predictor, store the future predicted battery level, and compare
the current true value with a previous prediction. We store the absolute error for each
prediction for the current bucket. This process is repeated for two remaining portions of
the dataset. After applying the predictor to each third of the dataset, we compute the
mean absolute error for each bucket in the week.














































































(b) One day absolute mean absolute prediction error.









































Figure 7.13: Mean absolute prediction error.
Device Predictor, we first partition the dataset into the training and target sets. Each
set is subsequently partitioned by device-type. The predictor is then executed using the
training set and target set corresponding to each device-type. Similarly, we evaluate the
Clustered Predictor by clustering users within the training set and target set into three
clusters per set using the same characteristics used to derive our three user-types. For
each of the three user-types, we train the predictor on the cluster in the training set and
apply it to the corresponding cluster in the target set. As before, the absolute error for
each battery level prediction algorithm is stored in a bucket, and the mean absolute error
is computed over the course of the week.
Figure 7.12(a) and Figure 7.12(b) illustrate the mean absolute prediction error for one
and 24 hour predictions for each of the four prediction algorithms. We illustrate the mean
prediction error up to 24 hours in advance from all five predictors in Figure 7.13. These
figures illustrate several important findings. Over short durations, predictions made on
an individual basis, on an aggregate basis, and by device are significantly more accurate
than those based on the clustered user-type. The relationship between the Individual and
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Figure 7.14: Example of error accumulation using four hypothetical traces.
two predictors yield equivalent results. For predications 12 hours and longer, predictions
based on aggregate statistics and device-type perform the worst. This is not surprising
given that we have shown that users differ, a property that is ignored by the Aggregate
Predictor. As previously illustrated in Figure 7.11, there is also more variability in the
cluster parameters between user-types than between users of the same device-type. It is
therefore not surprising that the Device Predictor also performs poorly.
Over long durations, the Clustered Predictor outperforms the Individual Predictor due
to reduced error accumulation. In the Individual Predictor case, each element of the δ
vector is calculated over few samples and has a correspondingly high standard deviation.
In the Clustered Predictor case, each element of the δ vector is calculated as the mean
of the corresponding element of δ for each constituent user (a mean of a mean), which is
a closer approximation of the population mean, with a reduced standard deviation and
lower propensity to accumulate error. We illustrate this explanation using four hypothet-
ical traces in Figure 7.14. In this example, the Individual and Clustered Predictors are
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initialized with δ values derived from either the individual user’s trace or from a cluster
of users. Each hypothetical trace contain the actual charge and discharge durations for
the hypothetical user. Given the time of a prediction, tcurr, the time of the last charge
or discharge event, tlast, and the prediction duration, tpred, the example illustrates how
expected charge and discharge durations may overshoot or undershoot the true charge and
discharge cycles. The degree that a predicted charge and discharge cycle differs from the
true charge and discharge cycle is illustrated as the accumulated error.
The peaks in mean error in the evenings of both Figure 7.12(a) and Figure 7.12(b) are
attributed to the order of magnitude in disparity between the charge and discharge rates.
Recall from Figure 7.10 that all three user-types tend to charge their device at night.
Also recall that our baseline prediction algorithm operates by estimating the duration of
a charge or discharge cycle. An incorrect estimation of either duration results in a rapid
gap between the predicted and true battery level.
Drawing from these observations, we introduce a fifth predictor, the Hybrid Predictor,
that combines the short-term accuracy of the Individual Predictor with the long-term
accuracy of the Clustered Predictor. The Hybrid Predictor is initialized with both an
individual user’s energy characteristics, the characteristics of all three user-types, and
the centroid coordinate of each user-type’s cluster. Recall that users are clustered based
on their mean charge and discharge durations for both the weekday and weekend. The
centroid is therefore the 4-dimensional value that lies at the center of each user-type cluster.
For predictions of less than 12 hours, the Hybrid Predictor yields the same results as
the Individual Predictor. For predictions greater than or equal to 12 hours, the Hybrid
Predictor examines the individual user’s δ values and selects the user’s type based on the
closest cluster centroid. The predictor then exploits the statistics underlying the user-type
to provide predictions as if they were from the Clustered Predictor. In practice, both
the energy characteristics of the three user-types and their centroid coordinates would be
hard coded into the predictor; allowing the code to be embedded into an energy-intensive
application to actively predict the device’s future energy level.
7.5.5 Energy Management Oracle
Using the Hybrid Predictor, and the ability to predict the future battery level, we now
present the design and analysis of the EMO library. The EMO is designed to provide
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energy-aware hints to applications at runtime. Using the library, applications query the
EMO prior to initiating an energy intensive operation. Upon receiving a query, the EMO
samples the current battery level and decrements the value by the amount of energy that
would be consumed by the operation if it were to be executed. The EMO then initiates a
24 hour battery level prediction using the reduced battery level value as the starting point
for prediction. The EMO query returns ‘true’ if the application can safely execute the
operation and thus reduce the battery level to a safe level. The EMO otherwise returns
‘false’ to indicate that the operation will reduce the battery level to a state that will result
in the full depletion of the battery.
Implementation
Our implementation of the EMO modifies the Hybrid Predictor slightly by halting the pre-
diction if the predicted battery level drops to zero. Like the EET, the EMO is implemented
as a stand-alone PERL module that can be imported into any PERL program/script.
PERL is supported on a wide range of mobile devices. For devices such as the Black-
Berry and iPhone that do not support PERL, the algorithms underlying the EMO could
be implemented in Java or Objective C easily.
Evaluation
We evaluate the EMO through simulation of the sample application previously described.
Recall that the application has two energy intensive operations: uploading 100 MB and
downloading 100 MB to a file. We refer to these jointly as the optional operation, which
consumes approximately 1727 Joules of energy when executed. If the optional operation
is performed, the application will consume energy at a standard rate of approximately 322
J/hour by scanning neighbouring devices and uploading memory resident data.
Our simulation engine consists of a modified version of the EET that decrements the
battery level at the standard rate over a specified execution duration. Like the EET, the
simulator steps through each energy trace file in five-minute steps. In each step, it initiates
a simulated execution of the application. During each simulated hour, the application
queries the EMO to decide if it should perform the optional operation. The simulator





























































(b) Twelve-hour execution duration using the EMO.
Figure 7.15: Evaluation of the EMO.
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the EET, the simulator records a success or failure for each bucket, which allows us to
compute the successful execution rate as a function of the starting time of the application.
We compare the results of the simulation with two additional scenarios that demonstrate
the upper and lower bounds on the execution success rate. The first, optimal scenario uses
an oracle with perfect future knowledge; this oracle scans ahead in the trace file and returns
‘true’ if and only if the application will succeed. If it returns ‘false’ the optional operation
is not carried out. The lower bound is determined by running the EET as normal, where
the simulated application executes without the benefit of battery prediction and the EMO.
Figure 7.15(a) and Figure 7.15(b) illustrates the aggregate successful execution rate of
the sample application over a six and twelve hour period respectively. Over six hours,
the EMO is able to increase the successful execution rate from 76.7% to 87.6%; a 46.5%
reduction in failures. Over long durations, the gain is more substantial. Without the
EMO, the application exhibits a successful execution rate of only 43.8%. Applying the
EMO increases this rate to 84.6%, which amounts to a 93.1% improvement. The EMO
does not improve the execution rate to 100% because of prediction errors. We therefore
believe that the EMO can add significant value to energy intensive applications.
7.6 Chapter summary
This chapter has detailed the design and deployment of a large-scale smartphone user
study that examines how users interact with and consume energy on their personal mobile
devices. Our dataset contains over 1150 years of cumulative data for 20,100 users from
around the globe. Smartphone users, like all complex objects, can be classified by many
variables. Our work differentiates users on the basis of their daily battery charge and
discharge characteristics, and has identified three user-types: opportunistic chargers, light
consumers, and nighttime chargers. This classification scheme provides 72% accuracy on
predictions between 12 to 24 hours in advance. Using our predictor we built the Energy
Management Oracle library, which can be queried by applications prior to the execution
of an energy intensive operation. Using the oracle, we demonstrate that applications
can achieve a near optimal successful execution rate. Using our dataset, we expect that
other researchers will discover more efficient energy prediction techniques and that user
differentiation will continue to yield similar improvements in prediction accuracy.
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As the scale and complexity of mobile applications continue to increase, we believe
that energy consumption will become a new dimension in mobile software evaluation.
Applications that consume large amounts of energy over long durations will be practical
for only a subset of the user population with compatible energy characteristics. We predict
that in the future, software will be distributed with a specified energy demand in the same
way that resources such as CPU speed, memory/disk capacity, and network bandwidth
requirements are specified in today’s software. The Energy Emulation Toolkit is designed
to support this trend by providing developers with tools to evaluate their applications
across all users, device hardware, and user-types.
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Chapter 8




Censorship is currently a fact of life for many people in the world. The recent efforts to quell
political uprisings throughout the Middle East are evidence for the need for censorship-
resistant communication systems [154]. CTNs running on personal mobile devices are
intended to counteract this growing trend.
Building on lessons learned from previous DTN systems, this thesis has defined an
architecture for CTNs. In a CTN, censorship resistance is achieved through nodes form-
ing pairwise trust relationships with other mutually trusted nodes. Trust relationships are
bootstrapped by direct social interaction between pairs of nodes. In a CTN, the underlying
trust topology serves to constrain both the degree of information shared with other nodes
and information that must be maintained about other nodes. The formation of trust rela-
tionships and the ensuing exchange of identities further facilitate private communication
between mutually trusted nodes. The trust topology is further utilized to provide a scope
for which to disseminate metadata about content in the system. By maintaining metadata
corresponding to reachable content, our approach tightly couples content in the system
with nodes’ demand for it. This approach allows nodes to explicitly and unambiguously
express their demand for content in the network.
We define the Laissez-faire framework, an incentivized, free-rider tolerant approach to
routing content within a DTN. Unlike existing approaches to DTN routing, content is
pulled from its source to destination to satisfy inter-node debt obligations and to satisfy
content requests. Unlike existing DTN routing protocols, Laissez-faire does not mandate
any specific mechanism for valuing and selecting fragments. Nodes implementing Laissez-
faire are free to exchange content in anyway they choose; however, nodes that do not
exchange content with others will accumulate debt and eventually be starved from the
system by resource-sensitive nodes. We believe that our simple approach to maintaining
the debt relationship between nodes makes our framework robust to free-riding nodes that
can manipulate any routing protocol for their own benefit. We evaluate several example
strategies for ranking nodes and several strategies for selecting fragments from a neigh-
bouring node. Further, we believe DTN research that is designed for resource-sensitive
smartphone users can benefit by our selfish approach to node interaction.
Through a prototype BlackBerry implementation of our CTN system, we demonstrate
the feasibility of CTNs in both controlled experiments and a three-week field trial of 36
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devices at the University of Waterloo. Although our field trial assumes that all nodes are
mutually trusted and is naturally biased by the mobility and diurnal patterns of graduate
students, our field trial was successful in exchanging large quantities of content when all
nodes both create content and express demand for each other’s content. Our field trial
further highlights the value of the occasional use of a low-bandwidth, SMS-based control
channel.
We conduct the first work that measures the channel characteristics of SMS from the
perspective of mobile applications using the service. Among many interesting results, we
were surprised to find that the cellular network does not block SMS bursts, message delay
varies significantly over the day, and that messages transmitted back-to-back are almost
always delivered in batches at a steady rate. Although our findings are based on one
network and a limited number of devices, preliminary experimentation on GSM networks
in both the United States and Europe suggest that other networks and devices will exhibit
similar properties. We believe that our work could serve as a basis for future study of the
channel characteristics of SMS - especially considering that SMS use continues to grow [78].
Building on our understanding of channel characteristics of SMS, we design an SMS-
based transport protocol for use as a dedicated CTN control channel. Through a Java
implementation, we showed that the transport protocol outperforms existing techniques
by reducing message overhead by as much as 50% and by increasing data throughput by as
much as 545% over the approach used by existing mobile applications to exchange data over
SMS. This work is useful when alternatives to SMS are either expensive, poorly deployed,
or do not exist.
CTNs are a class of application that must run continuously to maximize connection op-
portunities, and autonomously since the user should not be required to manage the CTN.
CTNs also consume a larger quantity of energy compared to most smartphone applica-
tions [52]. We conducted a large-scale smartphone user study that examines how users
interact with and consume energy on their personal mobile devices. As the scale and com-
plexity of mobile applications continue to increase, we believe that energy consumption
will become a new dimension in mobile software evaluation. We built the Energy Emu-
lation Toolkit to support this trend by providing developers with tools to evaluate their
applications across all users, BlackBerry device hardware, and user-types.
We demonstrated that smartphone users can be classified based upon their daily battery
charge and discharge characteristics, and have identified three user-types: opportunistic
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chargers, light consumers, and nighttime chargers. This classification scheme provides 72%
accuracy on predictions between 12 to 24 hours in advance. Using our predictor we built
the Energy Management Oracle library, which can be queried by applications prior to the
execution of an energy intensive operation.
8.1.1 Summary of achieved design goals and constraints
The following sections describe how each of the four censorship resistance criteria and the
six design constraints outlined in Chapter 1 have been satisfied. We further discuss how
the limitations of our prototype implementation affect each property.
Robustness
Recall from Reference [155] that robustness, in the context of CTNs, requires that no third
party is able to prevent two CTN nodes from communicating with each other. Through
opportunistic, short-range wireless communication, CTN nodes may exchange content di-
rectly and trivially achieve robustness. Attackers of our system are assumed to have the
capability of blocking communication in isolated areas. Robustness may, therefore, be
temporarily suspended while CTN nodes occupy regions blocked by an attacker. However,
an attacker is not capable of blocking communication everywhere, and thus cannot prevent
two nodes from communicating indefinitely.
Our prototype implementation clearly does not satisfy this requirement. An attack
that disables the BLS, for example, could easily deny communication to all nodes. We
discuss how our prototype will evolve to be fully independent of infrastructure, and thus
satisfy the robustness criteria, later in this section.
Communication over the SMS control channel can easily be blocked, further violating
robustness of our system. However, as discussed in Chapter 6, the user of SMS as a
control channel is optional. In the absence of SMS, control messages can be delivered
opportunistically along with content fragments. We view our work as providing a tradeoff




All nodes in a CTN operate by communicating and sharing content only with nodes whom
they trust. Consequently, as new nodes enter a CTN and the communication graph un-
derlying the network (the trust topology) grows, node interaction remains bounded to a
limited set. The storage space requirement for nodes participating in a CTN is bounded
by the number of nodes they trust times the quantity of data (the debt threshold) that a
node is willing to allocate to others.
As the system scales and the underlying trust graph grows, the quantity of metadata
stored within the Content Space grows exponentially. However, our prototype implemen-
tation näıvely pruned the Content Space based on a least-recently encountered policy once
the Content Space reached a specified size; however, given the importance of the Content
Space in our design, further study of pruning the Content Space is required. We discuss
this area of future work in Section 8.2.1.
Privacy
Communication privacy requires that no third party is able to determine the contents
of a messages exchanged between two CTN nodes. Each node in a CTN maintains a
private/public key pair. The public key is shared with trusted nodes as part of a node’s
identity. During an opportunistic connection between two nodes, each set of keys are used
to exchange a session key. The session key is used to symmetrically encrypt communication
between a pair of nodes. Using off-the-shelf, commodity encryption libraries, our prototype
implementation easily achieves communication privacy.
We explore other aspects of privacy in the next two sections.
Strong unlinkability
Strong unlinkability requires that no third party is able to determine that two CTN nodes
are communicating. Unfortunately, given the assumption in our threat model that an
attacker may monitor specific regions and subsequently identify communication patterns,
this constraint cannot be guaranteed 100% of the time. It is possible for an attacker, in
for example, a public square, to identity devices that are communicating with each other.
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Although the content exchanged between nodes is obfuscated through encryption, pre-
venting an attacker from identifying the nature of the communication, repeated communi-
cation between nodes may be evidence of illicit activity. One approach to solving this prob-
lem is steganography - embedding the encrypted content within other transmissions [14, 82].
For example, two devices that want to exchange content may simply stream non-censored
content to another node. When transmitting the non-censored content, the transmitting
node may introduce noise into the transmitted signal that encodes the censored content
fragment [20]. Although this technique does not provide unlinkability, it provides plausible
deniability in the event that two nodes are identified as communicating with each other.
The use of SMS in a CTN violates the unlinkability constraint due to its dependency
on cellular network infrastructure. As discussed above, the use of SMS as a control channel
is optional. Nodes that do not wish to use SMS simply omit their phone number when
exchanging an identity with another node. Control messages would then be delivered
directly exclusively through opportunistic connections.
Identity privacy
Content within a CTN is represented by metadata, which contains the GUID(s) of all
owners of a content item. Recall that a GUID is a self assigned random number that
uniquely identifies a node, and is shared as part of a node’s identity. Content metadata is
only shared with mutually trusted nodes; however, metadata may propagate beyond the
set of nodes trusted by the content owner. Thus allowing untrusted nodes to discover the
content owned by the GUID.
Our approach to establishing trust within a CTN relies on existing social relationships.
Nodes only trust each other in a CTN if their users share trust in the real world. We
therefore assume that a node will never betray the trust of another node by disclosing its
identity to any other node in the system. Given this assumption, it is not possible for an
untrusted node to associate a GUID of a content item with the identity of its owner.
Infrastructure-independence
Our CTN architecture and Laissez-faire framework do not rely on infrastructure to operate.
However, our prototype BlackBerry implementation is infrastructure dependent due to the
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lack of support for Wi-Fi ad hoc mode on BlackBerry devices as of April 2012 [6]. To
overcome this hardware limitations, our prototype must operate in Wi-Fi infrastructure
mode. After having discovered a neighbouring node through an infrastructure-independent
Bluetooth scan, nodes connect to each other over Wi-Fi. To connect to a neighbouring node
over Wi-Fi requires its IP address. Until recently, BlackBerry devices were unable to receive
broadcast UDP packets, leaving no mechanism to discover the dynamic IP addresses of
older, neighbouring devices. The BLS was introduced to overcome this additional hardware
limitation. The BLS is an online service that maps a Bluetooth MAC addresses to the LAN
and WAN IP addresses of neighbouring devices. The use of the BLS further violates our
infrastructure-independence goal; however, we expect that future versions of the system
will utilize Wi-Fi Direct, which is available as of version 4.0 of the Android platform [131].
Openness
Our CTN architecture achieves openness by virtue of being open source software that may
be downloaded and modified by anyone in the world. In Chapter 2, we demonstrated
that prior DTN work is ill-equipped to operate under this requirement. Existing work,
if made open source and widely available, could easily be modified to create free-riding
nodes and game the system. As an increasing number of nodes become free-riders, it is
easy to conceive scenarios where little content is propagated through a network of resource-
sensitive nodes. Although our CTN architecture is not immune to free-riding, the tit-for-tat
accounting mechanisms that underlines the Laissez-faire framework can be used to restrict
the amount of content provided to free-riding nodes.
No specified forwarding protocol
A CTN is able to be distributed as open source software because it does not mandate
that nodes implement any specific routing protocol. Nodes in a CTN are only required to
implement the tit-for-tat protocol underlying the Laissez-faire framework. Under Laissez-
faire, all nodes are free to operate selfishly to satisfy their own demands for content. A
node cannot cannot mandate that another node behave it a specific way. It may only adapt
its behaviour to incentivize behaviour on other nodes. For example, to incentivize another
node to retrieve content, a node can proactively retrieve content on their behalf. Credit is
218
then accumulated when the content is delivered. Although the receiving node is still not
required to retrieve any content, they will eventually need to retrieve content to satisfy
their debt relationship with the other node. We believe that this selfish approach to node
interaction will be an attribute that similar systems will adopt to achieve openness.
Deployability
As open source software, our prototype CTN system may be downloaded, compiled, and
installed by anyone in the world. In practice, we believe that content gateways, introduced
in Section 1.2.2, will be instrumental in the initial deployment of CTNs. Users may install
the CTN software without the need to register with an central server. Moreover, identities
in the system are self-generated by each node and may be verified by other nodes using
standard PKI techniques.
Participation fluidity
As previously discussed, the CTN software is open source software and available to all and
anyone may bootstrap their own CTN (of size 1), and incrementally add trusted nodes to
expand the size of the network. As nodes have no formal responsibility to other nodes in
the system, nodes may leave the network at any time by either deleting the CTN software
or by ceasing to trust other nodes. Nodes that leave the system leave behind any debt
or credit accumulated with other nodes. We assume that since nodes only communicate
with other nodes whose users share a real-world trust relationship, this process would not
be taken advantage of in practice. Nodes that repeatedly create new identities are clearly
gaming the system.
Nodes also leave the system with the identities of nodes that are trusted. Although the
identities are the primary asset of interest to attackers, we do not consider this a threat to
achieving participation fluidity because of the real-world trust relationships that underpin
the exchange of identities. We believe that individuals that trust each other in the real
world would not betray each other after leaving a CTN.
Attacking nodes that successfully infiltrate a CTN, and subsequently leave the network,




The accumulation of credit and debt that form the debt relationship between nodes is
fundamental to the operation of CTNs. However, this property can lead to a design
limitation. For example, in the field trial performed in Chapter 5, all nodes demanded
content on an hourly basis. The result was a highly symmetric relationship in quantity of
data demanded by each node. This observation is illustrated by the graphs in Appendix B
that indicate the quantity of content demanded by each node over the course of field trial.
Throughout the field trial the debt threshold never needed to be enforced. However, since
all nodes were resource-sensitive, had demand been asymmetric, we would expect many
nodes to have reached their debt threshold and denied other nodes’ requests for content
fragments. Although this would have been an intentional side-effect of nodes’ resistance
to free-riding, it is a natural state that can adversely affect the performance of the system.
It is possible for a network consisting purely of resource-sensitive nodes to perform poorly
if demand is asymmetric.
We address two approaches to mitigating the affect of this limitation in Section 8.2.3
and Section 8.2.4.
8.1.3 Security analysis
In Chapter 1 we outlined our threat model and the capabilities of a attacker. The most
capable attacker of our system is the state. Determining the identity of individuals that
violate state-mandated censorship is assumed to be the main asset of interest to attackers.
In this section we review each capability and assess how our system protects, or fails
to protect, the identity of CTN users.
Internet-monitoring
Clearly, a prototype implementation that uses the BLS and SMS cannot resist attacks by
an attacker with the capability to monitor the Internet. However, as previously discussed,
the use of SMS as a control channel in optional and disabled by default. The BLS is only
used to overcome hardware limitations of our testbed.
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The CTN architecture and Laissez-faire framework defined in this thesis are designed
to operate without using Internet infrastructure. By not using Internet infrastructure, our
system is robust to Internet-monitoring based attacks.
Locate end-hosts
As a corollary to not depending on Internet infrastructure, and thus being robust to
Internet-based attacks, our system is robust to an attacker’s ability to locate Internet
end-hosts.
Regulate access to public Internet access points
Our prototype CTN application is currently dependent on WLAN infrastructure due to the
lack of support for Wi-Fi ad hoc mode on BlackBerry devices. However, future implemen-
tations will utilize Wi-Fi direct and will therefore not utilize access points. By constraining
communication between nodes to direct, wireless, ad hoc communication, CTNs will be
resistant to government regulation of WLAN access points.
Isolated monitoring
Our system encrypts all communication between nodes, and thus prevents an attacker from
identifying the nature of the communication. However, utilizing wireless, ad hoc commu-
nication may be sufficient evidence that a node is participating in the exchange of censored
content. Since attackers are assumed to have the ability to monitor and identify communi-
cation patterns in an isolated region, nodes in our system are vulnerable to detection and
subsequent identification.
As discussed above, steganography is a technique that could be used to obfuscate
communication between a pair of nodes. By embedding the exchange of censored content
within, for example, a stream of non-censored music, two nodes could safely exchange
content over a wireless, opportunistic connection with a plausible explanation.
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Infiltrate social networks
In a real-world deployment, it is inevitable that agents of the government would install
the CTN software and seek to determine the content being exchanged within the network.
We assume that attackers have the ability to gain the trust of some nodes, and thus
obtain information about the content in the network. The CTN architecture takes steps
to mitigate the degree of this attack.
In this scenario, the node that inadvertently establishes trust with the attacking node
is totally vulnerable. Their identity would be disclosed to the attacker as part of the
establishment of a trust relationship. The metadata of content owned or carried by the
node would also be disclosed to the attacker, which may immediately incriminate the user.
While the compromised node will continue to share metadata corresponding to the rest of
the content in the network, the identities of other nodes in the network are not contained
within the metadata. The owner of a content item, or fragments of a content item, are
represented by their GUID only, which is self-assigned, randomly generated number. An
attacker may therefore discover the GUIDs of content owners, the number of participants
in the network (assuming that each node limits itself to one GUID), but it may not discover
the identity of the nodes. There is, unfortunately, one exception, which we describe next.
Physical harm
Unfortunately, our system is not robust to attacks that inflict personal harm on individ-
uals. We assume that when faced with physical harm and/or death, users will divulge all
information ‘requested’ by an attacker. This information includes: the password to decrypt
the file system of the device [2, 6] and the real-world identities of nodes that it trusts and
has communicated with in the past.
Although devices could be equipped with a ‘panic button’, configured to wipe the
device’s memory in the case of emergency [122], we consider this measure insufficient to
resist attacks involving physical harm. Even if a device is wiped, a determined, ruthless
attacker can extract information directly from the user.
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8.2 Future work
As a new approach to fighting censorship, there are many areas of future work. We consider
the following problems to have the greatest immediate benefit.
8.2.1 Pruning the Content Space
As trust between two CTN nodes is established, the degree of each node in the underlying
trust graph increases by one. Over time, as more trust relationships form, the graph will
grow and the quantity of metadata that may be propagated through the network will grow
exponentially. From the perspective of providing nodes with information about content
within the network, more metadata is always preferred to less. However, a large amount of
metadata will result in high communication overhead when exchanging metadata updates
with neighbouring devices, and at some point overwhelm the link capacity of two nodes.
We therefore require a mechanism to constrain the size of the Content Space to a practical
size.
Our prototype implementation currently discards content metadata according to a least-
recently encountered policy. However, this approach is näıve because it does not consider
the contact frequency of nodes, the amount of content previously exchanged between nodes,
or the amount of content that nodes demand of each other. Favouring metadata for content
of frequently encountered nodes would reduce the delay in retrieving any content that is
subsequently demanded. Content that is reachable via nodes with a high debt relationship
may be less accessible than content held by nodes with a lower debt relationship. Similarly,
if a node A demands a large amount of content from node B, then node A is incentivized
to provide content to node B. Given this relationship, it may be beneficial to node B to
preserve metadata for content that is reachable via node A.
The quality of the content could also be considered when discarding metadata. Al-
though quality is a qualitative metric, it could be inferred by simply ranking nodes by the
quantity of their content that has previously been retrieved. Metadata corresponding to
content that is created by quality producers is probably more valuable than content of poor
quality producers. The user’s viewing habits, or whether retrieved content was deleted or
saved, could also be used to further refine the quality metric.
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Although there are many factors that affect how content within a CTN is delivered,
we believe that the quality of metadata can impact service. It is therefore important for
future CTN implementations to consider these factors when discarding metadata.
8.2.2 Proactive state propagation
As previously discussed, the use of SMS violates our CTN design requirements and should
not be used in jurisdictions where the penalties for participating in a CTN could be se-
vere [110]. However, CTNs may be used in less strict jurisdictions, such as Europe or
North America, where participating in a CTN is not sufficient evidence of illegal activity.
CTNs may also be used for non-nefarious reasons despite the availability of legal, more
convenient, Internet-based alternatives. Under these conditions, we believe that an SMS-
based control channel is ideally suited to increase the efficiency of the network. Specifically,
we believe that SMS could be used to propagate changes to both the Content Space and
demand vectors.
As new content is created or retrieved by a node, Content Space updates would allow
other nodes to discover content earlier. This would be particularly useful in disseminating
highly popular, viral content to propagate as fast as possible. Conversely, if a node deletes a
content item, then an update would allow nodes to take the following action. If the deletion
of the content item caused the content to only be partially present in the network, then
all other nodes could save storage capacity by deleting their partial copies of the content
item. Similarly, nodes would be prevented from wasting a communication opportunity by
retrieving a fragment that would never result in a completed content item. We believe that
this simple feature would be a valuable addition to a CTN, and it’s impact worth exploring
in future work. However, the greatest impact on a CTN is likely to stem from propagating
demand vector updates.
Redundant content transfers take place whenever two nodes retrieve the same content
fragment on a behalf of a single node. Depending on the trust topology and as a discon-
nected network, redundant data transfers could be common. We believe these redundancies
could be reduced, if not eliminated, by proactively propagating demand vector updates.
Demand vector updates may contain the CIDs of a newly demanded content item(s), an
item that has been fully retrieved, or an item for which demand has been withdrawn. A
demand vector update may also contain the CID and index of a fragment(s) that have
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been retrieved from other nodes. These updates would allow other nodes to update their
view of the node’s state and adapt their behaviour accordingly. By proactively propagating
demand vector updates, we believe that redundant transfers could be minimized. However,
given that this technique is designed to reduce the number of content fragment replicas in
the system, its impact on both delay and the delivery ratio is an open area of study.
8.2.3 Debt forgiveness
As previously discussed, it is possible for asymmetries to form in a CTN that can result in
some nodes accumulating large amounts of credit, while others accumulate large amounts
of debt. Nodes have no obligation to act on debt relationships, and, in practice, we expect
that a large portion of nodes, the content activists, will ignore the debt relationship in
favour of propagating content. However, for resource-sensitive nodes that choose to strictly
enforce the credit and debt relationship, we believe that it may be in their bests interests
to forgive debt over time. That is, we believe that selfish strategies may be sub-optimal,
even for resource-sensitive nodes that would otherwise implement a pure tit-for-tat selfish
strategy. The accumulation of debt can create livelock in the system. Forgiving debt over
time would prevent selfish nodes from creating livelock, cause more data to be exchanged,
which may result in selfish node receiving more content than they would under a purely
selfish strategy. The rate that selfish nodes should forgive debt vs. the benefit of forgiving
debt is an open question that we believe is worth exploring in future evaluations of this
work.
Debt forgiveness techniques, however, are not immune to attack. In the BitTorrent
system, for example, nodes may be retrieve content with minimal reciprocity by first con-
suming the resources allocated to them by peers. The nodes subsequently exploit peers’
forgiveness of debt to continue to retrieve content with minimal reciprocity [109, 141]. In
our current CTN design, nodes could exploit debt forgiveness in a similar manner without
providing any reciprocal content.
8.2.4 Currency swapping
The pairwise debt relationship between nodes under the Laissez-faire framework creates a
byte-based currency between CTN nodes. Under this currency, an accumulated byte of
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credit can be redeemed for a byte of content. However, this currency is constrained to each
pair of nodes for which a debt relationship exists. In addition to forgiving debt obligations,
we believe that exchanging this currency with other nodes could be used to mitigate the
effect of asymmetries in the network. For example, in an asymmetric deployment, highly
altruistic nodes that accumulate a large amount of credit may transfer their credit to
other highly indebted nodes in the network. However, given that trust relationships are
pairwise and both the topology of the CTN and identities of other nodes may be unknown,
the mechanism for swapping currencies between potentially non-trusted nodes is likely a
difficult problem to solve.
8.3 Conclusion
Although there are several limitations and avenues for future work, we have shown that our
CTN system satisfies our design goals through an infrastructure-independent, delay tol-
erant architecture that partitions the population, and constrains communication, to pairs
of mutually trusted nodes. Our architecture provides communication privacy through a
pairwise encrypted channel, and identity privacy is achieved by decoupling content from
the identities of nodes that possess it. Our CTN architecture is incrementally deployable.
Participants may enter or leave at any time, with negligible impact on the CTN. Therefore
there are no barriers to CTNs forming all over a region, continuously coalescing and frag-
menting into new CTNs as participants join and leave the network. Finally, our system
fully satisfies our goal of openness. By releasing the work as open source (upon publication
of this thesis), anyone in the world may download, modify, and deploy their own CTN. As
an open system, wide-spread adoption will inevitably bring free-riders eager to capitalize
on the altruism of others. We believe that the simplicity of the Laissez-faire framework
protects the needs of resource-sensitive nodes and effectively limits the negative impact
that free-riders can have on the system.
Feature limitations of today’s devices unfortunately force us to make several imple-
mentation compromises that violate the criteria of censorship resistance. However, we are
optimistic that time will correct these shortcomings to make our system fully infrastructure-
independent.
We are under no illusion that this work will defeat censorship; however, we strongly
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believe that the approach outlined in this thesis is the most practical approach to solving







Using the MobiTether Prototype
CTN System
This appendix was written for participants of the field trial described in Chapter 5. It
provided participants with the information needed to interact with the application. This
document is included in this thesis both to illustrate the prototype implementation, and
to provide context into the field trial.
The prototype implementation originally organized nodes into trust groups, whose un-
derlying trust topology was a clique. Each clique had an administrator that was implicitly
trusted by every member of the clique. Trust amongst clique members was transitive about
the clique administrator. This change in architecture did not affect the field trial because
we controlled for the trust topology. All participants were configured to be mutually
trusted.
A.1 Application tutorial
The prototype CTN BlackBerry system is named MobiTether. It is a continuously running
background process. The user interface component of the application may be launched by
clicking on the MobiTether icon on the BlackBerry home screen.
Once launched there are six components of the main screen: a large field that is initially
empty representing the media requested by the user, the neighbourhood button, the media
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Figure A.1: Main screen of the MobiTether prototype CTN system.
space button, the cliques button, the control message button, and the settings button. The
following sub-sections describe each component.
A.1.1 Neighbourhood
The neighbourhood page indicates the set of neighbouring Bluetooth devices. Devices are
indicated by their friendly device name (when available) and their Bluetooth MAC address.
By default, the neighbourhood page displays the MAC addresses of all nearby devices.
This screen is illustrated in Figure A.2(a). Known, trusted devices may be filtered by
selecting Show trusted devices only from the menu. Trusted devices are accompanied
by a white device icon on the left.
CTNs operate by forming mutually trusted groups of users, known as cliques. Cliques
have a single trusted administrator that regulates clique membership. To invite a neigh-
bouring device to a clique, click on the desired neighbour. Clicking on a neighbouring
device will initiate a connection attempt. If the connection is successful (i.e. the other
device is running the CTN software), then the inviter device will be prompted to select
a clique to invite the neighbouring device into. The clique invitation screen is illustrated
in Figure A.2(b). This figure illustrates an invitation to Tetherless 52 into MobiTether
clique 70.
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(a) Select neighbouring Bluetooth enabled device. (b) Select clique for invitation.
Figure A.2: MobiTether screens for inviting new members to existing cliques.
If the invitee is not the clique administrator, then the administrator’s permission must
be obtained before adding the invitee to the clique (i.e. disclosing the identities of other
clique members). This functionality has been disabled in the field trial. Only the clique
administrator may add new members.
A.1.2 Media Space
In a CTN, nodes express their demand for content explicitly using a globally unique ID
for each known content item. The Media Space1 displays all content known to the device
(both local and remote). Figure A.3(a) illustrates how media is displayed.
Users may express demand for a remote content item (items present on other devices)
by selecting the item, which opens a screen that provides additional metadata about the
content item. Clicking on the button Request media will add the content item to the set
of content demanded by the device. Users may similarly revoke their demand for the item
by clicking Revoke request for media as illustrated in Figure A.3(b).
After requesting a content item, the current state of the request is shown on the main
screen of the application (Figure A.3(c)). If many items have been requested, the user may
sort the list via options in the menu. The requested content item will be visible on the
1The Content Space was called the Media Space in the prototype implementation.
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(a) Media available on the device (locally). (b) Revoke request for media.
(c) Main screen displays retrieval status of de-
manded media.
Figure A.3: MobiTether screens for displaying media information.
main screen until it has been fully retrieve, at which point it will be available in the Local
media list within the Media Space screen.
User interaction is not required in this study. Instead, each device has been instru-
mented to generate a “dummy” media item every hour during the hours of 8am to 10pm.
Dummy content items are generated with an artificial popularity index in the range of [0,
9]. Every hour the application will automatically demand a media item according to a
power-law distribution. The automatic creation and demand of content is postponed by
one hour each time the user creates and/or demands content.
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(a) Display a list of constituent cliques. (b) View clique membership.
(c) Send secure text messages to other clique mem-
bers.
(d) Coordinate with clique members to reduce de-
lays.
Figure A.4: MobiTether screens for displaying clique state.
A.1.3 Cliques
The Cliques screen illustrates all of the cliques that the local user is a member of (Fig-
ure A.4(a)). Through the menu, the user may create new cliques. The ability to leave a
clique has been disabled in this experiment.
Clicking on a listed clique displays its membership details. The membership of a sample
clique is illustrated in Figure A.4(b). Clicking on individual members of the clique provides
further information. All members of the clique are considered to be trusted contacts within
the CTN.
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Figure A.5: MobiTether screen for displaying a list of pending control messages.
Selecting a contact reveals an option in the menu to Send text message. Text mes-
sages exchanged between users are control messages. In practice, these messages are in-
tended to allow direct communication and possibly reduce the delay in retrieving desired
content. Figures A.4(c) and A.4(d) illustrate this.
A.1.4 Control Messages
This system uses an SMS-based control channel to reduce the time required to propagate
clique membership state to member contacts. Messages exchanged over the control channel
are temporarily visible in the Outbox, illustrated in Figure A.5. Messages received from
other devices are listed in Pending messages. In the current implementation, there are
only two forms of actionable messages: text messages received from other users, and clique
membership requests.
A.1.5 Settings
The Settings screen allows users to modify both their profile in the system and operating
settings. The settings process is illustrated in Figure A.6(a) and Figure A.6(b).
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(a) Alter application settings. (b) Alter the alias displayed to other clique mem-
bers.




Outstanding and Satisfied Demand
Traces for Field Trial Nodes
This appendix contains the traces of satisfied and unsatisfied demand for each node in
the field trial described in Chapter 5. Many nodes in the field trial are highly connected
and their demand for content is steadily satisfied throughout the field trial. Many other
nodes are poorly connected and retrieve very little demanded content. The purpose of this



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































(c) Node 15: No content demand was satisfied











































































































































(b) Node 18: Approximately 200 MB of demand










































(c) Node 19: No demand was satisfied between


















































(d) Node 20: Node had poor connectivity before
February 2. Approximately 300 MB of demand
was subsequently satisfied causing the total de-
mand satisfied to exceed the total unsatisfied de-
mand.
Figure B.4: Satisfied and unsatisfied demand for nodes 17 - 20.
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(c) Node 23. Node had poor connectivity between
February 9 and February 14, which caused the


























































































(a) Node 25. No demand was satisfied between
February 2 and February 7.










































































































































(a) Node 29. User manually withdrew demand for









































































































































(d) Node 32: No demand was satisfied before
February 2.
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